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ABSTRACT
This thesis first discusses the views of dependence theorists, 
focusing on Frank, Amin, Cardoso and dos Santos. Frank asserts 
that relations of production in Latin America and the rest of the 
Third W orld are capitalist, and that capitalism does not generate 
development in those countries, since it has not done so during the 
long time it has structurally  dom inated them. Therefore reforms 
within this dependence structure will bring neither autonom y nor 
development. Only a socialist revolution may effect any real change.
U n d erstan d in g  the problem s of underdevelopm en t and 
dependence in terms of the logic of the worldwide accumulation 
process, Amin concedes that capitalism  can be a source of 
developm ent in the 'centre' and in the 'periphery', but in reality 
only a limited and skewed form of development occurs in the latter. 
This is because of the Third W orld's lim ited control over the 
accum ulation process. Only a significant disengagem ent from 
current global arrangem ents of production and distribution can 
bring perm anent benefits. Industrial production of essential goods, 
as opposed to the export of primary goods, will help greatly but will 
not be enough. C ardoso argues that although the structure of 
dependence is primarily economic, it can be changed qualitatively by 
social forces and political actions. In addition the structure  is 
continually modified according to time and place, and therefore 
there is no reason to think that it can never change. Though 
skeptical of current Third World industrialization, he believes that 
real changes are possible through industrialization, dos Santos sees 
the inflexibility of social and political, rather than economic forces at 
both the local and global level as the major obstacles to change, and
thus his solution, like that of Frank, focuses on a socio-political 
revolution.
Critics of dependence are also discussed, showing in particular 
that empiricist critiques of dependence fail to conceptualize the 
problem, and that others, such as Warren, paint an erroneously rosy 
picture of capitalist development in the Third World. A particularly 
interesting critique of dependence through the "merchant capital" 
thesis of Kay is also rejected, mainly for blaming the problems of 
Third W orld developm ent on a form of capital which ceased to 
operate globally a long time ago, and for ascribing to capitalism only 
a faultless progressive mission. Some of the critics of dependence, 
however, rem ind us all in the process that the vital ingredients 
required for development are capital and industrialization. This is 
acknowledged, and it is combined with the awareness within the 
dependence framework, of global structural constraints which also 
m anifest them selves locally, to m ap out w hat anti-dependence 
programmes may look like.
Programs of an anti-dependence strategy may differ from each 
other, and must be expected to be modified by the circumstances of 
each country. But they m ust focus on industrialization, and on a 
capital goods sector as the vital ingred ien t in a process of 
developm ent which underm ines dependence. The general measure 
of achievement for a country pursuing an anti-dependence strategy 
is whether that country has set in train a process that is reducing 
dependence and is more likely than not to eliminate it altogether.
The pre-independence situation in Tanzania fits the theoretical 
thesis of the global incorporation and subordination of a Third 
W orld country, as well as dem onstrating  a case of original 
underdevelopm ent, which the incorporation did not change and
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even maintained. In 1961-1966 the Tanzanian leadership and others 
in society had begun to accumulate some knowledge of the 
incorporation and subordination. They then took some nationalist 
economic measures, later perceived as important but inadequate in 
confronting the unsatisfactory relationship with external economic 
interests. In 1967 the Tanzanian leadership, which had also been 
questioning the internal make-up of social relations and the way 
they were likely to develop in the future, was finally able to translate 
its ad hoc pre-1967 nationalist economic measures into a coherent 
statement of intent for changing its relations with external interests, 
and for confronting the internal social relations. The statement was 
the Arusha Declaration of February, 1967.
Both the statement and the subsidiary or complementary policies 
subsequent to it reflected not much more than a reaction to years of 
economic neglect, a frustration with the slow pace of development, 
and the limitation of decolonization. By being reactive, the policies 
(the strategy, collectively) could not produce a document covering 
all important areas of dependence. In time, its ideological 
accompaniment, Socialism, became the more prominent and 
acquired a life of its own, thereby affecting the ability to produce a 
better formulation of some important aspects of the strategy.
In later years the strategy was defined in more specific terms in 
relation to industry, identifying the type of industrialization best 
suited to the struggle against dependence and underdevelopment, 
and even following it up with a significant level of implementation. 
Other aspects of the strategy were not adhered to due to constraints 
of an economic nature, some predictable from the point of view of 
theorists of dependence, and some not so predictable. Some 
constraints merely modified the strategy in its practical application
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in Tanzania; others proved to be total barriers to aspects of the 
strategy. Programmes of an anti-dependence nature are difficult to 
implement, and, at the end of the period under study, there was 
reason to doubt that the Tanzanian version would continue.
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INTRODUCTION
OBJECTIVE
Recent trends in development literature have generally placed 
less emphasis on the importance of industrialization in the future 
developm ent of Third W orld countries. This thesis tries to bring 
back its centrality into focus. At the same time the now widespread 
attem pts by various theorists of developm ent to transcend the 
limitations of the original expressions of dependence theorists have 
not done justice to the essential thrust of their thinking. Both 
conventional and radical critics of recent tim es have tended to 
misrepresent it. This thesis attempts to provide a corrective.
In their attem pts to argue that there is a strong connection 
betw een the spread of capitalism  w orldw ide and the present, 
unsatisfac to ry  developm ent conditions in the Third W orld, 
dependence theorists in general did not fully appraise the problem 
of developm ent, and some m ade excessive assertions about it, for 
example that development can not take place in the Third World as 
long as dependence exists. It is hoped that this thesis will become an 
add itional criticism  of that view. M any of the theorists of 
dependence have also tended to argue, in connection w ith their 
assertion about the relation between dependence and development, 
that no program m e intended to elim inate dependence is viable 
unless it is part of a socialist programme. Consequently few works 
exist that examine the viability of an anti-dependence strategy on its 
own.
In relation to the country study of Tanzania, the attem pt to 
transcend the limitations of dependence theorisation has led to a
trend which restates the argum ent that the spread of capitalism was 
not responsible in any way for the problems of development in that 
country. This thesis should be one of the responses to that recent 
trend of argument.
Similar to the gap at the level of theory, few works on Tanzania 
have examined the viability of the anti-dependence strategy on its 
own, or stressed the centrality of industrialization in that strategy 
and in development in general, which this thesis tries to do.
OUTLINE
In this work the aim has been to interrogate the assumptions 
of dependence theorisation as well as those strategies or policies 
w hich have been prescribed  or in stitu ted  in order to curb 
dependence. This task can be divided into three parts.
The first part is an evaluation at the level of general theory, 
which entails at first an examination of existing form ulations on 
dependence. This is done mostly by a review of literature. Out of 
this a specific conceptualization is in tu rn  used to form the 
param eters in which the Tanzanian anti-dependence strategy is 
discussed. In Chapter One we examine first the evolution of an anti­
dependence literature (which is often term ed dependence theory, 
and is referred to as the dependence framework or outlook in this 
thesis). We then examine the conceptualization of dependence by 
each major author in that outlook (Frank, Cardoso, dos Santos and 
Amin), noting the differences in perception and 'policy' prescription 
among them. At the end of the chapter the major strands of the 
dependence framework are draw n out. In Chapter Two we examine 
the objections to the dependence outlook, in term s of major 
classifications (such as empirical and conceptual refutations), and in 
terms of prom inent authors such as W arren and Kay. In Chapter
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Three we set ourselves two tasks. The first one seeks to move away 
from the focus on theorists, prevalent in the first two chapters, to 
empirical material in terms of growth experiences of a number of 
countries around the world. In this task we try to relate the 
theorization of the first two chapters to the 'evidence' in the third. 
In the second task of this chapter we try to draw out the usefulness 
of the dependence framework, that of the framework's critiques, and 
of the empirical evidence in some countries. The points we draw 
out here make it possible for us to identify the characteristics of an 
anti-dependence strategy, which guide our examination of 
Tanzania.
In the second part we find it necessary to show the 
background to Tanzania's anti-dependence strategy, in order to at 
least show whether the features of Tanzanian society are similar to 
those described by formulations on dependence. This is done in 
Chapter Four, which describes Tanganyika from colonial times to 
independence, with some pre-colonial background also shown. The 
whole of Chapter Four in turn forms a background to the nationalist 
anti-dependence reactions of the Tanzanian leadership in the post­
colonial period. These reactions and the major policies constituting 
an anti-dependence strategy are then identified, using the theoretical 
conceptualization outlined in Chapter Three as the main guide. 
Later in this part we try to look at the implementation of the 
Tanzanian anti-dependence strategy. It is judged on the basis of the 
general framework outlined in Chapter Three, and on whether 
subsequent or complementary policies and actual projects carried 
out are consistent with the declared Tanzanian strategy. The policies 
on industrialization form our case study in this respect. In addition, 
the performance of industry is evaluated in order to have a
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com m ent on th is type of the an ti-dependence stra tegy  of 
developm ent.
The last part consists of the concluding chapter in which we 
sum m arize the argum ents of each of the previous chapters, 
showing what they say for the anti-dependence strategy in general, 
and its Tanzanian version in particular. We also try to look at the 
overall impact of the Tanzanian anti-dependence strategy on the 
economy, and the possibility of its continuation, especially in terms 
of its industrialization programme.
RESEARCH
Library research was conducted at the A ustralian N ational 
University and, to a lesser extent, at the University of Dar es Salaam 
in Tanzania. A six m onth field work was done in Tanzania, and this 
involved various m ethods of obtaining information. Open-ended 
questionnaires were administered to selected individuals at several 
industrial establishm ents, including Urafiki Textile Mill, M wanza 
Textile Company (MWATEX), Mara Dairy Company, The Tanzania 
Fertilizer Com pany (TFC) and The Steel Rolling Mill. These 
questionnaires w ere also adm inistered at some of the bigger 
'h o ld in g ' com panies, such as the N ationa l D evelopm ent 
Corporation (NDC) and the National Textile Corporation (TEXICO). 
Personal interviews were conducted at all these establishments, as 
well as at various ministries. Information from official and other 
unpublished  docum ents was obtained largely from the NDC, 
TEXICO, the M inistry of Development Planning and Economic 
A ffairs (DevPlan) the M inistry of Industry  and Com m erce 
(MinCom) the Bank of Tanzania's Departm ent of Research, the 
Bureau of Statistics and the Marketing Development Bureau (MDB).
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USAGE
Discussion of Tanzania in this thesis refers to the mainland part 
of the United Republic of Tanzania. The name Tanganyika has been 
used when reference is to the period before 1964, or when it is part of 
the name of a corporate entity.
Unless stated, all values are in current prices. The main reference 
currencies used are the Tanzanian shilling (Sh.), the British Pound 
(£ ) and the American dollar ($). Values have been expressed in, or 
converted to, Tanzanian shillings wherever possible. A few have 
been expressed in the currency in which they were originally 
designated, due to the uncertainly of the information on the 
prevailing exchange rate then.
Academic reference is by normal Harvard type. For example, 
reference to page 27 of a work by John James in 1964 is written in the 
text as James (1964: 27). Footnotes are at the end of each chapter. 
Smaller tables are in the text while bigger tables are at the end of the 
thesis as appendices. Only the references actually cited in the text 
appear at the end of the thesis as bibliography.
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CHAPTER ONE: THE CONCEPT AND THE THEORISTS OF 
DEPENDENCE.
1.1 Introduction: The sources of dependence theories.
To understand the theories of dependence it is first necessary to 
understand two factors. One of these is the nature of the economic 
philosophy which was dominant and was largely unchallenged in 
the period between the classical era of economics and the first half 
of this century. This philosophy was the basis for the prevailing 
views on development, and soon after the Second World War it 
became the source of what was to be known as the conventional 
development framework.
The second factor to be understood is a particular set of concerns 
of Latin American policy makers and theoreticians of the 1940s and 
1950s, which were born out of the actual development experience of 
Latin America particularly since the 1930s. The concerns came to 
form the major part of what was to be known as the ECLA-Prebisch 
thesis. This thesis was named after Raul Prebisch, the Argentine 
official and academician who originated it, and the Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLA), the United Nations regional 
organisation which popularized the thesis. In its evolution, the 
ECLA-Prebisch thesis generated a profound critique of the 
traditional philosophy of development.
Theories of dependence are related to these two factors in that 
they became the successors to the ECLA-Prebisch tradition and 
continued the critique of the traditional philosophy of 
development.
1.1.1. The traditional philosophy of development.
The most enduring precept of the traditional philosophy of 
development was the principle of comparative advantage, which 
dates from Adam Smith. The principle proposes that as long as one 
selects and specializes in conducting production in those areas in 
which one is best endowed, and as long as one carries out trade with 
others, economic benefits and thus development automatically 
accrue. One of the assumptions on which the principle rests is that 
monopoly power in the market is absent and there is no hindrance 
to the spread of technological progress to all parts of the trading 
system (Love, 1980: 48). In its post-classical version these
assumptions in turn presuppose equilibrium extended to the 
international system, and it is interesting to note that Prebisch came 
to attack these assumptions at the international level in the same 
ways as Keynes did with respect to the national economy.
1.1.2. The evolution of the ECLA-Prebisch critique:The experience of 
Argentina.
One source of information for the ECLA-Prebisch thesis was the 
development experience of Argentina. Historians agree that 
Argentina experienced spectacular economic growth in the fifty 
years or so to the late 1920s (Street, 1981; Love, 1980). The main 
characteristic of the growth was that while Argentina's agriculture 
benefitted from the spread of mechanization and the introduction of 
better varieties in crop and animal husbandry in the period, it was 
almost wholly built on the export of primary products
Another important characteristic of the growth was that an 
unusually high percentage of Argentina's exports (up to 40% at the 
end of the period) went to a single trading partner, which was
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Britain at that time. In turn  Britain provided a m uch sm aller 
percentage, about 20%, of Argentina's im ports (Love, 1980: 49). 
Argentina's trade relationship with another major trading partner 
was similar. The major source of imports for Argentina was the 
United States, but the latter did not buy any significant amounts of 
goods from it. The (foreign exchange) payments gap created by the 
imbalance in trade was only reduced by a heavy reliance on US 
capital inflows.
The significance of these factors was highlighted for Argentina by 
the two w orld depressions of 1929 and 1937-38. In the 1929 
depression , A rgentina, like other prim ary produce exporters, 
experienced falling export prices, rising unsold stocks and external 
debt repaym ent difficulties. It also experienced capital divestment 
and outflow, mainly back to the United States, which tended to 
increase Argentina's debt burden.
A major initiative for a rem edy undertaken by both the 
Argentine government and Britain - in which Prebisch participated 
- provided for a guaranteed quota of Argentinian beef sales in the 
U.K. m arket in return for a favourable tariff treatm ent of British 
m anufactures and A rgentina's com m itm ent to regular debt 
repaym ents at a time when many other countries were defaulting 
(Love, 1980: 49). Following the 1937-38 depressions, Argentina 
reached an agreement with Britain in which payment for its sales to 
the latter would be only in sterling, to be used exclusively to pay for 
imports from Britain. In addition the sterling was to be non- 
convertible, and would be held in a non-interest bearing blocked 
account (whereas interest on Argentina's debt to Britain was 
charged). The rationale for this 'unfair' agreem ent was that the 
world price for the export cereals in which Argentina had an interest
3
was falling drastically, and the European market was uncertain due 
to the escalating Second World War. Thus it was only out of British 
goodwill that some level of A rgentinian export sales could be 
guaranteed (Love, 1980: 67). Prebisch was a participant in the 
preparation of this agreement too.
Both the reverse flow of capital (back to the United States), and 
the two agreements that came in the wake of the two depressions, 
dem onstrated  the vulnerability  of A rgentina to unfavourable 
econom ic changes. This genera ted  the th ink ing  that the 
vulnerability was a result of the country's status as an exporter of 
primary products, and its heavy reliance on a single trading partner. 
It is w orth noting that Argentina's vulnerability in relation to 
Britain should have been somewhat reduced by the fact that the 
latter was a 'specialist' industrial nation whose economy depended 
on large volumes of agricultural imports, especially from Argentina, 
in a way in which the United States was not. The fact that England's 
bargaining position remained much stronger despite this generated 
the thought that the more im portant type of vulnerability was not 
the heavy reliance on a single trading partner, but that of being an 
exporter of primary products.
Other measures taken by Argentina between 1929 and 1943 - the 
period in which Prebisch was an im portant participant in the 
decisions - included the creation of a Central Bank and the 
introduction of exchange control to stem capital outflow; the 
introduction of a plan, in agreem ent w ith other major cereal 
exporters, to reduce production levels in order to get better world 
prices; and  g o v e rn m en ta l su p p o rt for in d u s tr ia liz a tio n  
program m es. Conceived first as a short term  response to the 
reduction in purchasing power, and then as a long term solution to
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the vulnerability that had become evident, industrialization became 
the critical elem ent of the attem pts to generate 'independent 
development' which came to be popularly referred to as inward- 
directed or inward-looking.
It was industrialization that became a common response of most 
of the major primary produce exporters, notably Brazil and Chile, 
but also Eastern Europe. Not surprisingly, parallels have sometimes 
been draw n between the ECLA-Prebisch thesis and the Rumanian 
advocacy of an 'industrial and closed development' in 1929 (Love, 
1980: 61). Although not yet fully elaborated, the strategy called for a 
faster pace of industrialization as well as some measures of a re­
orientation of the economy away from a heavy reliance on an 
external partner.
1.1.3. The ECLA-Prebisch thesis.
Prebisch's reflections on the plight of Argentina became 
notew orthy internationally in the 1930s and continued to draw  
attention in the 1940s. The propositions which became the basis for 
the ECLA-Prebisch thesis were particu larly  evident in the 
argum ents he advanced in 1934 and 1948. Prebisch attacked the 
assum ptions of equilibrium  and automatic (price) adjustm ent in 
the economic system, the received wisdom until then, arguing that 
it did not take account of the possibility of a prolonged depression 
(Love, 1980: 50). He also noted that in practice the principle of 
com parative advantage was regularly violated by industrialized 
nations.
In relation to the emergence of the United States as a major 
source of industrial goods to South America but still with a low 
propensity to import, he noted that this produced a tendency for the
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fruits of technical progress to remain in the United States, as well as 
creating a 'centre' and a 'periphery' in the economic system (the 
first usage of the centre-periphery terminology). According to him 
the centre could successfully institute policies that eliminated the 
effects of a prolonged depression while the periphery - Latin 
America - could not. He concluded that all this was likely to lead to 
a retardation in the growth of the periphery.
Prebisch brought together, and elaborated on, his ideas on trade 
and development in a work prepared for the ECLA in 1949. That 
work (Prebisch, 1950) became the basis of the official view of ECLA 
on those issues. The main argument in it was that the terms of 
trade for agricultural produce exporters had deteriorated between 
the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 2nd World 
War. A major explanation for this offered by ECLA-Prebisch was 
that in that period productivity gains were greater in industrial than 
in primary products. This was further elaborated in the following 
way. During the upswing of the trade cycle, the price of primary 
goods rose more sharply than those of industrial goods, but they fell 
more steeply during the downswing. In the upswing the working 
class of the centre absorbed real economic gains, but wages did not 
fall proportionately during the downswing. Because workers were 
not well organized in the periphery (least of all in agriculture), the 
periphery absorbed more of the system's income contraction than 
did the centre (Love, 1980: 58). That the centre had a rigid wage bill 
was a proposition that directly challenged the accepted trade theory, 
according to which there should have been (automatic) 
adjustments. ECLA-Prebisch also pointed out that there was 
monopolistic pricing at the centre, but that the periphery did not 
have monopolies on the goods they offered in the world market,
6
except in rare and tem porary situations. The w ork reiterated 
Prebisch's view that the United States, the main centre, exported 
more than it imported both generally and in regard to its South 
American trade. This led to an exhaustion of Latin American 
reserves and created  a tendency  tow ards a perm anen t 
disequilibrium, which had not been the case when Britain was the 
main centre (Love, 1980: 58).
Prebisch's work formed the first half of what was to be referred to 
as the Prebisch-Singer thesis. The other half was provided 
independen tly  by H ans Singer. Singer (1950) advanced two 
explanations for the apparently  different effects of technical 
progress. Firstly, he argued that the income elasticity of demand for 
prim ary products differed from that of industrial goods (the 
proportion of income spent on the purchase of prim ary products 
fell as incomes rose). He then noted that consumers of industrial 
products, who did not press for higher incomes, tended to live in 
underdeveloped  countries w hereas the opposite was true for 
consumers of raw materials.
It can been seen that Singer generalized the income inelasticity of 
dem and for prim ary products to cover the whole industrialized 
world. W ithout abandoning the explanation that pointed out the 
rigidity of the centre's wage bill, ECLA adopted Singer's terms, 
seeing tha t 'differences in dem and ' was a m ore plausible 
complimentary explanation on the world scale than 'the centre's 
low im port propensity', a peculiarity of the United States in that 
period.
In addition to rejecting the existing trade theory and its 
assessment of the benefits of technical progress, other tenets of the 
ECLA -Prebisch thesis inc luded  a com m itm ent to rap id
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industrialization, and an acceptance of state intervention in the 
accumulation process as well as in pricing (including the 
international catellisation of major commodities).
1.1.4.The ECLA-Prebisch thesis and the conventional development 
framework
After the Second World War there was a greater interest in the 
development of the Third World. Both this and the Prebisch impact 
produced a rethinking of the traditional philosophy of 
development. As this mainstream development thinking accepted 
that the Third World had special needs, it also became possible for 
some within it to see the intervention of the state in the Third 
World as acceptable, and to look at rapid industrialization and 
planning as necessary. Goals to be achieved by these commitments 
and the envisaged actions were now defined, the major ones being 
to put labour to a more productive use, to raise incomes (which 
subsequently evolved into a concern with raising the GDP and 
growth rates, the income distribution implicitly being left to the 
'trickle-down' market mechanism), and to spread technical progress 
(Arndt, 1983; Sen, 1983).
The tools to be used to achieve these goals were the diffusion of 
capital, which invariably had to be foreign (Higgins, 1968: 567-571; 
Meier, 1970: 297-299), and other modernizing factors, including the 
appropriate political institutions and processes (Almond and Verba, 
1965; Almond and Powell, 1965; Apter, 1965).
Proof of the effectiveness of the diffusion of capital in achieving 
modernization was often alluded to by pointing out that where the 
diffusion had taken place the economy was modern, vibrant and 
growing, while it was traditional and virtually stagnant in the
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sector where it had not occurred. This was the basis of the 
description of Third World national economies as dual societies. 
The characterization soon implied that the perceived traditionalism 
of the other sector in society was the explanation for 
underdevelopment.
It should be pointed out that although the advocates of the 
diffusion of capital and modernization carried with them 
ideological preferences and often relied on empirical observations of 
Western and capitalist experiences (Lipset, 1963, Deutsch, 1969), 
many did not doubt the ability of the Third World to modernize and 
were characteristically optimistic about the prospects of 
development there (Almond, 1970). Those who doubted this did so 
on the grounds that Third World nations were less achieving, either 
due to ethnic traits (McClelland, 1961; Hagen, 1962; Pye, 1962), or to 
cultural characteristics (Riggs, 1964; Bauer, 1972: 75-80; 1981: 118, 194- 
195). But these were the exceptions who were sometimes considered 
not part of the modernizing development framework. An 
underlying assumption for the optimism was the perception of 
underdevelopment as merely a lower stage of development 
through which every society passes, the classic formulation for 
which Rostow became famous.
The ground that this development framework shared with ECLA 
was the centrality of (foreign) capital in bringing about 
transformation and development. The ECLA-Prebisch thesis did 
not explore other possible consequences of this, for example in 
terms of social costs and new types of vulnerability, just as the 
modernizing development framework did not. The notable 
difference between the two approaches was that whereas the ECLA- 
Prebisch thesis had put into train a substantial questioning of the
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existing arrangements of the international economic system, 
pointing to them as the cause of the low rate of growth, reduced 
incomes, and eventually low levels of development in the Third 
World, the modernizing development framework generally 
eschewed this questioning, and implicitly denied that the 
arrangements were the cause of underdevelopment.
The direct successors of the ECLA-Prebisch trend developed their 
propositions mainly as an attack on what was by now the 
conventional development framework. But in addition, these 
new-generation writers of an emerging outlook generally felt that 
their ECLA-Prebisch predecessors had not fully exposed the short­
coming of the existing world economic arrangements, and the 
philosophical assumptions accompanying them. Also, as we shall 
see, some of them introduced into the emerging outlook a critical 
assessment of socio-political arrangements in Latin America, 
highlighting for example the integration and alliance of some social 
groupings in the 'periphery' with 'imperialist' centres of control, 
and generally advocated a more radical solution to the problem.
Below we examine a selected group of post-ECLA theorists, who 
have come to be known as dependence writers. These are not all 
Latin American, of course, since, although Latin America provided 
the initial setting, there have been similar experiences elsewhere, 
and writers from other parts of the world have increased their 
interest in the subject. In our presentation we seek to focus on the 
ideas of each writer individually. We consider this to be better than 
the presentation of 'tenets' of dependence theory for the following 
reasons. Firstly, although there are many similarities in the 
conceptualization of certain issues between the writers, as we shall 
see, their ideas are not the same. Moreover, there are philosophical
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and methodological differences between them which can influence 
their account of dependence, bearing in mind that for most of them 
dependence is only a part of a wider theorization on such topics as 
accumulation, capitalism, imperialism, development and change. 
A general presentation tends to give approximations of stands, 
often losing sight of important points of difference or disagreement, 
although it has its use when a less detailed summary is called for. 
The theorists considered here are those best known to English- 
language readers. These are also generally regarded as the leading 
dependence theorists.
1.2 Dependence theorists 
1.2.1 Andre Gunder Frank
The theorist who has popularized dependence thinking and 
attracted most criticism is Frank. His views are built on several 
basic assumptions. The first one is that development does not take 
place by going through the same stages in every country, that the 
underdeveloped nations at present are not at a universal lower 
stage through which all countries must pass, and that although 
developed capitalist countries may have been undeveloped at some 
point, they were certainly not underdeveloped (Frank: 1969: 4). This 
at once takes issue with advocates of historically given stages of 
growth, among them Rostow. It has been suggested that it also 
takes issue with the historical materialist idea of a definite sequence 
in human development (Halperin-Donghi, 1982: 125; Booth, 1979: 
64-66).
Frank's second basic assumption is that underdevelopment is not 
merely a consequence of the economic, political, social and cultural 
structures of the underdeveloped countries, but it is mainly a result
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of relations betw een developed and underdeveloped countries. 
These relations have been essential to the developm ent and 
organ isation  of capitalism  as a w orld-w ide system . The 
development of capitalism creates on the one hand the metropoles, 
and on the other the satellites, w ith the former dom inating the 
latter, but both m aintaining the structure. In the course of the 
relationship, metropoles develop while satellites underdevelop.
"... the m etropolis destroyed a n d /o r  totally transform ed the 
earlier viable social and economic systems of these societies, 
incorporated them  into the m etropolitan dom inated w orld 
wide capitalist system, and converted them into sources for its 
own m etropolitan capital accum ulation and developm ent. 
The resulting fate for these conquered, transformed, or newly 
acquired established societies was and rem ains their de- 
capitalization, structurally generated unproductiveness, ever- 
increasing m isery for the m asses - in a w ord , their 
underdevelopment." (Frank, 1969: 225)
It has sometimes been suggested that dependence theorists, and 
Frank in particular, did not pay attention to the internal structures 
of underdeveloped countries (Brenner, 1977: 33, 83). However, 
Frank's conceptualization of the m etropole-satellite relationship 
does not seem to bear this out. He argues that not only is the 
relationship continuing today, but more im portantly  it is not 
lim ited to the im perial or international level. It penetrates and 
structures the economic, political and social life of underdeveloped 
countries, thus establishing lesser metropoles and more satellites in 
them  (Frank, 1967: 10). Each of the satellites serves as an 
instrum ent to suck capital or economic surplus out of its own 
satellites and to channel part of this surplus to the world metropolis
12
of which all are satellites (Frank, 1969: 6-7). Neither does Frank 
assume that the process is purely one of sucking out 'economic 
surplus', or one that is totally dictated by 'external' forces, as implied 
by dos Santos (1973: 76) and others. A substantial part of Frank's 
writing is in fact devoted to the 'internal' social structures which he 
sees as giving life to the process of underdevelopment (Frank, 1972), 
though this seems to have come out as an afterthought, following 
criticism of the earlier publication.
Frank's third basic assumption is a rejection of the thesis which 
interpreted underdeveloped societies or economies as being 'dual' 
(Frank, 1967: 4). He understands the ’dual’ society thesis to revolve 
around the argument that each of two parts of the economy has a 
structure and dynamic of its own quite independent of the other. 
One part is intimately related to the ’outside’ capitalist world, is 
affected by it, and therefore becomes modern and relatively 
developed. The other part is feudal or pre- capitalist, subsistence- 
based and isolated, and therefore underdeveloped (Frank, 1969: 223- 
224). Frank argues that all this is false, and if the policy 
recom m endations which it engenders are practised the 
underdeveloped situation would only be perpetuated and 
intensified (Frank, 1969: 4-5). From these basic assumptions Frank 
derives several conclusions.
The first conclusion is that in contrast to the development of the 
world metropolis which is no one’s satellite, the development of 
national and other subordinate metropoles is limited by their 
satellite status. The examples Frank gives are the metropolitan 
regions of Brazil, including Sao Paulo, which built up a large 
industrial establishment in a relatively autonomous way, especially
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during the 1st World War, the Great Depression and the 2nd World 
War, only to be increasingly taken over by outside metropoles:
"... although Sao Paulo's industry was relatively autonomous it 
is being satellized and its future development restricted. This 
development appears destined to limited or underdeveloped 
development." (Frank, 1969: 8-9)
He gives many other Latin American examples similar to that of 
Sao Paulo and draws a further conclusion that satellites experience 
their greatest economic development and their most classically 
capitalist industrial development if and when their ties to their 
metropolis are weakest. (Frank, 1969: 9-10).l
Frank also observes that the regions which are the most 
underdeveloped and feudal-seeming today had the closest ties to 
the metropolis in the past, were the greatest exporters of primary 
products, and were also the biggest sources of capital for the world 
metropolis. But these were abandoned when business fell off (Frank, 
1969: 13). According to Frank, this observation refutes the thesis 
that the source of a region's underdevelopment is its isolation and 
its pre-capitalist institutions.
Another observation which Frank makes is that the latifundium, 
as a plantation or a hacienda, was typically born as a commercial 
enterprise which developed for itself mechanisms to respond to 
demand (Frank, 1969: 235-239). Thus the latifundia which appear 
isolated, subsistence-based, and semi-feudal today are those which 
suffered a decline in demand for their products. Their location is 
chiefly in the former agricultural and mining regions whose 
economic activities experienced a general decline (Frank, 1969: 14).
In Frank's view, 'all of these hypotheses and studies suggest that 
the global extension and unity of the capitalist system, its monopoly
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structure and uneven development throughout its history, and the 
resulting commercial rather than industrial capitalism  in the 
underdeveloped world (including its most industrially advanced 
countries) deserve much more attention in the study of economic 
developm ent and cultural change than they have h itherto  
received' (Frank, 1969: 15).
1.2.1.1, An elaboration and evaluation of Frank's views: 
a) Dualism
Frank's critique of the 'dual' society thesis (that it underestimates 
the degree of commercialization in the rural areas, as it does the 
complex nature of the relationship between the two major parts of 
the economy), and his alternative description of the situation (that 
Latin American societies were fully integrated into the m arket 
economy), have been accepted by many writers on the subject as 
convincing and correct (Laclau, 1971: 22; Kay, 1975: 2-9). This appears 
to be the case whether Frank’s critique is applied to the simple 
dualist thesis that there is no commercialization of any kind in the 
part of society referred to as traditional, or to that which employs 
the concept, as does Lewis (1958) and Furtado (1964), to refer to the 
non-prevalence of a com m odity econom y in the so-called 
traditional part.
Laclau (1971:24) for example suggests that a predominance of the 
m arket econom y in a society (in the general sense of 
com m oditization, rather than the ideological one of 'free' 
enterprise) is adequate indication that no dualism  between the 
m odern and the traditional exists in that society.
In the 1960's Frank's rejection of the 'dual' society thesis at the 
level of theory was already being supported by some of the concrete
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and sectoral studies of rural Latin America.2 All confirmed Frank's 
argum ent that the commodity economy prevails in seemingly 
subsistence-based and isolated rural areas. This erodes the basis for 
disassociating capitalism as a worldwide system from the problems 
of developm ent in the Third W orld, and for im plying as the 
dualists did, that all that needs to be done to effect development is 
to introduce capitalism, 
b) Capitalism
Frank’s views on dualism are im portant to his understanding of 
capitalism. It was part of his argum ent against the 'dual society' 
thesis to state that capitalism is not confined to certain enclaves in 
Latin America but exists everywhere. He extends his belief that 
capitalism is w idespread in Latin America by stating that it has 
existed on the South American continent since the 16th century. In 
the process of form ulating these statem ents he displays an 
understand ing  of capitalism  w hich has been controversial, 
including the suggestion that the prevalence of a com m odity 
economy in society is a decisive proof of the existence of capitalism, 
and that nations are exploited by other nations in the same way as 
people of the same nation are by others (Frank, 1969: 227; Laclau, 
1971: 24-25). Brenner (1977) has suggested that Frank shares the 
understanding  of capitalism  as the existence of a com m odity 
economy with Wallerstein (1974) and Sweezy (1976).
The im portant questions that Frank's understand ing  of 
capitalism  generates are, in the m ain, w hether com m odity 
production can be considered part and parcel of the process towards 
capitalist production, w hether m ercantile production (i.e. the 
involvement of trade-based merchants in production) lies outside 
the era of capitalist production, and, empirically, what type or form
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of production has existed in Latin America from the 16th century. 
In spite of arguments to the contrary (Brenner, 1977: 66-67; Laclau, 
1971: 27-31), we find Frank convincing - and he is supported by 
some theoretical studies (Marx, 1976a: 7-10; Kay, 1975: 56-66) - in 
arguing that commodity production for an overseas market is an 
element of the process towards capitalist production, and that 
mercantile production lies in the era of capitalist production. 
Though not completely generalised, both these factors existed in 
colonial Latin America.
There are other preconditions for the emergence of capitalism, of 
course, such as the freeing of labour from servitude and from land. 
As Laclau (1971) has pointed out, Latin American labour remained 
in feudal servitude, and was not fully landless (or dispossessed) 
during colonialism.
This, of course, does not by itself invalidate Frank's claim that 
capitalism bears responsibility for underdevelopment in that part of 
the world, unless one assumes that such a relationship exists only if 
pure capitalist relations of production are found to exist in Latin 
America to the exclusion of all other relations. Both Laclau (1971) 
and Brenner (1977) assume the latter to be the terms of the debate, 
following a formulation by Frank (1967, 1969) which gave this 
impression. It appears that the impression given by Frank is a 
consequence of not paying attention to the need to distinguish the 
capitalist mode of production from the capitalist system. In a mode 
of production the characteristics (of capitalism) are sharply defined, 
especially in terms of the nature of property ownership and social 
relations. Also, a mode of production by definition works to the 
exclusion of the characteristics of another mode. An economic 
system on the other hand is not usually as well spelt out as a mode
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of production. Its characteristics are not wholly attributable to one 
mode, and, although there is always one mode of production which 
is dominant enough to reduce other modes to being merely its own 
form s of production, it is possible to speak of several modes of 
production within the system. Frank talks a great deal about 
capitalism, but nowhere does he examine seriously the differences 
in characteristics between the mode and the system. This has led 
Laclau (1971: 33-37) to concede the possibility that in talking about 
the existence of capitalism in Latin America, Frank may have been 
referring to the system. It would appear, even to those who have 
given him a comparatively more positive appraisal such as Booth 
(1979: 68-69, 76-79), that Frank has a tendency to employ analogies, 
seldom specifies his concepts, and is inclined to write about 
'everything'. The consequences of these, it seems, are a blurring of 
focus and a breeding of avoidable controversies, 
c) Development
Frank's view of development is not only debatable but is 
illustrative of the above-mentioned problems in his writings. Let 
us look at his claim that satellites experience their fastest growth, 
especially industrial growth, when their links with metropoles are 
weakest, such as during the 17th century Spanish Depression, the 
19th century Napoleonic Wars, the 1930s Depression and the two 
World Wars. This undoubtedly was the case in Latin America and 
other Third World countries. But it does not justify generalization 
for all times and places - the impression that Frank gives. Similarly 
the statement that satellite growth was stopped when the 
metropoles recovered and re-established the links may well be 
supported by historical data for all the relevant cases, but there is no 
reason to expect this experience to occur everywhere at all times.
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Furthermore, for each concrete study, such as the development of 
Sao Paulo which Frank mentions, it must be shown that the 
satellite relationship was so dominant that it was the only factor 
which could have been responsible for the deterioration in its 
development. In other words the empirical examples that Frank 
provides are in the strict sense only indicators which illustrate the 
theses; they do not prove them. At the same time the theses 
should only be the beginning of concrete studies; they should not 
pre-empty them.
Frank has argued that regions which had the closest ties to 
metropoles in the past ’degenerated' into ultra underdevelopment 
when their wealth ran out (Frank, 1969: 13). This is generally true 
of past mining and plantation centres. It can not be disputed that 
when business was good the said regions became famous and 
attracted large populations of 'fortune- makers' in the form of 
merchants and labourers. But perhaps also they were merely 
temporary sources of wealth and regarded as such by everybody all 
along. The fact that the importance of the regions disappeared soon 
after the depletion of the resources for which they were famous 
should indicate that there had not been much development. This 
should support the thesis that contact with capitalism does not 
necessarily produce development, and should go some way towards 
supporting Frank on this particular point. The problem comes with 
Frank's insistence that development occurred in these regions 
during the period of capitalist activities but stopped when the 
metropoles pulled out; strangely, this is precisely the thesis of the 
dualists he opposes. As Booth (1979: 76) has also pointed out, 
logically Frank should be arguing exactly the opposite.
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Finally, let us look at Frank's use of the term underdevelopment 
It is fair to suggest that in spite of its frequent use, the exact meaning 
of the term is not spelt out. It appears to refer to a wide range of 
phenomena, including dependence (Frank, 1969), a constantly 
deteriorating rate of industrial growth (Frank, 1969: 378-393), the 
subservience of the economic and class structure to external forces 
(Frank, 1972: 92-137), and unemployment, poverty and 
immiseration (Frank, 1972). A more enduring interpretation of 
Frank’s usage of the term has been a combination of all these 
meanings, generally assumed to refer collectively to a lack of 
development. Frank would of course be wrong if to him 
'underdevelopment' really meant absolute stagnation. His thesis 
would then state that Latin America is dependent and, therefore, 
stagnant. There are enough references to some concept of 
'dependent development' in his texts to argue that he does not refer 
to absolute stagnation (Frank, 1972; Booth, 1979: 75-76), but the 
looseness in usage provides some justification for critics to associate 
him with the stagnation thesis.
d) The level of generalization in Frank's view and its consequence 
regarding empirical work
We have already noted in passing the tendency for Frank to take 
generalizations beyond what could possibly be supported by 
available evidence. One of the notable things about his 
theorization is the reluctance to divide the process of dependence 
and the reality of underdevelopment into historical phases. For 
example, despite being aware that some changes have taken place in 
terms of development in general and the growth of industry in 
particular (Frank, 1969: 378-393: 1972: 92-137), Frank is keen to stress 
that:
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"Contemporary underdevelopment is simply a continuation 
of the same fundamental processes of dependence, 
transformation of economic and class structure, and 
lumpenbourgeois policies of underdevelopment which have 
been in operation throughout our history". (Frank, 1972: 92) 
Booth (1979: 78) observes that the failure to specify historical phases 
and types of dependence often leads to a suppression of useful 
comparison, while Laclau (1971) sees the omission as being 
detrimental to analyses of concrete situations. Later studies by 
Frank appear to have responded to these criticisms, and have gone 
some way towards showing a concrete manifestation of dependence 
(Frank, 1969) and identifying phases of accumulation and 
dependence (Frank, 1978a; 1978b; 1980; 1981). 
e) Frank's policy conclusions:
Frank's characterization of Latin America as having been fully 
capitalist for centuries, and his suggestion that capitalist-led growth 
has outlived its usefulness in the Third World in every way, has 
led to what others regard as erroneous political conclusions. As he 
has himself pointed out (Frank, 1972: 1-12; Frank, 1977), it has also 
led to major controversies with activists of both a socialist and 
nationalist standpoint. Some of his better known political 
conclusions, arising from discussion on such subjects as 
imperialism, social classes, who the enemy of Third World peasants 
and workers is, and the role of Third World national bourgeoisies 
(Frank, 1969: Chs 23-25), have a common thread running through 
them. They all make the point that since Latin America is capitalist 
and must be changed, the only correct change is a socialist one.
Frank is notable for denouncing local bourgeois classes, whom he 
finds sycophantic to imperialism, and for disparaging present
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industrialization policies - which he believes are only capable of 
intensifying the dependence problem (Frank, 1969: 350-408; Frank, 
1972). Much of Frank's disillusionment was a direct result of the 
failure of the ECLA-Prebisch 'inward-looking' development 
strategy to effect rapid progress, and of the increasing reliance of that 
strategy's industrialization efforts on external capital (Frank, 1969; 
1972; Horowitz, 1964).
Frank does not seek to show how the structure of dependence can 
be changed within the existing international economic and political 
order. This appears to be induced by his own pre-determined 
ideological rejection of anything reformist (Frank, 1972: Ch.8).
It is notable that despite an analysis which identifies and 
conceptually locates (exploiting) industrialized capitalist countries 
on one side of the fence, and (oppressed) Third World countries on 
the other, Frank does not adopt a purely Third Worldist nationalist 
political position, and any claim that he does (Brenner, 1977: 92) is 
clearly erroneous.
It is Frank's characterization of Latin America as being fully 
capitalist, and his view that capitalism has outlived its usefulness, 
that makes him regard a socialist revolution as the only viable 
solution to dependence and underdevelopment. We attribute this, 
in the first place, to the fact that Frank tries too hard to prove that 
current problems of development in the Third World are associated 
with the global spread of capitalism. In our view, to establish this 
association Frank need not have pronounced Latin America fully 
capitalist. In a similar way, that current developmental problems in 
the Third World have arisen while capitalism was dominant over 
all other modes of production need not lead to the conclusion that 
it has outlived its usefulness in every aspect, and for every concrete
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situation. The fact that Frank does not have these considerations 
prevents him from seeing the legitimacy, possibility and long-term 
viability of reforms in present arrangements that may free some 
countries from dependence while allowing for a greater rate and a 
more acceptable form of development.
1.2.2. Fernando Henrique Cardoso
Cardoso's main ideas can be found in his other works 
(Cardoso, 1972; 1973; 1977), but it is his book with Enzo Faletto 
(Cardoso and Faletto, 1979) that we refer to in the discussion here. 
I.2.2.I. Cardoso's dependence framework.
Cardoso describes the ECLA literature as having been critical of 
conventional development literature while falling short of 
analyzing social processes. He therefore he states that in the end the 
ECLA literature did not emphasize the domination of countries by 
others, and could not highlight the absence of harmony between 
social classes. He characterizes the post-ECLA analyses of society as 
radical and 'critical of the narrowness of the ECLA approach', and he 
describes himself as belonging to that radical heritage. It is clear that 
the radical heritage he refers to is the dependence approach. Like 
others in the heritage, his analysis aims at a more comprehensive 
social science than that which normally analyses society in terms of 
separate, unrelated dimensions (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979, ix). 
Cardoso also shares the basic assumption of the dependence 
approach, that there are relatively stable structures governing the 
world economic system in the present epoch. But he adds:
"For us it is necessary to recognize from the beginning that 
social structures are the product of man's collective behaviour. 
Therefore, although enduring, social structures can be, and in
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fact are, continuously transformed by social movements". 
(Cardoso and Faletto, 1979: x)
Thus Cardoso avoids giving the impression left by others, that 
situations of dependence are stable and permanent:
"This impression can also suggest that situations of dependency 
are continuously and necessarily generating more 
underdevelopment and dependency". (Cardoso and Faletto, 
1979: x)
He rejects studies which assume that there is a general, abstract form 
of dependence permeating all types of situations. He is against 
studies which do not delineate moments of significant structural 
change, and those which portray imperialism as an active, all- 
conquering force over passive dependent countries (Cardoso and 
Faletto, 1979: xii-xvi).
It can be seen that these remarks are directed against the 
general impression that is sometimes left by Frank's writings 
(Frank, 1967; 1969), and are regarded by some to be a profound 
counter-critique of Frank (Halperin-Donghi, 1982; Palma, 1981: 62- 
64) while others see them as an elaboration and a logical 
development of the dependence approach (Booth, 1979).
This is the framework which governs Cardoso's writings. Some 
writers have found the framework to be clearly spelt out, and have 
observed that Cardoso's subsequent historical study of Latin 
America keeps to this framework (Halperin-Donghi, 1982: 115-116).
The concern of Cardoso' framework, or to put it another way, the 
dependence framework as elaborated by Cardoso, is to bring out the 
diversity of concrete situations of dependence, as well as the fact that 
such situations continually change, not only in form but also in 
substance (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979: xviii-xxii).
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I.2.2.2. Cardoso’s characterization of dependence
It is in this context that Cardoso upholds the characterization of 
forms of dependence hitherto presented by what he calls structural 
dependence, while at the same time recognizing that where 
industrialization has taken place some development and new forms 
of dependence have emerged. In agreement with Amin (1974a), he 
states that peripheral industrialization is based on products which 
in the centre are mass consumed, but which are typically luxurious 
consumption in dependent societies (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979: 
xxii). Also in agreement with Quijano (1974), he states that such 
industrialization enhances income concentration as it increases 
sharp differences in productivity without generalizing this trend to 
the whole of the economy, i.e., accentuating income disparities. 
However, although these symptoms are traceable to the economic 
drive of the 'centre' (Frank, 1972); Amin, 1974a), there are 
dependent societies in which some have been overcome, and where 
the structure of production has been altered.
The characterization of dependence outlined here, in 
combination with existing definitions of underdevelopment and 
dependence, according to Cardoso, assists him in working out his 
own definition of dependence.
Firstly there is the concept of underdevelopment, which he 
understands to mean:
"A type of economic system with a predominant primary 
sector, a high concentration of income, little diversification in 
its production system, and above all, an external market far 
outweighing the internal". (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979: 17).
He finds this description correct but inadequate for the definition of 
dependence in so far as:
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"The idea refers to the degree of diversification w ithout 
emphasizing the patterns of control of decisions of production 
and consumption". (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979: 18)
Secondly there is the concept of periphery, which he considers to 
be more useful than that of underdevelopm ent in so far as it 
im m ediately incorporates the idea of unequal positions and 
functions w ithin the same structure of overall production, for 
example by recognizing that for most of the history of certain 
peripheral economies:
"Decisions affecting production or consumption are taken in 
term s of the grow th  and in terests of the developed 
economies". (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979: 18)
From all these considerations, Cardoso develops his definition of 
dependence. At first he talks about what he considers to be an 
economic definition of dependence, which is:
"When the accumulation and expansion of capital cannot find 
its essential dynamic component inside the system". (Cardoso 
and Faletto, 1979: xx)
W hat is im plied by this is the lack of capacity to create new 
technologies, the inability to continuously expand the production of 
capital goods, and the lack of capacity for building a solid financial 
system to support this expansion (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979: xx-xxi).
But Cardoso warns that a structuralist definition like this one 
should  not overlook the socio-political factors involved in 
situations of dependence - for example the social classes, both 
external and internal, which generally sustain dependence. It may 
be adequate for formal purposes to define dependence by reference 
to a structure of production lacking diversification and autonomy,
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he argues, but it should be kept in mind that such a structure is held 
in place, or can be modified, by social forces.
1.2.2.3. The possibility of reform within a structure of 
dependence
Cardoso argues that modifications in dependence have occurred 
in Latin America. According to him a great deal of industrialization 
has taken place, making production highly diversified, developing 
a capital goods sector, using skilled labour, reducing income 
disparities in the urban industrial sector, and ensuring a m uch 
lower outflow  in order to safeguard investm ent (Cardoso and 
Faletto, 1979: 160-161). He argues as an exam ple that Brazil's 
industrialization resulted in a capital goods sector whose greater 
dynamism relative to the consumer goods sector ensures that the 
technological level attained can not falter even in crisis (Cardoso 
and Faletto, 1979: 5).
The recognition of these developments appears to be the result of 
the aw areness in his fram ew ork of the d y n a m i s m  of the 
accumulation process and the role of active social forces, especially 
the internal ones (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979: xvi, xx, 20). It is 
dynamic accumulation and active social forces that have produced 
the new situation: on the one hand the emergence of a kind of 
'progressive' capitalism  of the transnational corporations, the 
increasing availability of their technology, and their production of 
capital goods for the local Latin American markets; on the other, the 
industrializing local social forces, including those based in the state 
(Cardoso and Faletto, 1979: 177-216).
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1.2.2.4. Cardoso's views on the relation between dependence 
and development
The modifications of dependence that accumulation and social 
forces have produced make it possible for Cardoso to conclude that 
development is not precluded by dependence. His use of phrases 
like 'associated-dependent capitalist economy' (Cardoso and Faletto, 
1979: 194) and 'dependent development' (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979: 
213) dem onstrate his view that developm ent is taking place in 
dependent countries (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979: xxiii). Notice, 
however, that his definition of development is, by excluding the 
hum anitarian aspects, different from that of other dependence 
theorists. In one place he says that development means capitalist 
developm ent (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979: xxiii), while in another it 
means the progress of productive forces, m ainly through the 
im port of technology, capital accumulation, penetration of local 
economies by foreign enterprises, increasing num bers of wage­
earning groups, and the intensification of the social division of 
labour (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979: xxiv).
But Cardoso is careful not to say that dependence has been 
broken, because although some dependent countries have achieved 
a high degree of diversity, neither has attained production  
autonomy and appropriate income levels to sustain the autonom y 
(Cardoso and Faletto, 1979: 5-6,18,160-161).
1.2.2.5. An evaluation of Cardoso's writings
Although Cardoso is credited with placing a greater emphasis on 
analyses of concrete situations (Palma, 1981: 43), he has also been 
criticized by others (Bienfeld, 1980: 7; Rodriguez, 1980: 11) for a 
disparaging of theory. In our view it would be wrong to argue that
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only concrete studies are valid, implying that general frameworks, 
such as dependence, are not important merely because they are 
general. But it appears to us that Cardoso’s advice is merely that a 
study becomes comprehensive and more fruitful if it is pursued 
beyond generalization (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979: xviii, xx, xxiii). 
The reason for this is that although a generalization is itself usually 
drawn from concrete situations, it can only be a model, not a 
replica. For this reason Cardoso's point is correct: no general 
framework can substitute for a concrete analysis.
In a comparative sense it should be said that although Cardoso's 
historical treatment of dependent industrialization in Latin 
America is similar to that of Frank, the emphasis he places on 
periodisation and the specificity of concrete situations of dependence 
provides an additional refinement to the framework. Similarly, to 
stress the possibility of development, and the importance of socio­
political forces in the dependence structure and not just its rigidity, 
is an important theoretical intervention which elaborates on the 
more general schema presented by Frank.
I.2.2.6. The way out of dependence and Cardoso's implied 
political position
Clearly Cardoso rates investment and the production of capital 
goods in a dependent country as the most significant factors likely 
to lead to an enduring process of development and, eventually, to 
the elimination of dependence (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979: xx-xxi, 5, 
175). He adds, of course, that the identification of the appropriate 
social forces, and the possession of a political will are important in 
the struggle against dependence. But, while ideologically he does 
not support the internal classes that are dominant in Latin
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America, his (measured) approval of 'dependent development' 
(which has occurred under the rule of these classes) shows that he 
regards reforms within the system as being useful.
1.2.3. Theotonio dos Santos
Dos Santos (1973: 60-71) criticizes the conventional development 
framework, and points out the shortcoming of ECLA, in terms 
similar to those of Frank and Cardoso. But he spells out the 
relationship between dependence and the theory of imperialism 
more than they do.
Dos Santos argues that dependence is an approach which 
integrates the capitalist expansion of the developed countries and 
the consequences of that expansion into a single historical account. 
It is for this reason that he sees dependence theorisation as a subset 
of the general framework of the theory of imperialism, serving to 
specify the expansion in dependent countries, which the theory of 
imperialism in its classical formulation could not have done (dos 
Santos, 1973: 73-74). The expansion, itself a function of the 
accumulation process which breeds inequality among people, 
results in a 'combined inequality' among countries (dos Santos, 
1973: 77). The major feature of this inequality is that dependent 
countries are 'assigned' the production and export of primary 
commodities (export-based capitalism) while lacking capital and 
technology, and being socio- politically dominated (dos Santos, 1973: 
76). According to dos Santos, these are the general considerations 
that the concept of dependence embodies.
The notions of 'the capitalist expansion of the developed 
countries' and 'the inequality among countries' are central in the
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construction of a formal definition of dependence, which according 
to dos Santos is:
"A conditioning situation in which the economies of one 
group of countries are conditioned by the development and 
expansion of others. A relationship of interdependence 
between such economies and the world trading system 
becomes a dependent relationship when some countries can 
expand through self-impulsion while others, being in a 
dependent position, can only expand as a reflection of the 
dominant countries, which may have positive or negative 
effects on their immediate development. In either case, the 
basic situation of dependence causes these countries to be both 
backward and exploited", (dos Santos, 1973: 76. Emphasis 
original.)
What does the definition imply regarding the characterization of 
dependence as an external factor in Third World development 
processes? Dos Santos considers an answer to this question an 
important part of his clarification of dependence. Like Quijano 
(1974: 398), dos Santos maintains and stresses that dependence 
should not be understood as an external factor. At present there are 
local components which play roles as important, sometimes greater 
than, those played by externally-based factors in constituting 
dependence (dos Santos, 1973: 72).
For comparative purposes it is important to note that dos Santos 
is as explicit as Frank and Cardoso are, that the dependence 
situation is responsible for problems of development in Latin 
America (and the rest of the Third World) by establishing the 
'limits and forms' of that development (dos Santos, 1973: 76, 78). 
Nevertheless, like Cardoso, he is keen to stress what Frank does
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not, namely the possibility of development within dependence. In 
his scheme this possibility is theorised as follows:
"Firstly, concrete development situations arise as much from 
the specific characteristics of the conditioned situation which 
re- define and specify the general conditioning situation, as 
from the general conditioning factors of dependence 
themselves. Secondly, the very situation of dependence can be 
and is susceptible to change as the hegemonic and the 
dependent structures themselves change", (dos Santos, 1973: 
78).
But it appears that dos Santos sees the possibility of development 
under dependence conditions only in the short term. There is a 
strong impression left by his writings that he is pessimistic about 
the long-term sustenance of such development within the 
dependence structure. It is this implied pessimism that has led 
others (Godfrey, 1980: 2) to place him closer to Frank than to 
Cardoso. Also, like Frank (1969: 372-373), dos Santos stresses that 
there is a coincidence of interests between local and international 
dominators which not only accounts for the socio-political 
sustenance of dependence, but also implies that a struggle against 
the 'dominated (local) dominators' is the one most likely to create 
conditions for 'self-impulsion' and the long term development of 
Third World countries (dos Santos, 1973: 79). But he is against 
breaking off the international economic relations, since he believes 
that solutions to the problem lie within, not outside, the system.
1.2.4 Samir Amin:
Many reviewers of the works of Samir Amin have pointed to his 
eclecticism which, they believe, has produced numerous positive
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contributions as well as numerous errors (Gerstein, 1977; Bernstein, 
1979; Dore and Weeks, 1979; Barone, 1982). According to these 
reviewers, Amin's most important contribution is in displaying a 
theoretical awareness of certain problems which are ignored by the 
underdevelopment theorists (Bernstein, 1979: 100), and in refining 
dependence theorisation by tying it more explicitly to the process of 
capital accumulation (Barone, 1982: 10). Amin's work is certainly 
massive, and for our purposes it is an appropriate starting point to 
review his work with these claims as a general guide.
As indicated by Barone (1982) an evaluation of Amin's 
contribution to the dependence approach is usually also an 
examination of his conceptualization of capital accumulation. In 
general it can be said that dependence theorisation has always 
sought to refute conventional development thinking as well as 
reformulate certain aspects of historical materialism, in particular 
the conceptualization of the accumulation process and the 
development of capitalism. But while in its infancy the approach 
emphasized the inadequacy of conventional development thinking 
(Frank, 1967; 1969), later it turned more to the implications for 
historical materialism. Even Frank (1978a; 1978b) began to pay more 
attention to this. Since Amin's is the epitome of the later trend, his 
explanation of dependence carries more of this specialized debate, 
and so the dependence aspects which we are considering here must 
include a considerable portion of it.
I.2.4.I. The focus and methodology of the accumulation study
Amin argues that in order to understand the capitalist system 
and the development of the Third World in this epoch, it is 
essential to study not merely the laws of the capitalist mode of
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production but to focus on the nature and results of the expansion 
of that mode into a worldwide system. Thus, like dos Santos, Amin 
regards his explanation of dependence as part of the theory of 
imperialism (Amin, 1977a; 1978: 57-58).
Arguing that it is possible to construct in purely economic terms a 
model of the development, or the type of accumulation, of a 
particular socio-economic situation, Amin nevertheless warns that 
although the model would provide a correct illustration, it would 
not alone explain the reality. It is necessary therefore to go beyond 
the model. This entails considering the historical origins of the 
situation, as well as keeping in mind that no economic laws are 
independent of the actions of social forces (Amin, 1978: 64). But 
since the subject under examination is the worldwide capitalist 
system, an analysis of the model, its history and the struggle among 
social forces must be carried out at the world level. Thus, social 
forces modify the strictly economic accumulation model on the 
world scale, their actions influencing the rate of surplus value on 
that scale and the respective (differing) rates at the centre and in the 
periphery. They affect the price structure of world commodities as 
well as real wages at the world level, at the centre and in the 
periphery (Amin, 1978: 67; 1980: 149-166). In the struggles of the 
social forces, one social force - imperialist/international capital - 
remains dominant (Amin, 1978: 65-66).
This statement of a methodology is a double-edged response, on 
the one hand to economists who assume that economic laws 
explain all of reality, and on the other to those (Disney 1977; 
Bernstein, 1979: 99; Barone, 1982: 10-11) who have taken Amin's 
accumulation model to be an example of (neo-Ricardian) 
economism which does not take into account exploitation and class
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forces. But the more important aspect of Amin's statement is that 
the action of social forces be understood at the level of the world, 
and that a certain amount of hierarchy exists among social forces. 
This is a clear contrast in emphasis from other post-Frank 
theorisations of 'class struggle' which, in speaking of the 
participation of 'internal classes' in dependence, have either ended 
up not assigning a dominant status to any social force (Cardoso and 
Faletto, 1979), or have argued as if the character of 'internal classes' 
is all that mattered (Brenner, 1977).
I.2.4.2. Amin's argument
Amin's ideas on dependence can be found in each of his major 
works, but they are best spelt out in two books (Amin, 1974a; 1976), 
and well summarized in a few pages in another (Amin, 1980: Ch. 6). 
There is an article (Amin, 1974b) which condenses one of the books 
(Amin, 1974a) and remains an accurate summary of the ideas. In 
these works Amin rarely mentions the term dependence, preferring 
to use the contrasting terms centre and periphery. But he makes it 
quite clear that his theoretical model of accumulation and 
development can be referred to as dependence (Amin, 1977a: Part 
IV).
One of the major ways in which Amin distinguishes the centre 
from the periphery is the characterization of what he calls 
determining relationships between (production) sectors, which he 
sketches out as follows:
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Centre's determining relationship
1 2 3 4
Main peripheral relationship
Key: 1. export, 2.'mass' consumption, 3. luxury goods, 4. capital
goods.
The relationship between sectors 2 and 4 is the determining 
relationship in the centre, i.e., Europe, North America and Japan 
(Amin, 1980: 132), and, to a great extent, the USSR and China as 
well (Amin, 1974b: 11). This relationship corresponds to the history 
of industrial capital.
In the centre , there is an objective relation between the rate of 
surplus value (the theoretical value of unpaid labour, central to 
determining capitalist profits) and the level of the development of 
productive forces (the improvement of the technical and human 
conditions of production). But it is the rate of surplus value which 
essentially determines the structure of the social distribution of the 
national income, allocating thereby the share of wages and profits, 
and ultimately shaping demand (Amin, 1980: 132). In less abstract 
terms, this objective correspondence between the rate of surplus 
value and the level of the development of productive forces can be 
expressed as follows: Demand based on wages increases with the 
improvement of productive forces. In the history of capitalism, the 
sequence of this demand was as follows. At first it consisted 
exclusively of necessities such as food, clothing and shelter. Then 
that type of demand stimulated the agricultural revolution (or the 
capitalisation of agriculture) by providing a market for food 
products. It also stimulated the textile and urban development
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industries. Later it increasingly turned  to the consum ption of 
'consum er durables' w hose highly capital-intensive production 
appears very late on the market (Amin, 1974b: 11).
This outline enables Amin to determine that in the centres 
capitalism flowed from an internal process of disintegration from 
previous modes of production, and that the developm ent of the 
centres was shaped by the logic and needs of internal accumulation 
(Amin, 1980: 132-133). This model of 'autocentred accumulation' 
further dem onstrates the fact that the contradiction between the 
system's productive capacity and its consumption capacity is being 
constantly overcome, a mechanism of self-adjustment as it were. 
Although historically this adjustm ent occurs at both the internal 
and external levels, it is possible for it to occur exclusively at the 
internal level, 
a) The internal level.
Amin distinguishes three historical stages of the accumulation 
process:
(i) The period up to about 1880. In that era of 'com petitive 
capitalism' an increase in the rate of surplus value over and above 
its 'objectively necessary' level tended to lead to a depression. This 
can be explained as follows. In the long run a rate of surplus 
value that is consistently 'above normal' leads to an insufficient 
effective dem and, itself kept low partly  by the insufficient 
bargaining strength of labour (Amin, 1976). A logical consequence 
of this is a reduction of the rate of surplus value, triggering a 
tendency for the rate of profit to fall, in turn  slowing down 
economic growth. But this slowing down of economic growth 
begins a new cycle since it creates labour market conditions which 
favour capital (including the creation of an industrial reserve army
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of labour), a cycle tending towards 'full employment' again and 
economic growth (Amin, 1974b; 1976).
11) The period 1880 to 1939. This period is characterized by, among 
others, the rise of monopoly. Monopoly made it possible for capital 
to resist the tendency of prices to come down, and Amin notes that 
in the formative decade of monopolies (1880-1890) there was a 
steady rise in prices. But the rise of monopolies was also 
accompanied by the strengthening of labour, which now organized 
itself into unions. As a result the rise in prices raised incomes not 
only for capitalists but also for labour (Amin, 1976: 170). The rise in 
real wages in turn depressed the rate of surplus value. This 
induced capital to seek, create and utilize newer and better 
techniques of production, thus establishing favourable labour 
market conditions once again.
iii) The period after 1945. In this period both labour unions and 
monopoly capital consolidated themselves. This consolidation in a 
way erodes the self-adjustment mechanism by making it possible to 
'plan' in order to reduce the cyclical fluctuations. Capital and 
labour accept under the aegis of the state, a social contract which 
relates increases in real wages to increases in productivity (Amin, 
1974b; 1976: 102-104). In this way a state of permanent quasi-full 
employment can be assured. The widespread social democratic 
ideology in the centre corresponds to this social pact (Amin, 1974b:
12) . The social pact brings into practice what is theoretically 
predictable, namely that the continuation of accumulation (or 
equilibrium) is possible internally provided real wages increase 
with productivity (Amin, 1977a: 110). But this, together with the 
external factor that we shall examine below, brings into being the 
ever-increasing problem of the absorption of excess capital or
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'su rp lu s’. Part of the solution to this problem  involves the 
inclusion of 'selling costs' in the price of the product, 'personal' 
consumption by capitalism such as in the increase of services, and, 
above all, the direct intervention by the state in the absorption at 
the centre through public and military expenditure (Amin, 1976: 77; 
1977a: 206-208).
The value of distinguishing the internal form of adjustm ent of 
capitalist accumulation from the external form is to show that it is 
possible for capitalism  to tackle the production-consum ption 
'contradiction' w ithin itself, i.e., w ithout the foreign market. The 
differentiation of the stages is im portant in order to acknowledge 
the significant changes in the development of capitalism in general, 
and the role of dependence as indicated by the external level of self 
adjustment which we examine below.
b) The external level. Whereas the history of capitalism shows its 
capacity for internal self-adjustm ent on the one hand, it also 
demonstrates three other things. The first is that, as indicated by the 
the recurrence of the cyclical fluctuation of the economy, the 
internal form  of adjustm ent was not adequate, and thus the 
external form came into being. Secondly, even the addition of the 
external form  does not solve the problem  perm anently  and, 
according to Amin, ultimately worsens it by helping raise the rate 
of surplus value which in turn raises the organic composition of 
capital. The latter largely translates itself into the problem  of 
’surplus’ absorption. Thirdly, the fact that ultimately it is not only 
the search for markets (the production-consumption contradiction) 
that is involved, but also the problem of the absorption of ’surplus', 
shows that the the more im portant function of the adjustm ent
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mechanism is the attempt to counteract the tendency of the rate of 
profit to fall, in which the external factor played a role as follows.
i) The period up to about 1880. Amin argues that even in that early 
period the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, caused by 
underconsumptionism, was counteracted with the help of the 
external expansion of the market (Amin, 1976: 76). The external 
market not only made possible the sale of goods abroad but also the 
provision of cheaper goods for general consumption in the centre, 
thus reducing the cost of labour. It also provided cheaper raw 
materials, making it possible to reduce the value of 'consumption 
capital' employed in production (Amin, 1976: 184).
ii) The period 1880 to 1939. Due to the strength of labour unions in 
this period, real wages rose steadily, and despite improved internal 
productivity, this soon put a check on the rate of profit at the centre. 
An additional measure to counteract the tendency of the rate of 
profit to fall was required. This came in the form of export of 
capital (for investment in search of higher returns (Amin, 1974b; 
1980: 134). The major part of the exported capital flowed to the new 
centres of autocentric accumulation. The returns here were higher 
not because of lower wages but due to improved productivity 
resulting from the use of better technical processes. A part of the 
exported capital went to peripheral countries, where the higher 
return to capital was due to lower wages for equivalent products 
(Amin, 1976: 178). The return to capital exported to the periphery, 
seen in a technical sense and on its own, is significant to the extent 
that it promotes the equalization of the rate of profit for capital as a 
whole (Amin, 1974b: 13), and higher profits for individual capitals 
(Amin, 1976: 144). The favourable return to capital is established and 
maintained due to certain conditions. At first facilitated by the use
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of force through colonialism, henceforth the periphery is 
structurally 'assigned' particular tasks in world production, which is 
propelled by the needs of accumulation at the centre. In addition, its 
labour power is paid below value. It is the particular role of the 
periphery in the general accumulation process, and the lower 
return to labour power, which laid the basis for underdevelopment. 
The importance of the period 1880 to 1939 is that it was the time 
when this basis was laid and consolidated.
iii) The period after 1945. In this period, export of capital continues 
to be an important feature. But rapid progress towards the 
centralization of capital and production (and the emergence of 
transnational companies) is the most significant feature of the 
period. It is significant because the period is one of the dominance 
of ultra-modern industries and the use of more highly skilled 
labour, while technological knowledge itself gets concentrated in the 
transnational firms (Amin, 1976: 189). What this means for 
peripheral countries is that control over technology, which the 
centre-based transnational firms have, provides enough overall 
control to permit a relinquishing of a proportion of direct control 
over production. As in the second period, the export of capital 
facilitates higher returns, and as in all of the duration when the 
external form of adjustment of capital accumulation exists, this 
counteracts the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. The 
significance of the role of the periphery in the accumulation 
process, the role established in the second period, is more clearly 
seen in this period. For this is the period in which labour strength 
in the centre is consolidated and the social contract which 
guarantees wage rises in conformity with increased productivity is 
struck between labour and capital. The overall structure established
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'allows salaries and productivity (in the centre) to grow in tandem 
over a long period, bringing about a relative loss which capital 
makes up for by continually raising the rate of extraction of surplus 
labour in the periphery' (Amin, 1980: 164). According to Amin, 
politically this means that the structure gives the workers in the 
centre the possibility of carrying on their economic class struggles 
under more favourable conditions. They thus take an interest in 
the continued role of the periphery to the extent that the role gives 
life to the pact, participating in an ideology of interclass national 
solidarity which is the essence of present social democracy (Amin, 
1980: 164). This view, it can be noted in passing, makes some writers 
associate Amin with an anti-working class nationalist stance, 
wrongly so since his total perspective is not (Amin, 1978: 65-67; 1980: 
163-164). More important to our presentation, however, is to 
look closely at how Amin relates the process of accumulation, the 
external aspect of autocentric accumulation in particular, to the 
problems of development in the Third World.
I.2.4.3. Dependence and Unequal Exchange
We have already stated Amin's argument that the basis for 
'under-development' was laid in the second period of the expansion 
of capitalism, the colonial period of 1880 to 1939 (which began 
earlier in Latin America and continued beyond the 1950s in Africa). 
The basis itself, according to Amin, appears to consist of lower 
returns to labour in the periphery and a 'dependent' structural role 
for the periphery determined and maintained by the needs of 
accumulation in the centre.
a) Dependence and its reproduction. Amin argues that in the 
periphery the specific mechanism of accumulation known as
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dependence, which characterizes it, began when under an impulse 
from the centre an 'export sector' was created (Amin, 1974b: 12). 
This 'export sector' still characterizes the periphery  despite 
im portant changes. It consists chiefly of the export of mineral and 
primary agricultural products in which the periphery or a part of it 
has a natural advantage. According to Amin, this is is easy to see. 
But the im portant point that is not often m entioned is that the 
establishment of that sector was a direct result of the expansion of 
capitalism, and that the driving force for its establishment was the 
expectation that 'em igrating' capital w ould get a better return 
(Amin, 1974b: 13).
Amin argues that the beginning of this new 'export' role of the 
traditional (i.e., pre-capitalist) society, m aking it in that sense 
dependent, is also the end of its 'traditionalism'. Thus references to 
'dualism ' or to a so-called juxtaposition of an autonom ous 
traditional society w ith an expanding m odern society can only 
mislead (Amin, 1974b: 13). In this way he rejects the dual-society 
theory, in which he includes the newer marxist version of it, better 
known as 'the 'articulation of modes of production' school (Amin, 
1977a; 1978:121).
Also, from the time of the establishment of the 'export sector' the 
dependent society is bound to supply cheap labour to the 'sector', 
and the wage rate there will be as low as economic and extra- 
economic conditions allow (Amin, 1974b; 1980: 134-135). Thus the 
objective relation between the returns to labour and the level of 
development of the productive forces, which exists in the centre, is 
not found here.
Amin maintains that whereas productive forces at the centre 
grow m ore or less hom ogeneously, at the periphery they grow
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heterogeneously - advanced (and sometimes very advanced) in the 
'export sector', and backward in the rest of the economy. The 
backwardness has an im portant function in the system - ensuring 
that the 'export sector' gets cheap labour power (Amin, 1974b; 1980: 
135).
At a certain point in its life, the 'export sector' (sector 1) generates 
a significant internal market. This m arket has two significant 
characteristics. The first is that the lower returns to labour limits the 
expansion of the market. This is the major reason for the fact that 
the periphery attracts only a limited am ount of capital from the 
centre, even though it offers a higher return on it (Amin, 1974a; 
1980: 135). The second is that this market is distorted, since it is 
biased against the dem and for mass consumer goods (sector 2) in 
favour of luxury goods (sector 3). If all the capital in the 'export 
sector' continued to be external, and if all its products were re­
exported to the centre, the limited internal market in the periphery 
would be restricted to the demand for mass consumer goods. But in 
the course of the expansion of the 'export sector' a part of the capital 
in this area becomes locally- owned, and this situation produces and 
strengthens internal social forces (latifundists, kulaks, comprador 
commercial bourgeoisies, state bureaucracies) which keep the 
system going. It is the luxury demand of these social forces that the 
internal m arket serves (Amin, 1974b; 1980: 135). When (import 
substituting) industrialization takes place therefore it begins from 
the end; manufactured products correspond to later historical stages 
of industrialization. Resources are poured into the im port- 
substituting production of luxury goods, which handicaps the mass 
consum ption  sector. Even w hen, in the larger p e rip h e ra l 
economies, a capital goods sector (sector 4) is developed, it will be for
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the purpose of serving sectors 1 and 3, and not sector 2 (Amin, 1974b: 
16).
Amin further argues that once the above-mentioned structure 
is established, and precisely because of it, any development strategy 
based on profitability will necessarily reinforce this structure, since 
each new activity would be patterned on the existing structure of 
income distribution, the structure of relative prices, and the existing 
demand pattern. Industries set up in this way do not become 
growth centres; instead they help impoverish the major part of the 
population while further integrating the minority in the system 
(Amin, 1974b; 1980: 138-144). This is what Amin refers to 
sociologically as the marginalisation of the masses (Amin, 1976: 351; 
1977a: 219, 223; 1980:138).
b) Unequal Exchange. The term unequal exchange is simply the 
technical reference that Amin employs to describe one of the factors 
responsible for the problems of development, namely the lower 
returns to labour in the periphery. To have an understanding that 
lower wages in the periphery ultimately constitute unequal 
exchange, and that capitalism is directly responsible for it, requires 
several assumptions. That capitalism has expanded and become a 
worldwide system. That an export sector producing primarily for 
the needs of accumulation of the capitalist mode of production at 
the centre has been established at the periphery. That techniques of 
production are everywhere nearly the same, and that products can 
be produced anywhere in the world (i.e., they are not specific to any 
area of the globe). And, finally, that the above notwithstanding, 
real wages are lower at the periphery. Unequal exchange is 
therefore the exchange of products whose production involves
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wage differentials greater than those of productivity (Amin, 1977a: 
211; 1980:134).
Since the concept of unequal exchange has generated its own 
debate on the question of development, it is useful to have a 
detailed look at how Amin uses it. Also, contrary to the evaluation 
by others (Evans, 1984), Amin's use of the concept differs 
substantially from that of Emmanuel (1972), and it is useful to 
examine it in this respect.
In the debate on unequal exchange, Amin seeks to respond to 
neo- classical economists (whom he calls marginalists) on the one 
hand, and to some marxists on the other. At the same time, while 
acknowledging the value of the work by Emmanuel (1972) on 
unequal exchange, he differs with him on several important points.
Amin makes several observations which relate to the debate in a 
general way. He notes that the theory of unequal exchange is based 
on an understanding of the labour theory of value and the theory of 
international trade, both of which originated in classical economic 
theory (equated with Ricardianism by Amin). He states that 
although marginalists rejected Ricardianism on account of the 
latter's association with the labour theory of value, they embraced 
the theory of international trade. He suggests that they did this for 
ideological reasons. According to him, the theory of international 
trade does not challenge the status quo of the structure of 
international trade, whereas the labour theory of value potentially 
does. This, he argues, makes it possible to justify the international 
order, the insertion of a new (Third World) state into this order and 
the exercise of paternalism towards the periphery.
Amin accepts the assumptions of the benefits of trade, on which 
the 'Ricardian' theory of international trade is based, but observes
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that on the international scene there is a reversal of the labour 
theory of value. The reversal, according to him, consists in the fact 
that it is no longer the production conditions which determine 
trade, but trade which determines production. He observes that 
some theorists of historical materialism are not prepared to accept 
that there's a reversal of the labour theory of value at the 
international level, since it implies a refutation of that theory in 
general.
Amin's point of departure is the unequal exchange thesis 
advanced by Emmanuel (1972). The thesis revolves around the 
in ternational m obility of comm odities and capital, and the 
immobility of labour. Amin reacts favourably to the thesis because 
Em m anuel is the first to clearly form ulate the problem  of 
international values. But he is critical of the conclusions that 
Emmanuel derives from this formulation. The shortcoming of the 
latter is the inability to analyse the theoretical status of the value of 
labour power in the capitalist mode of production, consequently 
failing to pose the question of international values as merely that of 
the domination of the capitalist mode over the others - or that of 
the specific nature of the peripheral capitalist mode with respect to 
the central one.
As far as Amin is concerned, the inability to conceptualize the 
value of labour power theoretically leads Emmanuel to answer this 
question in m arginalist empiricist terms, calling the wage an 
independen t variable. M aintaining that there are no truly
independent variables in the capitalist mode of production, Amin 
argues that it is the whole, i.e., the reproduction of the conditions of 
the m ode of production, that determ ines the parts, i.e., the 
variables.
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However, Amin argues, Emmanuel's historical materialist critics, 
such as Kay (1975: 116), themselves do not go beyond this lacuna; 
they merely repeat the same marginalist formulation in reverse, 
that the wage is not independent, that it is dependent on 
productivity or the level of development of productive forces 
(Amin, 1977a: 186).
It is only partly correct to say that the wage depends on the level 
of the development of productive forces. For the level of the wage 
is determined by both objective and subjective factors, by the level 
of productive forces and the deliberate actions of social forces 
(Amin, 1977a: 195, 206, 208). Moreover, an important question
remains, namely at what level should one view the development 
of productive forces as taking place: the enterprise, the branch, the
nation, or the world. Amin argues that the only relevant values 
are world values since practically all commodities are produced for 
the world capitalist market, and they are either similar or can 
substitute each other (Amin, 1977a: 217). It is on this account that 
Amin supports Emmanuel on the latter's retort to critics:
"How does one compare an hour of African labour with that of 
a Detroit worker? Well, in the same way that one labour-hour 
of a Detroit worker is compared with the labour-hour of a New 
York barber." (Quoted by Amin, 1977a: 187)
As this quotation indicates, it can be noted that for both Amin 
and Emmanuel the assumption which is important here is the 
unity of the world capitalist system, but Amin stresses that this 
unity does not presuppose that the entire world operates as a 
capitalist mode of production. It requires only that the capitalist 
mode is dominant over others (Amin, 1977a: 126). And, although 
at places he argues that in industry technical conditions of
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production are often comparable in the centre and periphery 
(Amin, 1980: 152, 160), it is not essential to his point about products 
being world commodities.
Amin differs significantly from Emmanuel firstly on the question 
of wage determination. With Emmanuel the determination 
becomes almost purely subjective. This is a result of tending to 
generalize 'the reversal' beyond its limit of operation, with the aim 
of totally disproving the labour theory of value. With Amin the 
reversal operates only at the international level, and in relation to 
the periphery of the system, beginning at the second historical stage 
of capitalist expansion. The second major difference is that Amin 
views the products of the Third World as being non-specific (Amin, 
1977a; 217,210-211), as being identical or close substitutes to those of 
the centre (Amin, 1977a: 126). This conceptualization becomes a 
basis for a different policy conclusion from that of Emmanuel. For 
example it might be suggested that a raising of wages in the 
periphery would be a workable effort towards resolving the 
development problem in the periphery, a suggestion put forward by 
Emmanuel as we shall see in Chapter Two. But Amin would argue 
that the subjective aspect of the determination of wages would then 
replay its role in the form of an attempt by external and internal 
dominant classes to keep the returns to labour low (Amin, 1977a: 
206). And if such a policy was truly carried out, inevitably leading 
to a reduced rate of profit, there may not be a logical enough reason 
to stop international capital from moving out of Third World 
production, and to initiate other products in order to obtain a 
higher rate of profit (Amin, 1977a: Part IV).
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I.2.4.4. Unequal Exchange and the Transfer of value
The transfer of value is an important concept which Amin uses 
in relation to unequal exchange. W here the capital engaged in 
production in the periphery is external, the returns to it, if 
repatriated, constitute a transfer of value from the point of view of 
the periphery. This would be so especially considering that a great 
deal of development engendered by accumulation depends on the 
continuous reploughing of capital back into production. To 
hypothesise this is easy enough, and perhaps not controversial. 
The problem however has often been the empirical documentation 
of the transfer, including its statistical calculation. Amin considers 
two points related to this question. The first one is the statistical 
evidence of the transfer of value. In collaboration w ith Andre 
Gunder Frank, who provides evidence for the pre-colonial and 
colonial period, Amin presents figures which appear to be proof of 
the transfer of value (Amin, 1980: 149-163,170-171). The second 
point that Amin considers is the significance of the transfer. Again 
with Frank, he argues that the visible part of the transferred value, 
often in the form of a consistent surplus in the balance of trade with 
Britain and Europe in the colonial period, enabled the financing of 
investm ent in the new centres (Amin, 1980: 171). Elsewhere he 
estimates that the hidden transfer of value in the period am ounted 
to 15% of the product of peripheral countries. According to him 
this alone is enough basis for the blocking of growth, and for 
increasing the gap between the periphery and the centre (Amin, 
1976: 1944). However, as we saw earlier, Amin argues that it is not 
the transfer of value which accounts for the problem s of 
development, i.e., underdevelopm ent. It is the 'export' structure
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(the dependent nature of accumulation in the periphery), and its 
persistent reproduction, which is the primary cause.
I.2.4.5. The significant areas of Amin's theorisation
If we were to summarise Amin's intervention in the debate, 
there are several things we would consider. The first is that he 
firmly anchors dependence not just in the accumulation process, 
but in a specific stage of that accumulation, namely the imperialist 
stage. This imperialist stage is defined by him not in terms of the 
entire  period  of expansion of capitalism , which included 
'mercantilist' expansion before 1880, but in terms of the period 
(1880 to the present) when capital from the 'centre' w ent into 
production in the 'periphery'. This at once distances him from 
Frank, who in effect associates dependence with capitalism  in 
general. Another point that is well brought out by Amin is that the 
association of dependence with capitalism need not suggest that 
developm ent in the 'centre' would have been impossible w ithout 
the 'underdevelopm ent' of the 'periphery', as can sometimes be 
inferred from Frank. If anything should be said about the effect of 
the dependence of the periphery on accumulation in the centre, it is 
that at some stage the periphery's role helped it along. Finally, 
Amin's concept of unequal exchange is noteworthy. He is aware of 
the 'classic' understanding of this concept, the paying of low prices 
for goods bought by 'monopolistic' merchants from independent 
producers in the period before the dominance of the capitalist mode 
of production, a mechanism which in its own way involved a 
transfer of value (Amin, 1974a, II: 382-383). But by stressing that it 
now exists in the form of a relation between international capital 
and labour in the periphery, he provides an effective challenge to
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those who confine it to the prehistory of capitalism, and to those 
who refuse to associate the development problems of the Third 
World in any way with modern 'productive' capital - the position 
of Kay (1975) as we shall see in Chapter Two. Amin's argument 
that unequal exchange is significant but not crucial in generating 
problems of underdevelopment makes him differ importantly from 
Emmanuel and others, especially in regard to potential policies to 
be advocated.
I.2.4.6. Amin’s views on development
Like Cardoso and dos Santos, Amin acknowledges the 
importance of industrialization, especially the establishment of the 
capital goods sector, in the creation of an 'autoncentric' economy. 
His theorisation acknowledges the possibility of some positive 
development of Third World countries within the structure of 
dependence. One must not rule out the possibility of a positive 
contribution by the modifying actions of social forces. Such 
development may also occur independently of the voluntary, 
reformist actions of Third World governments. It can occur through 
the logic of the global accumulation process itself by transferring the 
larger part of international capital to the Third World if conditions 
of production permitting a higher rate of surplus value, such as 
labour conditions, become and remain favourable. To an extent the 
new phenomenon of 'runaway industries' in South East Asia and 
elsewhere mirrors this possibility, he argues. But he is in no doubt 
that every trend favourable to development in the 'periphery' must 
be part of a strategy to reverse the dependent nature of 
accumulation for it to be effective (Amin, 1980: 143-148).
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It can be seen that Cardoso gives this possibility of development a 
better chance than Amin does. This is due to the fact that Cardoso 
accords more im portance than Amin to voluntary  actions for 
change in dependence. N ow here is this em phasis better 
demonstrated than on the concept of autonomy. Whereas Cardoso 
lam ents that despite  industrial diversification (including the 
establishment of the capital goods sector) in several Latin American 
countries decisions are still in the hands of outsiders, Amin 
continually sees the lack of autonom y in terms of the function 
objectively 'assigned ' by the accum ulation process to the 
'periphery'. The implied message is that no matter what people do, 
w hatever positive changes they try to introduce, no long-term 
developm ent and autonom y are likely to occur unless a 
fundam enta l change at the in ternational level and to the 
accumulation process itself takes place.
This is the context in which Amin’s solution to the problem, 
socialism and collective self-reliance, can be understood. By this he 
m eans a strategy of developm ent which strives to create an 
'independent' industrialization (in turn  requiring greater state 
partic ipa tion ), to re- o rien tate  p roduction  to m atch the 
requirements of the majority of the people in the country, to reduce 
trade-based vulnerability through the diversification of production 
and markets, to create a Third World economic bloc by encouraging 
intra-Third World trade and joint economic ventures (the kernel of 
collective self-reliance), and to influence international economic 
decisions by acting as a bloc in relevant fora (Amin, 1974a; 1977a; 
1977b). The solution is one of the logical derivations that can result 
from  A m in's theorisation, and is therefore, to that extent, 
theoretically consistent with the assumptions.
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1.3 Conclusion
We have tried to extract the essential points in the arguments of 
each of the major dependence writer reviewed here. It can be seen 
that there are im portant differences among them in the way they 
express their view s on the origin and the constitu tion of 
dependence, its relation with developm ent and the possibility of 
overcoming it. The differences are partly a result of the importance 
that each author attaches to subjects such as capitalism, the capital 
accumulation process, imperialism, social classes, industrialization, 
and m any other issues that are related  to dependence and 
development. Thus it can be seen that, in a general way, Frank's 
preoccupation w ith the assertion that relations of production in 
Latin America (and by extension the Third World) are capitalist, and 
that capitalism is not a source of development, become important 
sources for his view that reforms of the dependence structure short 
of a (socialist) revo lu tion  brings ne ither au tonom y nor 
development. Amin's focus on the accumulation process is one of 
the reasons he reaches conclusions on dependence and 
developm ent th a t d iffer from those of Frank. That the 
accumulation process has expanded worldw ide, and is to a great 
extent unitary, leads Amin to state that although it can be a source 
of development for both the industrialized capitalist countries and 
the Third World - the centre and periphery in Amin's terms - in 
the main it brings about only a lim ited and 'skewed' form of 
developm ent in the latter. This is because of the Third W orld's 
limited control of the accumulation process, or, to put it another 
way, the lack of autonom y in Third W orld accumulation, which 
ensures that the periphery in general performs particular tasks that 
benefit the centre m ore than the periphery. A greater rate of
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development which is also more in tune with Third World needs 
is possible if the periphery eschews aspects of the role it has usually 
played, for example by moving from being merely the producer of 
raw materials for export and embarking on non-luxurious 
industrialization. The long-term sustenance of such a programme, 
however, is only possible if the periphery disengages significantly 
from the existing global production and trading arrangements, and 
a socialistic strategy of development is undertaken in tandem.
Since Cardoso perceives the (largely economic) dependence 
structure to be pliable to social and political actions, and because he 
believes that the structure differs in relation to time and place, he 
perceives development to have a better chance in the Third World 
than what is assumed by either Frank or Amin. Thus, although he 
is also skeptical of current Third World industrialization 
programmes, he is more willing to predict a positive future for such 
programmes for some countries.
Dos Santos' pessimism about long-term development in a Third 
World dominated by imperialism (and within the dependence 
structure) is akin to that of Amin. But in outlining the reason for 
this he places more emphasis on the nature of the social structure at 
international and local levels, and, unlike Amin, less on the 
rigidity of the economic structure (i.e., the accumulation process).
Due to this diversity, we can say that there is no single theory of 
dependence. The appropriate way to describe dependence 
theorisation therefore seems to be that there are theorists of 
dependence who share an outlook, a perspective (Palma, 1981: 20), 
an approach (Godfrey, 1980: 4), or who belong to the same school of 
thought (Seers, 1981: 18). The ground that these theorists share is 
simply that, contrary to conventional development thinking, the
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ways to development are not open to the Third World as they were 
to the now industrialized capitalist countries in the past, and that 
this is largely due to the Third World's subordinate role in its 
economic ties to the industrialized capitalist world - brought about 
by the spread of capitalism worldwide.
Footnotes to Chapter One:
1 He also gives one 'international' example, that of Japan, arguing
that 'resource-poor' Japan was able to forge ahead after the 
Meiji Restoration because it was unsatellised and therefore did 
not have its development structurally limited (Frank, 1969: 11). 
Nabudere (1977) and Nafziger (1979: 37) have made a similar 
observation.
2 Such studies include those of Alejandro Morroquin and of
Rudolfo Stavenhagen, Quoted by Laclau (1971: 23).
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CHAPTER TWO: CRITIQUES OF THE DEPENDENCE WORLD 
OUTLOOK
2.1 Introduction
There is now an abundance of literature which offers a critique of 
the dependence world outlook. We can identify two major groups 
in that literature. One group has sought to question or refute the 
validity of the dependence outlook by empirical means alone. The 
other has attempted to construct an alternative theorisation  of 
economic relations and development on a world scale.
2.2. Empirically-based refutations and appraisals of dependence 
The empirical critiques can themselves be divided into two sub­
groups. The first sub-group tests the validity of the dependence 
approach by quantitative measurements, but does not provide 
alternative statements. The other sub-group is made up of critiques 
which provide empirically-based alternative statements.
2.2.1. Purely empirical refutations
We shall start with the first sub-group of the empirical critiques, 
for which we take McGowan (1976) to be a significant representative.
McGowan seeks to respond to a proposition he perceives to be 
part of the dependence outlook, that a dependence relationship has 
a negative effect on the development of the the dependent country. 
The first point to note is that McGowan takes dependence to mean 
dependence on trade, and development to mean econ om ic  
p erfo rm a n ce . He accordingly seeks to test the proposition 
empirically by working out correlations between certain aspects of 
trade and a number of economic indicators of performance. The
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trade aspects deemed by him to define dependence are the share of a 
major donor in the total official bilateral aid to a 'dependent 
country', the percentage of exports going to a major trading partner, 
the share of the three leading commodities in total exports, and the 
extent of in ternational trad ing  tha t a country  carries out.i 
McGowan understands the dependence outlook to be proposing 
that where the ratios are higher, economic perform ance becomes 
negative. Having m ade this assum ption, he matches each of the 
trade aspects in turn  with twenty-three quantifiable economic 
indicators of perform ance in a sample of thirty 'black African' 
countries.
McGowan's project enables him to conclude that there is no 
significant correlation betw een ratios of the trade aspects in 
question and levels of economic performance, except in terms of 
in ternational trading. H ow ever, he argues, in this case the 
correlation contradicts the prediction of the dependence outlook, 
since w hat his results show is that the 'black African' countries 
where foreign trade was a relatively large factor in the national 
economy perform ed better than in those in which it was not 
(McGowan, 1976: 31). With this argum ent, McGowan then states 
that dependence 'theory' is not valid.
Several observations can be m ade on M cGowan’s project. 
W ithout questioning the ability of his indicators to m easure 
economic performance as others have done (Smith, 1977), it can be 
seen that McGowan does not exercise adequate caution in his use of 
economic indicators to make a judgem ent on development. It will 
also be seen that his understanding of dependence is not correct.
McGowan observes that dependence theorists have criticized 
'export-generated economic growth', and concludes from this that
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these authors see large ratios of foreign trade as evidence of 
dependence (McGowan, 1976: 29). The latter does not necessarily 
follow from the former, and no dependence theorist has reached 
that conclusion. It is of course possible to link a dependence theorist 
with a criticism of 'export-generated economic growth', for example 
Samir Amin (1974b) w ith the concept of the 'export sector'. 
However, a keener examination of the concept of 'export sector', 
which is only one among a num ber of dependence  sym ptom s 
considered, shows that the m eaning is different from that of 
'export-generated economic growth'. Not only does the concept 
encompass a particular type of social relations, but even in its 
economic sense its specified differentia is not that a country's 
economic growth is generated by export, but that the 'export sector' 
is disarticulated from the rest of the dependent economy.
McGowan's understanding of dependence derives from a very 
general meaning of vulnerability, as pointed out by Smith (1977), 
and som etim es even from a dictionary m eaning of relying on 
som ething or som eone. D ependence transcends both  these 
m eanings.
McGowan's problem with the meaning of dependence is partly 
due to w hat he himself considers a lack of a commonly agreed upon 
definition (McGowan, 1976: 38). Observing generally that much of 
the critique of the dependence approach is 'm isplaced' and 
'misconceived', Bienefeld (1980: 5) has had this to say:
"the theoretical and political diversity of the argum ents which 
have been associated with this [dependence] school of thought 
is such that it is no great task to find form ulations and 
conclusions w ith which to disagree. W hat is more difficult, 
m ore rare and more useful is to distil  the essence o f  the
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argument out of the stew of the debate and to subject it to 
scrutiny. As will become obvious, the way one defines this 
essence has a direct bearing on how it withstands the 
subsequent scrutiny." (Emphasis added.)
As has been pointed out by Kleemeier (1978: 703-704) and Smith 
(1977: 116), even in a very general sense dependence refers to a 
particular historical evolution and the structure of the global social 
formation which prevents self-generating growth from occurring in 
dependent countries. Two propositions, again of a general nature, 
can serve as elaborations of this broad description. Firstly that the 
lack of self-generating growth is chiefly associated with the global 
spread of capitalism as an economic system. This general 
proposition is a starting point for investigation, and it hardly 
expresses a preference for the social system in question. Its 
validation is possible by the investigation of the history of the 
global spread of capitalism both generally and for specific 
geographical entities. The second proposition is that the 
perpetuation of the lack of self-generating growth is caused by the 
economic structure whose relative stability is supported by various 
externally and internally based social forces acting at economic, 
social and political levels. The emphasis of the propositions on the 
system and the global character of that system shows a recognition 
of the objective and universalistic tendency of the accumulation 
process, and it is in this context that associating capitalism with the 
present state of affairs in the Third World should be understood. 
McGowan's polemical interpretation of it as a 'psychologically 
satisfying value standpoint which places the blame on the "devils" 
in the West' misses the point.
A critique which assigns itself the task of refuting the entire
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dependence world outlook is expected to address the entire context 
of the object of refutation. McGowan's critique revolves around one 
factor, which is trade, and therefore should be directed towards that 
factor alone, or, better still, to a specific author who understands 
dependence purely in terms of trade and economic performance. 
That McGowan does not identify such an author and yet assigns 
this meaning to dependence, we suggest, is largely because he 
sought and made out empirical propositions that would be readily 
measurable. McGowan (1976: 37) reveals his central concern in one 
of the passages, where he states that
"The problem for the social scientist is to describe dependence 
adequately, and to measure it in a reliable and valid fashion ” 
(Emphasis added.)
In the process McGowan pushes aside the question of a correct 
presentation of the material to be evaluated.
Several participants in this debate have observed that the main 
difficulty of social scientists who are heavily inclined towards 
quantitative measurements is that they are predisposed towards 
deriving meaning that is readily measurable (Jackson, et.al., 1979: 
20; Seers, 1981: 15). There is then a tendency to push aside the 
question of a correct presentation of the material to be evaluated, as 
McGowan does with dependence. This central concern for what is 
readily measurable ultimately turns into empiricism in the case of 
McGowan when he declares dependence invalidated on account of 
his own quantitative empirical project alone.
The points raised by McGowan are similar to those put forward by 
another purely empirical appraisal of dependence, conducted by 
Kaufman and others (1975). By using cross-sectional data for 
various nations, this project examines the effect of certain types of
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external factors, including trade, investm ent and debt, on Third 
W orld 'economic development and distribution'. The project has 
been criticized by Jackson et al (1979: 19- 20), who are themselves 
in v o lv ed  in q u an tita tiv e  m easu rem en ts of dependence  
propositions. The latter argue that such projects have no regard to 
structure, history and social relations, and that they assign to 
dependence different kinds of m eaning which are only remotely 
connected with it. These kinds of meaning, they point out, include 
the notion that external relations cause inequality, and that 
aggregate economic production equals development. Chase-Dunn 
(1975), w ho has conducted  ano ther em pirical app ra isa l of 
dependence, can be criticized in a similar way (Jackson et al, 1979).
The same dissatisfaction can be expressed regarding the work of 
Vengroff (1975, 1977). By his own account, Vengroff's work ends up 
'supporting the propositions of the dependence outlook', after he 
set out 'to subject dependency theory to a prelim inary empirical 
test'. But, once again, neither does the author seek to identify the 
central thesis or theses of the dependence outlook nor does he 
relate any of what he calls 'assertions of dependence' to a writer 
w ithin that outlook. He lists three of w hat he regards as elements 
of dependence. These are accordingly form ulated into three 
hypotheses for testing. The first is that there is a negative 
correlation  betw een economic dependence and the econom ic 
perform ance of a nation. His figures appear to disprove this 
hypothesis. The second is that there are positive correlations 
betw een economic dependence, political dependence and m ilitary 
dependence, and he finds the hypothesis proven. The th ird  
proposition is that there is a positive correlation between economic 
dependence and the level of inequality within a nation. While
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regarding inequality as being the 'most crucial test of dependence 
theory', he considers that 'the best available m easure of this 
inequality ' is 'the ethnic represen tativeness of the cabinet' 
(Vengroff, 1977: 615, 620). And this rather rare definition of 
inequality in the dependence debate helps Vengroff prove the 
hypothesis correct. W hat is quite clear is that none of these 
hypotheses is proposed by the dependence outlook.
One other appraisal of dependence to be considered in this 
category is that of Lall (1975). Lall argues that there is a close affinity 
between the words dependence and interdependence, and that it is 
possible to show empirically the relationship between nation-states 
as one of interdependence. He agrees that the features of the 
economy as described by dependence theorists exist, but argues that 
dependence is the wrong word to describe them. In effect Lall's 
critique becomes a linguistic one.
There is indeed interdependence between alm ost all social 
phenomena. But concepts do not necessarily equal the elementary 
meaning of words from which they originate. Foster-Carter (1976) 
and Cardoso and Faletto (1979: xxi) have dem onstrated how  
conceptually mistaken this 'interdependence' view is as a counter­
critique of the dependence approach.
Lall raises two further themes for consideration, although they 
are quite undeveloped in the essay. The first argues that the features 
of underdevelopm ent described by dependence theorization are 
general to capitalist growth, and that these features are present in 
no greater m agnitude in 'underdeveloped ' countries than in 
industrialized countries. Lall does not produce figures, but he 
insists that his views are based on their empirical demonstrability. 
What is notable is the impression given, that the significant features
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of development observed in the Third W orld are not peculiar to it. 
The second theme raised by Lall is that dependence theorization 
takes a value standpoint, i.e. whether capitalist developm ent is 
desirable or not. This description of dependence analyses as being 
influenced by ideological or moral preferences is better formulated 
than McGowan's attem pt in his reference to 'blaming the devil in 
the West', and can to an extent be demonstrated. Lall also points to 
features - for example im m iseration - which he thinks do not 
signify dependence but aspects of capitalism that are objectionable to 
dependence theorists (Lall, 1981). But he merely mentions them, 
and we think that they are better articulated by those who have 
attempted to present an alternative statement, as we shall see soon.
Although Lall himself does not produce figures, he works out 
'characteristics of dependence' to be measured as factors in a manner 
similar to others in this category. He too appears to be convinced 
that the proof or validation  of dependence theorization  is 
dependent entirely on the critic's empirical measures of what are 
thought to be characteristics of dependence. The additional two 
them es in troduced by him and m entioned above indicate an 
awareness that dependence is not m ade up of rigid features and 
mechanical relationships - an attem pt to meet the theorization on a 
conceptual plane. Below we consider the largely empirical refutation 
of dependence by Warren (1973), who is categorised in a different 
sub-group because he offers alternative statem ents to those he 
criticizes.
2.2.2 Warren’s refutation of dependence
In his article, W arren (1973) addresses two conceptual issues, 
imperialism  and dependence. The two issues are not treated as
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separate, an omission that is not peculiar to Warren; the material 
he criticizes also usually presents the two issues as if they were 
always one and the same. In this section we try to pick out only 
those aspects of W arren's critique th a t are relevant to the 
dependence outlook.
Despite the fact that W arren does not argue out a fully co­
ordinated conceptual framework or theory of his own as such, some 
of the statements he makes are of a conceptual nature. Let us 
present these first.
In his critique of dependence theorists, W arren addresses them as 
m arxist socialists. According to him  these m arxist socialists 
m aintain that im perialist dom ination causes underdevelopm ent 
and dependence, and that because of these factors the prospects of 
independent economic developm ent/independent industrialization 
in underdeveloped countries are nil or negligible unless they take a 
socialist option (Warren, 1973: 3).
W arren's response contains the following points:
(a) Empirical observations suggest that the prospects for successful 
capitalist economic development (implying industrialization) of a 
significant num ber of major underdeveloped countries are quite 
good (Warren, 1973: 3).
(b) Substantial progress in capitalist industrialization has already- 
been achieved.
(c) The period since the second W orld W ar has been marked by a 
major upsurge in capitalist social relations and productive forces 
(especially in industrialisation) in the Third World.
(d) In so far as there are obstacles to this development, they originate 
not in current imperialist-Third W orld relationships, but almost 
entirely from the internal contradictions of the Third World itself.
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(e) The policies of imperialist countries and their overall impact on 
the Third World actually favour the latter's industrialization.
(f) The ties of dependence binding the Third W orld to the imperialist 
countries have been, and are being, m arkedly loosened, with the 
consequence that the distribution of pow er w ithin the capitalist 
world is becoming less uneven (Warren, 1973: 3).
2.2.2.I. Evaluation of Warren’s statements
The first observation we can make is that it is m isleading to 
interpret dependence theorisation in a simple way as a marxist 
socialist debate. We have already noted in C hapter One that 
in d iv id u a l d e p e n d e n c e  th e o ris ts  d raw  from  d iffe ren t 
methodological and philosophical sources, a view supported by 
some of the classifiers of dependence writers such as O'Brien (1979), 
Higgott (1980) and Chilcote (1981). The main danger of W arren's 
characterization lies in the possibility of losing the kernel and 
identity of the dependence debate in either a different or a more 
general discourse. One of the usual problems which accompanies 
W arren-like characterisations of dependence w riters is the 
emphasis on the ideological 'spin-offs' of the debate, one which, as 
Palma (1981) observes, has left an indelible negative m ark on the 
objective aspect of it. As we shall see later, W arren's critique of 
dependence is full of ideological intervention which should be 
relevant to marxists or socialists, but which prohibits treatm ent of 
the dependence debate in depth.
A second observation which can be m ade is that at the 
theoretical level W arren does not appear to pay enough attention to 
a clear conceptualization of the factors and term s that are 
fundam ental to the debate on dependence and imperialism. For
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example, throughout the essay, and as indicated by point (d) above, 
he treats imperialism as if it was a purely external factor to the 
Third World. Like those sustaining dependence, the social forces of 
im perialism  are both externally and internally based, at least 
according to some of the major theorists of dependence. As such it 
is not accurate to portray imperialism as being exclusive from, or 
the opposite of, 'internal contradictions' of the Third World. Thus 
the use that W arren makes of the concept of dependence itself at 
times seems unclear.2
W arren's statement that the policies of imperialist countries and 
their overall impact favour Third World industrialization is based 
on two premises: That intra-imperialist rivalry has increased the 
latitude for Third W orld m anoeuvre and bargaining, and that 
im p eria lis t policies are now  consciously d irec ted  to the 
developm ent of productive forces in order to stop revolutions in 
that part of the world (Warren, 1973: 13-16). When these premises 
are combined with the development, after formal independence, of 
various dom estic groups that are keen to industrialise  their 
countries, then according to Warren the result can only be further 
industrialization (Warren, 1973: 13-16, 42-43).
There is no doubting the increased bargaining power of the Third 
W orld at some levels, especially after the reinforcement of the bloc 
brought about by decolonisation, although this fact remains only 
rem otely connected to the issue of dependence. There is also no 
d o u b tin g  tha t extensive industria l in frastruc tu re  has been 
constructed in many parts of the Third World since then. However 
the po in t about the relationship betw een dependence and 
developm ent raised by the theorists still remains, and that is the 
extent to which these increased chances for industrialization or
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development remain only a possibility or become a reality.
In the early 1970s a more substantive type of bargaining power for 
the Third World was seen to have come into being from the unity 
of o il-p roducing  T hird  W orld C ountries, and  also, m ore 
importantly, from an apparently steady world market price rise for 
other major Third W orld-produced commodities. W riting in the 
same period as W arren, and with 'optimism' for the Third World 
typical of the time, Hone (1973) was so impressed by this that he 
interpreted it as a definite and im portant shift in power relations. 
W ithout at the m om ent questioning the appropria teness of 
equating the possession of bargaining power with the elimination of 
dependence which W arren, as Hone and others in the period 
appeared to do, even here the question rem ained w hether this 
'shift' was not exclusively tied to the boom and therefore transitory. 
W hile offering qualified support to Hone, and arguing that oil, 
ra ther than the com m odity boom, offered the possibility of a 
perm anent shift in such power relations, Emmanuel (1974: 79-82) 
was not convinced that the observed boom of the 1970s would be a 
perm anent feature. In addition, it should be noted that Hone 
shows the rise of the price index of Third World commodities one- 
sidedly, w ithout showing the price index of m anufactured goods 
that are commonly imported by the Third W orld.3
In attaching a great deal of significance to the im petus to 
industrialise in the era following decolonisation, W arren finds the 
'participation of imperialism ' critical and a factor to be sought by 
Third World industrialisers. It is this which leads him to argue that 
w hat may be term ed the organisational form of imperialism, the 
transnational corporation, is highly beneficial to the Third World, 
and, he adds, almost a liability to its home country. This, according
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to him, is because transnational corporations transfer capital, 
technology and employment to the Third World, thus creating a 
net loss on these factors in their countries of origin (Warren, 1973: 
39). Emmanuel (1976: 754-768) has made the same argument in an 
article devoted to the study of transnational corporations. But, 
mindful of the possible charge from some of the 'dependetistas', 
that this does not lead to 'independent industrialization', and 
perhaps conceding the point that economic sovereignty in this area 
might have a value in its own right, Warren states that such a 
criterion has already been met to a great extent. He recognises four 
aspects of the criterion of sovereignty, first highlighted by Sutcliffe 
(1972), in which the achievement has been made. These are: that 
development should be based on the home market, that 
development should entail the existence of a wide range of 
industries locally, that development should not rely on 
uncontrolled foreign finance and that technological progress should 
be independent.
Warren uses a lot of statistical data and believes that they are a 
strong basis for his arguments. Let us now turn to those figures. 
The figures used are national aggregates as well as totals for major 
categories of countries such as the 'underdeveloped' countries and 
the developed countries. They are organized around the common 
economic indicators in which the categories of GDP and industrial 
output are central. They show growth or increases in the economy 
in general, the share of industry in the economy, the number of 
industrial or manufacturing workers, the countries' terms of trade, 
their share of world trade, their balance of payments situation, their 
international reserves, and the local share in companies operating 
in domestic economies. All figures representing each of these
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categories show significant Third W orld growth rates.
A few preliminary points in relation to W arren's data should be 
advanced here. First, here as in numerous other studies of this type 
we have the problem of cross-national data, which tends to falsify 
the picture when countries with small GDPs or industrial outputs 
are lum ped together with those having large ones. Secondly we 
have the problem  of the tendency to exaggerate the rate of 
developm ent (or industrialization) when we rely on GDPs since in 
some countries these may be constituted almost exclusively by 
extractive economic activities that momentarily raise GDPs without 
p rov id ing  m uch im petus to the fu rther developm ent of the 
econom y, as w itness the case of oil-producing Third W orld 
economies as well as some which are primarily based on mining.
W hen the same cross-national data is broken up into individual 
national data units, and general totals disaggregated into more 
specific and analytical categories, the extremely positive picture of 
development in the Third World portrayed by Warren ceases to be 
dram atic and in places turns negative. This conclusion which 
W arren is only partly aware of comes out clearly in the critique by 
Emmanuel (1974), which we examine below.
2.2.3. Emmanuel's critique of Warren
Emmanuel agrees with W arren that developm ent implies 
industrialization, but he is critical of the claims the latter makes for 
his em pirical m aterial, and for 'jum ping to the unw arran ted  
conclusion that industrialization and development are one and the 
same thing' (Emmanuel, 1974: 63).
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"The very fact that manufacturing labour and manufacturing 
output, as percentages of total labour force and total output, are 
roughly the same in Argentina as in the USA, 25.1% and 28% 
as against 26.5% and 28%, and considerably higher than that, 
41.4% and 38%, in Hong Kong, proves in my view that 
industrialization  (sic) is by itself not a good gauge of 
development; for it would logically compel W arren to admit 
that Argentina is as highly developed as the USA, and Hong 
Kong 50% more so!" (Emmanuel, 1974: 63).
Emmanuel continues to argue (with figures) and show that where 
W arren incorrectly saw a robust developing Third W orld 
industrialization and the advance of productive forces, there was 
only 'backward industry' and 'backward agriculture' (Emmanuel, 
1974: 66). He uses the same aggregate totals of Third W orld 
industrial production over a specified period that W arren uses, but 
unlike W arren he introduces a labour p roductiv ity  m easure 
(defined simply as the ratio of total output to the total num ber of 
employees). Thus output per person was $592 in 'underdeveloped' 
countries, $3,760 in OECD countries and $7,180 in USA (Emmanuel, 
1974: 66). Furtherm ore considering that growth per head as an 
indicator of the development of the productive forces has more 
importance than  W arren is willing to assign it, Emmanuel finds 
that the gap between 'underdeveloped' countries and the developed 
ones has been widening. The difference in per capita levels had 
widened from 1:6 in 1900 to 1:13.2 in 1970 (Emmanuel, 1974: 71).
W arren (1973: 10) tells us that "the most relevant single indicator 
of the degree to which a large or m edium -sized economy is 
constructing m odern productive forces is the proportion of the
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active population employed in m odern manufacturing as compared 
to that employed in backward agriculture. He then refers us to a 
portion of his figures which shows the proportion of manufacturing 
workers to the total active population. Despite showing a much 
higher proportion in developed countries across the board, he 
thinks that the figures are an 'absolu tely  crucial', positive 
indication of the progress m ade in some Third W orld countries 
(Warren, 1973: 10). Yet on examining the figures critically one 
notices that W arren does not indicate the proportion of people still 
in agriculture. Emmanuel finds this to be an im portant omission. 
If included, the gap betw een developed countries and the 
'underdeveloped' ones would be far wider. Thus manufacturing 
labour force as a percentage of total population for the period that 
both writers work with would be 28.5 for OECD countries (less 
Turkey) and 10% for the rest of the world (less Eastern Europe). But 
agricultural labour force as a percentage of the total active 
population would be 11.6 and 68.7% respectively (Emmanuel, 1974: 
70).
Emmanuel's critique strengthens the argum ent that W arren's 
empirical evidence is the wrong source of commentary on whether 
there has been any significant development in the Third World. It 
merely shows that the Third World was not stagnant in the period 
under study. Indeed it is difficult to see how a social phenomenon 
can experience an absolute standstill for any meaningful length of 
time. It would therefore be ridiculous for W arren to marshall a 
mass of figures merely to dem onstrate this simple (and therefore 
tautological) point if it were not for what we suggest is his greater 
worry - namely that, anti-dependence and anti-im perialist notions 
contain the 'danger' of an autarkic shut-off from capital. The
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keenness on guarding against this 'danger', we suggest, leads him to 
infer more from his figures than they permit.
At the surface Emmanuel's critique of Warren appears to state 
only that 'underdeveloped' countries are in fact less developed 
than the developed countries (which is tautological), that the 
former's growth is inadequate, and that the gap between the two 
sets of countries is either as wide as, or is getting wider than, it used 
to be. What is more, Emmanuel is using similar cross-national data 
to argue this. It is on the surface a simple difference, built around 
the interpretation of figures. But in reality they differ on a central 
conceptual issue of development, and it is this which influences 
their differing conclusions even if made from the same set of 
figures.
Warren's concept of development appears to be limited to the 
notion of the development of 'productive forces', and his 
understanding of this notion seems to be simply the quantitative 
increase in material things.4 For Warren the 'human factor' is not 
an issue in the present era; it is moral and socialist, perhaps 
relevant in the future. What matters now is simply the increase in 
(the technical) productive forces irrespective of, for example, 
whether there is exploitation or not (Warren, 1973; Warren, 1980).
Emmanuel on the other hand is appreciative of the role played 
by the technical productive forces without conceding to the 
tendency to see them as ends in themselves (Emmanuel, 1974: 64). 
To elaborate, he states that labour productivity is a key to 
development, and that productivity is achieved through the 
intensification and spread of mechanization and workers' skills. 
The increase in mechanization and workers' skills, however, does 
not come from the production of machines in specified branches as
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is often assum ed, bu t from the utilisation of m achines and 
technicians in any branch whatsoever, including that in which 
machines are produced (Emmanuel, 1974: 64-66). Thus although 
industrialization is preferable to backward agriculture (Emmanuel, 
1974: 70), the appearance of factories alone does not enhance the 
capacity to meet the goals of development, nor does it become a 
good indicator of development by itself, the goals of development 
are stated by Emmanuel in a general way to be the attainm ent of 
w hat industrialized societies have come to regard as standard 
consum ption levels of various goods and services (Emmanuel, 
1972: 370; 1974: 62-65).
This view of developm ent provides some affinity between 
Emmanuel and dependence theorists, as well as with a number of 
others concerned as it were w ith 'the quality of life'. There is 
another aspect to this affinity with dependence theorists, of course. 
It is the popularly perceived Third Worldism considered portrayed 
by the theses of his writings, especially that of unequal exchange to 
which we referred earlier in Chapter One.
Emmanuel's purpose in the book (Emmanuel, 1972) was, among 
others, to explain why 'underdeveloped ' countries were not 
narrowing 'the gap'. Its message was that they were not narrowing 
the gap because their workers were paid below the value of their 
labour-power, leading to lower prices for Third World- produced 
commodities. This thesis was recounted throughout the book, 
th o u g h  E m m anuel d id  no t then  see the  so lu tio n  to 
'underdevelopm ent' as being the im provem ent of the terms of 
trade (Emmanuel, 1972: 371). In the articles (Emmanuel, 1974; 1976) 
which came later the explanation was repeated, but in addition, the 
importance of capital (including technology) was brought to the
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fore. The argument of these articles was that lower incomes in the 
Third World would not attract capital, which is crucial in 
development, and if the Third World continues to be starved of 
capital, productivity will not rise and incomes will be kept low. In 
one of the articles (Emmanuel, 1976) he exhorts the Third World to 
attract those with capital, identified as the transnational 
corporations, and attacks those who are anti-capital, perceived to be 
mainly the dependence theorists.
It can be said that, because Emmanuel retains the unequal 
exchange explanation of 'underdevelopment', and because he is 
concerned with the 'quality of life' in the Third World even though 
in the purely underconsumptionist sense of the magnitude of 
incomes, he still has some affinity with the dependence outlook in 
the articles too. However, for those who believe as he now does, 
that the dependence outlook is anti- capital, his articles finally show 
him abandoning the 'Third Worldist' stance. This may be the more 
accurate interpretation, particularly since in the articles, Emmanuel 
himself makes it clear that his real adversaries are dependence 
theorists. Taking it for the moment that this is the interpretation of 
his writings that matters, for the purpose of comparison and 
summary we can note the following. It is the view of both Warren 
and Emmanuel that capital is crucial to the Third World due to its 
ability to bring about development there. With Warren it is already 
doing so. With Emmanuel it remains only a potential force.
Both Warren and Emmanuel use extensively the quantitative 
empirical approach to make their points. But whereas Warren's 
attempt to make an alternative statement derives exclusively from 
his figures, Emmanuel's does not.
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Below we examine a fully conceptual critique of dependence with 
its own alternative framework.
2.3. A conceptual refutation of dependence: The 'merchant capital’ 
thesis of Geoffrey Kay
2.3.1 Kay's appraisal of conventional development theory, and of 
the dependence response
To an extent, all the major theorists of dependence place the 
initial responsibility for underdevelopment on merchant capital. 
The degree of emphasis differs from one writer to another, but we 
can note that some dependence-oriented historical studies (Rodney, 
1972; Amin, 1972) have dwelt on this more than the purely 
theoretical ones. We also find that Baran (1973), who is sometimes 
considered to be one of the sources of the dependence framework, 
placed more emphasis on the role of merchant capital in 
underdevelopment than was done by dependence theorists. This is 
not surprising, since he had an entire chapter devoted to tracing 'the 
roots of backwardness'. However, both Baran and the dependence 
theorists saw merchant capital as a specific historical stage of capital. 
Its operation in what is now the Third World occurred when there 
was a purely commercial contact between the then mercantile 
Europe and other parts of the world. As we shall see, Kay's 
understanding of merchant capital differs from this, and he is more 
explicit about its responsibility for 'underdevelopment'.
Firstly Kay states that the conventional development framework 
dominated development studies and was its only framework before 
the advent of the dependence outlook. He also states that the 
framework saw 'underdevelopment' chiefly as an original 
condition in which all countries once existed - characterized by such
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things as poverty, low labour productivity, inadequate equipment 
and a heavy dependence on a primitive agrarian sector. The 
ideological point arising from this conventional development 
argument, according to Kay, was that in this way the responsibility 
for underdevelopment could not be attributed to any country or 
social class, and colonialism was exonerated.5 Kay then shows that 
just as no single body of knowledge can have a secure existence 
without a scientific basis, the conventional development 
framework had its scientific basis too. To demonstrate how wrong a 
body of knowledge is, it is important to identify and examine its 
scientific basis. Kay identifies the scientific basis of the 
conventional development framework as neo-classical economics. 
The important elements of neo classical economics in a simplified 
summary include among others the following arguments.
(a) There is a universal problem, scarce means and unlimited ends, 
and therefore the object of (economic) study is the allocation of 
scarce means to unlimited ends. Kay argues that this element 
accounts for the preoccupation of much of economics, by 
implication conventional development analyses as well, with 
quantitative data.
(b) The three factors of production, land, labour and capital are 
socially equivalent to each other and rewarded according to their 
contribution in production. The ideological position which this 
element produces, according to Kay, is that there is no exploitation 
at all.
(c) The property relations of capitalism are universal and desirable. 
The ideological position in support of capitalism is obvious here, 
according to Kay. Furthermore, this element, together with the 
concept of universal scarcity is the basis for the lack of history, and
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the dominance of static notions, in neo-classical economics as well 
as conventional development analyses (Kay, 1975: 1-12).
Kay goes on to show how it is possible to move from the neo­
classical economic categories to the concepts of a dual society in the 
Third World - one traditional the other modern, the object of 
development being essentially the diffusion of modernity into the 
traditional society. The strictly economic variant of this diffusion of 
modernity is the diffusion of capital. A good part of Kay's work is 
then devoted to refuting the assumptions of neo-classical 
economics, which takes him to the categories employed by Karl 
Marx, the most important of which, according to Kay, is the law of 
value.
It is the law of value, at least Kay's interpretation of it, which 
leads him to place responsibility for 'underdevelopment' on 
merchant capital while crediting productive capital with 
development. His position is a significant alternative to both 
conventional development theory and dependence, at least in the 
realm of theory, allowing Kay to agree with both in one respect, and 
to disagree with them in another. He agrees with dependence 
theorists for placing responsibility for 'underdevelopment' on 
capitalism and disagrees with them for saying or implying that 
capital is not the source of development. In turn he agrees with 
conventional development theorists that capitalism is the source of 
development while disagreeing with them for saying that it is not 
responsible for 'underdevelopment'. Of greater interest to us here, 
however, is Kay's basic disagreement with the dependence outlook 
and the logic of his alternative theory.
Kay commends the dependence theorists for having shown that 
the phenomenon of 'underdevelopment' is a result of the same
78
process which accounted for development elsewhere, such as 
Europe. In this way the dependence outlook countered the 
ideological and often chauvinistic stance prevalent in the 
conventional development framework, according to which Europe 
and capitalism could only carry out a developmental mission to the 
Third World (Kay, 1975: 1-3). The shortcoming in the dependence 
outlook, according to Kay, was to respond in ideological terms 
without attacking the scientific basis of conventional development 
theory. This inadequacy leaves dependence theorists still 
preoccupied with quantitative analyses, which must mean that they 
belong to the same framework that they appear to attack (Kay, 1975: 
10). Leys (1977) has taken up Kay’s criticism of dependence theorists 
and said much the same thing about them. The ideological counter­
argument by dependence theorists is the reason, according to Kay, 
they were so eager to prove what conventional development 
theorists were themselves already beginning to accept - capitalism's 
responsibility for 'underdevelopment' - that they missed the more 
important point of capitalism being the source of development 
(Kay, 1975: 7-10).
Kay is unconvincing in his assertion that dependence theorists 
were in a sense all part of the conventional development 
framework, especially when seen in the light of the individual 
contributions of the theorists we discussed in Chapter One. There is 
also no supportive evidence, either for arguing that dependence 
theorists merely presented ideological responses, or for implying as 
Kay does, that ideological additions to analyses diminish the latter's 
value. With these preliminary comments, we must now turn to the 
alternative statement that Kay makes.
The law of value has implications for theories of capitalism,
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development and exploitation. Many of these lie outside the scope 
of this thesis. We therefore do not treat that 'law' in detail here, 
our emphasis being on the elements that constitute the relationship 
between the 'law' and merchant capital, even though this may not 
do justice to Kay's presentation. Let us begin by saying that the law 
recognizes labour as the only value-creating factor in all societies 
which carry out commodity exchange, and that merchant capital 
opens up but does not fully facilitate the development of capitalist 
commodity production. This is because, being largely restricted to 
exchange, it does not add value, which takes place only in 
production.
2.3.2 The Law of value and the development of unequal 
exchange
What follows is our attempt to present the history of the 
operation of the law of value in relation to forms or stages of 
capital, but especially in relation to merchant capital. Our 
presentation is roughly similar to that of Kay (1975) up to the period 
of 'colonial imperialism'.
First let us look at the operation of the law of value in the period 
of commodity production preceding capitalist production. It is 
known that at a very low level of production, all products are 
consumed by the producers themselves. Such a society knows no 
exchange. At a later time in its development, there begins to appear 
a surplus product in society. The surplus product then becomes a 
basis for exchange. Historically, the first act of exchange therefore 
occurred between two or more self sufficient communities, and 
what was exchanged was only that product which was practically 
superfluous to each of them. What is noteworthy at this point is
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that exchange took place between units of production that were 
independent, and made up of independent producers, each of 
whom engaged in, and had knowledge of, many activities. The 
exchange of products superfluous to their needs therefore was for 
obtaining what they could not find time to produce. Due to this 
non-specialization in a peasant 'natural economy' the amount of 
labour-time required to produce an article or articles could be clearly 
known or closely estimated. This and the fact that exchange was 
barter made it possible for goods to exchange at or close to value 
(what can be regarded as the pure form of the operation of the law 
of value relating to prices).
Even when the division of social labour developed much higher, 
such as when towns came into being (while exchange was still 
barter), exchange between town artisans and peasants could only be 
on the basis of the centrality of labour (Engels, 1976a: 106-125).
Known history shows that as society's 'forces of production' 
developed further, an enlargement of the surplus product occurred, 
necessitating a further development of the division of labour. In 
addition, at a point in this development of the division of labour, 
there was a discovery of precious metals, and their use as the 
universal exchange equivalent. Since this money form was a 
special commodity whose conditions of production was known 
only to a few people in areas distant to those which did not produce 
it, and since specialization meant that distant lands could now 
supply commodities whose conditions of production could not be 
fully ascertained, independent producers began to lose the ability to 
exchange at or close to value. Prices now tended to be only 
reflective of value.
It was out of this increased division of social labour that
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merchants appeared. Corresponding to the closed and proscriptive 
nature of society then, which in Europe was predominantly feudal, 
merchant trade associations with closed membership were formed. 
One of the advantages of the associations for merchants was their 
ability to guarantee equalized rates of profit for members, since they 
could compel members to sell or buy in accordance with prices fixed 
by the associations. It appears also that at this time the proportion 
of the surplus product extracted from independent producers and 
kept by merchants was very high. The reason for this, of course, is 
that exchange became a monopoly in many of its aspects. In 
addition the possession of vast sums of money by merchants made 
it possible for them to acquire influence and privilege in society. 
However, this was also the time when the state was being 
strengthened and centralized, and therefore requiring large sums of 
money for maintenance. In order to trade in alien estates or 
monopolies, merchants had to pay taxes and trade duties to ruling 
princes. Also, some of the merchants were likely to borrow heavily, 
in conditions of generally high-interest usury. This atmosphere of 
insecurity regarding their financial future contributed to the 
maintenance of a high rate of extraction of the surplus product.
The insecurity points to the limit of the power of merchants as a 
social grouping at that time, but the ability to determine prices 
almost at will made it a very privileged one indeed. Of particular 
theoretical interest is the point that, seen as a grouping able to 
'subdue' different producers at the level of exchange, merchants can 
be said to have engaged in unequal exchange with them, and that 
the unequal exchange 'objectively' being established at the 
economic level due to specialization and the coming into being of 
rare commodities was soon supported by the extra- economic
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organisation of merchants. This is the first instance of unequal 
exchange that can be said to have modified the pure operation of the 
law of value regarding prices (Engels, 1976a).
We have seen that the monopoly position of merchants 
engendered by strong associations or guilds ensured an equalization 
of the rate of profit for its members. However, a particular rate for 
each merchant guild or a group of them depended on the particular 
community or nation (i.e., the market) remaining closed, as it did 
for a while. This meant that although within the same guild or 
market merchants had an equal rate of profit, each market area had 
its own special rate of profit. The logical thing to follow from this 
situation would be that trade would tend to withdraw from an area 
with a lower rate of profit to where it is higher, provided the 
markets opened up and allowed competition, which they did later. 
The competition among different associations and among different 
nationalities that followed realized an equalization of profit by 
economic means alone. This competition inevitably put more 
money into the hands of single merchants, some of the competitors 
were squeezed out of action, and the guilds gradually became 
superfluous.
One type of competition which hastened the deterioration of 
merchant associations was the inter-continental trade which now 
came into being. With this trade the associations receded further 
into the background; to the fore came the protection of single 
merchants by the state, and in some cases the state itself now 
actively traded through these single merchants (Engels, 1976a). In 
'distant' lands the merchants traded with independent producers 
who obviously had no knowledge of most of the goods brought to 
them or of conditions of production elsewhere. They also
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overwhelmed the independent producers, since they had powerful 
states to back them. This made it possible for merchants to have a 
dominant position in the determination of prices, and, in the 
historical sense, this is another instance of unequal exchange. This 
too constituted a modification of the law of value since the 
determination of prices was increasingly less reflective of the 
labour-time expended in production, and more of the privileged 
status of the merchant in the market, which was both economic and 
political.
What we have considered so far is that the development of 
commodity production necessitated the emergence of the merchant 
at some point, and with it unequal exchange, and the modification 
of the law of value. But it is important to emphasize that 
merchants did not overwhelm independent producers everywhere. 
This was not possible because the production process and the means 
of production were still in the hands of producers, thus permitting 
a large part of the domestic market of each merchant's own 
community or nationality to remain outside the merchant circuit, 
and for exchange to continue to take place more or less at value in 
that market. As long as producers remained independent in the 
merchant's own community, the chief sources of profits for 
merchants were the foreign buyers of domestic products or the 
domestic buyers of foreign products.
Engels (1976a: 121) summed up the operation of the law of value 
in this period in the following terms:
"And thus we find here that commodities are sold at their 
values, on the average, in the domestic retail trade, but, for 
reasons given, not in international trade as a rule."
The suggestion here is that the most significant modification of the
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law of value, referred to as a reversal by Amin (1977), and 
considered a refutation of that law by Emmanuel (1972), occurred 
outside the domestic markets. The suggestion is also that in the 
original sense, for instance as understood by Engels, unequal 
exchange occurred at the 'rudimentary' stage of capital (or during 
the 'prehistory' of capital), as merchant capital, then the only form 
of capital, asserted itself over independent producers.
2.3.3 Merchant capital and the beginning of capitalist 
production
As merchants acquired more capital and specialization 
intensified, it now became possible for some to employ people from 
the population of independent producers, a situation no doubt 
assisted into existence by, among other things, the emerging process 
of land alienation. It has been suggested by some that wage labour 
as a form of production first emerged in shipping and mining, 
controlled by richer merchants. Its characteristic was the payment 
for the workers in those activities of what we now describe as an 
amount enough for subsistence, and not necessarily the amount 
equivalent to the labour-time the labourer expended on the job. In 
this way a further increase in merchants' profits was possible: there 
was unequal exchange with distant independent producers, as well 
as outright plunder; and the merchants were also exploiting 
labourers on the basis of unpaid-for surplus labour, which is the 
definition of capitalist exploitation. Meanwhile, as production for 
exchange became generalized, greater amounts of capital as well as 
stable sources of raw materials were now required to maintain or 
step up levels of production. This need appears to have been felt 
especially by the exporting craftsmen. Initially, merchants were
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well placed for this task of supplying large amounts of capital. They 
now bought raw materials which they brought to independent 
artisans and craftsmen, who worked them for a wage, to be sold as 
goods by merchants. This guaranteed a stable employment for the 
artisans, but it also accounted for a high rate of profit for merchants, 
since they were able to sell the products at an established mercantile 
rate of profit. The merchants who went into production in this 
limited way were therefore at an advantage in comparison with the 
merchants per excellence. This advantage soon afforded the former 
an opportunity to undersell the other merchants by reducing the 
price. In time, this forced other mercantile competitors to do the 
same, i.e., get involved in production to a degree, which tended to 
equalize the rate of profit, and, more importantly, led to the 
intensification of the exploitation of the labour of independent 
producers.
But merchant capital did not put back into production the surplus 
value so acquired; in effect it transferred value otherwise created in 
(the now increasingly capitalist) production to the sphere of 
circulation, where it was non-productive. It is true that through 
unequal exchange, plunder and later the exploitation of labour, the 
amount of wealth was increased, and these large amounts of wealth 
further spread and intensified trade, stimulating commodity 
production in every area they touched in turn. But merchant 
capital was now a fetter to the development of capitalist production, 
not only because it continued to draw out and away from 
production the value necessary for reploughing, but also because, 
having been brought up in the care of restrictive feudal guilds, it 
could not open the economy wide enough for capitalist production 
and exchange.
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It was the independent producers, and some merchants, through 
the investment of large amounts of capital, who began to organize 
capitalist production away from the control of merchants. When 
manufacture started, and the technical production process was 
organized through 'co-operative' labour - the pre-cursor of large- 
scale industry, more commodities were produced and cheapened 
(Engels, 1976a: 124).
2.3.4 The defeat of merchant capital
Large-scale industry ultimately conquered the domestic market 
for capital, which in its long history had created the process of 
proletarianisation based on the freeing of a section of the producers 
from their means of production. The maturation of capitalism, and 
of industry in particular, heralded the demise of not only the feudal 
system but also merchant capital as the dominant capital. 
Consequently this set into motion the decline of the economic 
power of the merchant class, in particular its commercial 
subjugation of independent producers.
The course and outcome of the struggle between industry and 
mercantilism is the main point at issue in the debate on the role of 
merchant capital and 'underdevelopment'. In England this struggle 
came to a climax in the first half of the 19th century; the 
parliamentary reforms of 1830 and the repeal of the protectionist 
corn laws in the 1840s were the immediate political representation 
of these struggles (Engels, 1976b), as were, in the long term, the Tory 
party of the time (for landed and mercantile interests) and the 
Whigs (for the rising 'free-trade' industrialists).
One of the political forms that the struggle took at that time was 
the India Question, in which the trading (and governing) East India
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Company was the centre of the debate (Marx, 1976c). The history of 
the company is unique to the extent that it spanned the entire 
m ercantilist period, and can easily be seen to epitom ize the 
developm ent of m erchant activities abroad, i.e., at first unequal 
exchange accompanied with plunder, then a tendency tow ards 
involvem ent in production, and, above all, a monopoly of trade 
w hich it m aintained until its demise. A lthough m ost of its 
ac tiv ities, inc lud ing  its 'h a lf-h earted ' invo lvem ent w ith  
production, were in India, its privileged relationship with the state 
(which also spanned the entire mercantilist period) was situated in 
England. Thus the struggle on the Indian Question, in which the 
East India Com pany then occupied centre stage, also clearly 
represented industrial capital's struggle against m erchant capital 
abroad and at home. The defeat of the pro-East India group, and the 
consequent demise of the company and others of its kind, mirrored 
the elimination of merchant capital and the start of the dominance 
of productive capital, led by industrial capital. The ending of the 
Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade was also largely related to this.
The defeat of m erchant capital everywhere was necessary to 
industrial capital since, to use the words of Kay (1975: 101), "as an 
independent dominant power, merchant capital trades where it can 
and w hat it can without scruple: here slaves; there opium". In this 
way it leaves behind a devastating effect on the productive powers 
and consum ption capacity of society, one not conducive to 
supplying raw materials and providing a market for manufactured 
goods, the role that was being created for the non- industrial areas at 
that time. Later, these areas took an additional role as new areas of 
investm ent (or Lenin's 'export of capital'). Obviously 'productive 
capital' itself d id  not everyw here tu rn  producers into wage
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labourers, but the process of capital accumulation required, as a 
minimum condition, the spread of a commodity economy geared to 
the specific needs of industry, and the guarantee of an 'open' 
market, which could not be accomplished by merchant capital even 
in the new areas.
The process culminating in the defeat of m erchant capital was 
w orldw ide, and the m erchants' position as a dom inant social 
grouping in an evolving worldwide system of commodity exchange 
was now taken by industrial capitalists.
2.3.5 The limitation of Kay's theory of merchant capital
Kay differs from this view at the point of conclusion, for he 
argues that whereas m erchant capital was defeated in Europe, it 
continued to exist hegem onically in the 'underdeveloped world', 
and tha t this is w hat explains 'underdevelopm ent'. This is 
elaborated theoretically by Kay in the following m anner: that 
m erchant capital entails, from the standpoint of the law of value, 
unequal exchange and the transfer of value from production, both 
of which are related to its monopolistic exchange position, and 
w hich result in a high profit rate. Kay then attem pts to 
demonstrate this argum ent with 'four acts of exchange' in which he 
perceives merchant capital to be engaged: there are two acts of 
selling, and two of buying. On one side of the transaction with 
m erchant capital are Third W orld producers, on the other 
'p roductive ' capital. The circuit involving m erchant capital, 
therefore, has the following phases.
1.Purchase of raw materials in the underdeveloped countries.
2.Sale of raw materials to productive capital.
3.Purchase of output of productive capital.
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4.Sale of output to 'underdeveloped' countries and the completion 
of the circuit involving merchant capital (Kay, 1975: 120-122).
Kay then puts up several possible cases of unequal exchange that 
can occur between other groups and merchant capital. According to 
him, unequal exchange occurs on both ends in some cases, and it is 
these cases that account for merchant profits. It can also occur at 
one end only (in the Third World) while on the other (with 
productive capital) merchants exchange either at value or under it.
We suggest that to argue this way involves two assumptions. 
The first is that exchange is the only relationship between Third 
World producers and capital. But this is not the only relationship; 
production is another. As Bernstein has argued in his critique of 
Kay, the involvement of capital in production in the Third World 
is not merely a 20th century phenomenon; it goes back to the last 
century. Secondly, assuming that there is a predominance of 
commercial activities in the Third World which Kay equates with 
merchant capital, it would still be necessary to show the 
independence and equality of all the three actors - Third World 
producers, commercial capital and 'productive' capital, in particular 
the independence of both Third World producers and commercial 
capital from 'productive' capital. But this is not the case. 
Productive capital has brought under its control all forms of 
production even if these are still pre-capitalist (Bernstein, 1976). 
And this 'productive' capital may at certain moments in its circuit 
appear mercantile (Marx, 1974: Ch.XX), but this does not change its 
productive characteristic. Thus 'productive' capital has been 
dominant in commodity production even in the Third World, such 
that it is possible to refer to producers there as surplus-value- 
creating labourers who are paid below the minimum requirements
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for their reproduction (Amin, 1974C; Bernstein, 1977).
It may seem that Kay merely fails to trace the evolution of the 
forms of capital, that his is only a problem of ignoring history. But, 
although he does not place any emphasis on it, at some point he 
admits that in the 'world economy’ the form of capital that he calls 
merchant capital exists only as a derivative of 'productive' capital, 
and that since the 1930s merchant capital has been dying out 
anyway. He also mentions that even though there has been a 
change since the 1930s, making it possible for the Third World to 
move towards industrialization, the historical advantages enjoyed 
by the early industrialisers will not reappear for the Third World. 
The last point probably represents a conscious effort not to fall into 
the trap of restating the conventional development thesis that the 
Third World has been going through a predictable and normal 
route of development all the while.
2.4 Summary and conclusion
The empirical critiques of the dependence outlook that we 
examined here clearly reject the outlook as a basis for explaining 
current world economic relations and levels of development in the 
Third World. Among those mentioned here, one sees itself as 
being supportive of the assumptions made by dependence theorists. 
However, we observed that this particular appraisal did not 
conceptualize the concerns of the dependence outlook correctly. 
This is a shortcoming it shared with all other empirical appraisals, 
in addition to not offering an alternative conceptualization of the 
problem.
In our view, one of the most interesting critiques of the 
dependence outlook came from Warren, who has used empirical
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material to make several statements which can be put together as a 
conceptual challenge to the outlook. The material we selected for 
this chapter from the substantial body of writings by Emmanuel, 
also indicated an important attempt at offering an alternative 
conceptual statement to the dependence outlook. Later we presented 
Kay's 'merchant capital' thesis as a fully conceptual alternative to 
the outlook.
We can regard Warren as an important participant in the debate 
on imperialism, socialism in the Third World and, for our purpose, 
the theories of dependence and development. The strength of his 
arguments includes the following.
(a) He pointed out the possibility of capitalist industrialization in the 
Third World in general, and gave statistical evidence of actual 
capitalist industrialization in some countries of the Third World in 
the latter half of this century. It is not that dependence theorists 
had refuted this; the point is simply that Warren focuses on this 
possibility and brings it out more sharply.
(b) He emphasized, in probably the way no-one before him had 
done, the role of political independence in current efforts at Third 
World industrialization. The point here is that nationalism and 
political autonomy - to the extent that it permits Third World 
countries to pursue some important developmental courses of 
action independently, and widens the range of sources of external 
capital - is conducive to industrialization, provided that becomes a 
national goal.
(c) He emphasized in a new way that once nationalists had gained 
political independence, the security and profits of imperialist 
corporations in the Third World increased, since not only were 
most factors of production cheaper, but usually there were also
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guarantees against production and m arket d isruptions w here 
nationalist industrialisers invited them. In this way imperialism 
becomes a partner in Third World industrialization.
But as we saw earlier in the chapter, W arren's contribution had 
significant weaknesses, which can be summed up as follows.
(a) A sim plistic usage of the concept of developm ent inducing 
exaggerated claims of actual development in the Third World. At 
times he means by developm ent in the Third W orld a simple 
increment in the supply and consumption of goods. This is neither 
a new point nor a very important one, for there is hardly a country 
in the w orld that has not increased its m aterial possessions, 
especially when such long time-segments as W arren uses are in 
consideration. At times he means by development an increase in 
capitalist industrialization. This as we know may reflect but is not 
equal to development in a comprehensive sense.
(b) An uncritical usage of data, and, in this case, cross-country 
statistics, m aking him fail to notice im portant differences in the 
pace of industrialization, and of development, among Third W orld 
countries.
(c) A preoccupation with the idea of a progressive imperialism (and
with polemical forms of response to anti-imperialist dependence 
theorists), making him fail to acknowledge the limits of imperialist 
contribution to Third W orld industrialization. One can envisage 
Third W orld nationalists wanting to go on industrializing, but 
there is no guarantee  that the im perialist partner in the
industrialization venture w ould continue to participate if, for 
example, the venture ceased to be profitable. W arren incorrectly 
appears to assume that imperialist participation is non-selective 
and will be perm anent. Furthermore, W arren assumes that all
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imperialist participation is positive, an assumption partly caused by 
an uncritical look at growth rates, when in fact all that his evidence 
indicates is an increase in industrial activities in some countries 
still under a great deal of imperialist influence.
Obviously there are wider implications of Warren's position for 
political philosophy and activist politics. We think it is fair to 
conclude in this regard by observing that Warren looks at the 
present world situation (in which, according to him, the Third 
World is steadily winning from imperialism the control over its 
destiny and is closing the development gap) as an objective one 
which happens to be useful and desirable to the Third World. 
Nothing radically different should be done to this situation, at least 
until capitalism runs its full life cycle in the Third World. The 
undesirable human side effects that this objective situation leaves 
behind in its process of development is a moral issue, largely 
unimportant at the moment and best left to a future post-capitalist 
society.
In his criticism of Warren, Emmanuel does not see 
development as having taken place in the Third World to any 
significant degree this century. He arrives at this conclusion even 
when he uses the same statistical data as Warren's. This is largely 
due to the fact that he believes cross-national or regional aggregates 
can be misleading and should therefore normally be broken down 
for analysis, and because he avoids a simple interpretation of 
positive increases in growth rates, refusing to rely wholly on such 
rates to define development, although they are useful in other 
aspects of the debate. At the same time he appears to be staunchly 
opposed to a possible suggestion that the Third World might 
achieve better levels of development by 'breaking away from the
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system', which he perceives to be the inclination of dependence 
theorists. He sees the potential for realizing development in the 
Third World as lying in the present system, and even, like Warren, 
with imperialism itself. Unlike Warren, he advocates a reform of 
the existing 'objective situation', believing that it can be modified 
by conscious policy actions, especially on wages, incomes and prices, 
perceived in global terms. These kinds of actions are not opposed by 
dependence theorists, but they are not regarded by them as crucial in 
the elimination of underdevelopment and dependence.
The main thrust of Kay's argument is that capitalism is 
important to the Third World because it inevitably develops the 
productive forces. He sees it as being responsible for 
'underdevelopment', but explains this away as being the nature of 
capitalism only in its infancy - at the stage of merchant capital. As 
capitalism develops, it sheds this nature and transforms itself into a 
productive capital, but the process of transformation is completed 
only through a struggle with its old nature, which may continue to 
be one of its various forms of existence for quite a while. Kay 
believes that the real problem  of developm ent (or 
underdevelopment) is that the victory of productive capital over 
merchant capital in the Third World came much later than it did in 
Europe. Thus, during the prolonged reign of merchant capital in 
the Third World, the development of productive forces could not 
be expected to occur in any notable way, or in a 'normal' way. Now 
that merchant capital has been defeated, s o m e  'normal' 
development can be expected to occur under capitalism in the Third 
World, but this can not happen in the same way it did in Europe in 
the 19th century. Although the 19th century conditions would 
have been just as beneficial to those who industrialise today as they
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were to those who did then, history can not repeat itself, and this 
creates an additional problem for Third World development.
The m ain po litical im plication of Kay's in te rven tion  is 
ultimately that if there is a problem of development to be associated 
with capitalism, then it is not the present type of capitalism, for this 
is presented as being completely free of errors of development, even 
in its Third W orld form of expansion.
That Kay attributes 'underdevelopm ent' to a form of capital 
long superseded is largely a result of taking the popularly perceived 
classical marxian line that capitalism w ould everywhere advance 
and revolutionize productive forces (Avineri, 1969; Kay, 1975: 
Intro.). Since this appears not to have happened in the Third 
W orld, the cause m ust lie in m erchant capital, the form of capital 
that is incapable of advancing the forces of production. But this line 
of thought is a limited one; it does not fully capture the arguments 
involved in this by now old debate. For there is another related 
proposition by Marx, that capital contains a lim itation which 
contradicts its general tendency to push beyond any barrier to its 
expansion (Marx, 1975: 318-319). Indeed the prediction of the 
bourgeois/industrial revolution expected to be repeated in the Third 
World as a direct result of the spread of commodity production was 
in its 'classical' form ulation couched in tentative and equivocal 
terms (Marx, 1976b). l
Footnotes to Chapter Two:
1 McGowan claims authority  for this definition from Stallings 
(1972).
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2 Warren's understanding of the concept of dependence is at times
quite elementary. For example, he says: "Dependence as a 
concept becomes extremely tricky in an increasingly integrated 
world economy. Does for example the US's increasing need for 
Middle East oil and Algerian natural gas make it dependent on 
these countries or are these countries dependent on the US 
market?" (Warren, 1973: 4). Other inaccurate usages of concepts 
include that of contradictions. In Warren's use this concept 
yields a meaning equivalent to 'problems' and not 'two 
opposing sides of a social movement' which is the correct usage 
in the dependence debate. The following statement reveals this 
"...Capitalist industrialization faces serious problems. But these 
are now rooted in the internal contradictions of 
underdeveloped countries, centred around agricultural 
stagnation, excessive urbanization, growing unemployment 
and the premature 'spread' of socialism prior to the 
development of industrial capitalism." (Warren, 1973: 42).
3 It is not clear why Hone does not show at all the price index of
manufactured goods which were the imports of Third World 
countries, a crucial aspect in portraying the complete picture of 
trade. Only in this way would he be able to display the export- 
import price ratio which is the basic definition of 
(international) terms of trade. Even in his attempt to refute the 
ECLA-Prebisch thesis of the tendency of the primary producers' 
terms of trade to deteriorate, Hone still presents a one-sided 
price index rise. The figures which supported the ECLA-
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Prebisch thesis, as we know, did indicate an even higher price 
index for manufactured imports into the Third World.
4 In its popular usage the concept of 'the development of productive
forces' has come to refer sim ply to aggregate increases in 
material things, which should be only an aspect of productive 
forces - the technical aspect as it were. An im portant 
com ponent of productive forces not usually incorporated in 
popular usage is hum an labour.
5 Kay shows that this was the argum ent of some prom inent
economists as late as the 1970s, for example that of Robinson 
and Eatwell, although they may not have been consciously 
ideological (Kay, 1975: 2). 
l
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CHAPTER THREE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEPENDENCE 
FRAMEWORK AND RECENT EXPERIENCES FOR A STRATEGY 
OF DEVELOPMENT
3.1. Introduction
We have seen that the dependence framework emphasized the 
existence of constraints to development that are related to present 
arrangements of relations between nations. The basis of these 
arrangements, according to the framework, is economic, but social 
forces help to maintain them. One of the messages from the outlook 
is that it is important to be aware of both these largely economic 
arrangements as well as the social forces that maintain them 
globally and locally in Third World countries.
By their constant reference to underdevelopment (sometimes 
equated with immiseration) they helped focus on the fact that 
modernization programmes, whether well-meaning or not, had not 
benefited the majority of people in the third World. They also 
implied that socio-economic programmes to correct this should not 
wait a gradual transformation of growth into ’growth with equity' 
through some form of 'trickle-down' effect. With the exception of 
Cardoso (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979), their belief that this can not be 
done by present capitalist (and, according to them, imperialist- 
aligned) Third World regimes, in combination with a belief that the 
economic system is a rigid structure, led them to prescribe some 
form of a socialist revolution or transformation. It may also be that 
ideological positions adopted by them a priori influenced their 
prescription. Later we shall argue that they were also influenced by 
the sometimes spectacular growth and development performance of 
newly-industrializing socialist countries which had insulated
themselves somewhat from the traditional industrialized countries, 
and which were not often positively appraised by the conventional 
development framework.
Having generally formed the view that foreign capital (i.e. direct 
foreign investment) increased dependence and facilitated the flow 
of capital from the Third World, they either relegated the discussion 
of the role of capital to the background or could only picture its 
harmful effects; some economists working within that framework 
but not strictly theorists of dependence themselves (Griffin, 1970, 
Stoneman, 1975) could be said to have been the exception. Generally 
theorists of dependence did not bother to formulate the problem of 
external sources of capital in a reformist way, which although 
recognizing the dangers related to the loss of various forms of 
independence, argues at the same time that external capital is useful 
to country initiating large development projects, especially if the 
major part of the the external inflow is aid (Stoneman, 1975). A 
formulation of this nature emphasizes only that strategies be 
devised to counter the mechanisms of foreign capital which cause 
the harm, and that the awareness of the dangers be improved. Once 
again the disappointing experience of a Latin America whose 
developmental programmes were largely dependent on direct 
foreign investment, and which was a constant focus of the outlook, 
influenced the judgement of dependence theorists.
The attempt by some radical thinkers to bring back the emphasis 
on the importance of capital to the Third World was not well 
argued, and, despite intentions, sometimes turned into an apologia 
for capitalism (Warren, 1973; Kay, 1975) or its modern 
organizational form, the transnational corporation (Emmanuel, 
1976).
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3.2 Growth experiences
3.2.1.The Third World and the Traditional industrial countries
In Chapter Two we discussed Warren's attempt to refute 
dependence with the help of doubtful growth statistics. Let us now 
revisit a similar set of statistics on other terms. We will start by 
exploring the extent to which material growth has taken place in 
most of the Third World, and by making a comparison with other 
countries. Warren (1973) quoted growth rates that were higher in 
the Third World than in the industrialized capitalist countries up to 
the early 1970s, while on a cross-national basis Morawetz (1977: 11- 
22) confirms that in the 1950-1975 period the Third World grew 
faster than any group of countries had ever done before. Morawetz 
also shows separate growth rates of above 4% in a number of these. 
These growth rates are generally higher than in industrialized 
capitalist countries, with the exception of Japan (Morawetz, 1977: 80). 
We have already seen the danger of claiming too much for these 
figures, for example the ambiguity of cross-national statistics, and 
the mistake of equating growth with development, as the 'quality of 
life' argument by Emmanuel (1974: 62-65) shows. However, to the 
extent that the Third World's starting magnitude of material 
'wealth' is much lower, significant development even in the sense 
of growth entails rates far higher than those obtaining in 'mature' 
countries, as the logic of 'catching up' or 'closing a very wide gap' in 
growth levels demands. This argument is consistent with the 
theories on possible growth rates of new and industrializing 
countries, as well as with certain previous concrete experiences 
(Dobb, 1963: Moore, 1980).
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It is accepted that at later stages of development the growth rate 
of industrialized countries tends to fall, the reason for this being that 
once high levels of accumulation have been attained, and 
production capacity is large, an even greater total investment is 
required to maintain a stable growth rate (Moore, 1980) while some 
of the potential investment shies away for fear of a low return 
(Dobb, 1963:62). The collorary of this is that a country achieves 
optimal rates of growth when young in industrialization, or when 
purposely embarking on a programme of industrialization. Thus 
while estimates show that the economy of the first country to 
industrialise, Britain, grew at 3% in the 40 years of 1830-1860, this 
growth rate had dropped to 2% by 1880, at which it roughly 
remained right through to the 1960s (Dobb, 1963: 10).1 In the 
following period, 1913-1958, France's growth rate had tapered off to 
2%; Germany's to 2.4% and that of Italy, Sweden and USA to 3%. In 
the meantime the industrial newcomer, Japan, showed a growth 
rate of 5.4% but even Japan’s relatively high rate pales in the light of 
the growth rate of a new and purposefully industrializing country in 
the same period, the USSR. In 1928-1940 its industrial production 
grew at 14-18% while in 1948-58 it maintained a growth rate of 10% 
(excepting agriculture, which had a slightly lower rate).2 In the 
1950s decade, newly industrializing China and East European 
countries each averaged a rate of 13% (Dobb, 1963:15).
3.2.2. New Socialist countries 
(a) Yugoslavia
An interesting evaluation of Yugoslavia's growth after the war 
has been made by Moore (1980). Moore starts with the usual 
skepticism of western scholars about the unreliability of
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government-based statistics in East European or Socialist countries. 
He finds that the government's published growth rates of 
Yugoslavia have been too positive. Therefore he restructures the 
data so that non-Yugoslav scholars can have a more objective basis 
for discussing the growth rates. He finds that the growth rate, 
estimated by the Yugoslav government to be 10% for 1952-1975, was 
'actually' 8.4% - 8.9%. Moore’s version of Yugoslavia's growth rates 
shows that they were still higher than in any other country except 
Japan and the Republic of Korea. He also notes that Yugoslavia's 
rates were similar to those of other East European countries, and 
that they are certainly comparable to historical data on the Soviet 
Union at the same stage of development (Moore, 1980:56).
(b) North Korea
Another interesting presentation of growth rates has been made 
by Halliday (1981a, 1981b) regarding the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea (DPRK). She too is extremely skeptical of the 
government statistics on growth rates. The DPRK is the country in 
which the cult of the personality enjoys wide acceptance and the 
leaders are used to being praised almost as super-human heroes. 
For this reason the DPRK’s claims should usually attract skepticism. 
Halliday compares the DPRK government's claims with the few 
independent statistical compilations on the country, and the 
impressions of western visitors and other North Korea watchers, 
including the CIA of America. Even after having substantially 
discounted the official account on the extent of growth, the 
impression of an extremely high rate of industrialization after the 
Korean war is inescapable - over 23% in 1954-65 and over 12% in 
1965-76. There is at least very little doubt that since that time the 
DPRK has become a highly industrialized country.
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W hat the figures indicate is that, in view of the possibilities in 
new and industrializing countries, rates of growth equal to or only 
slightly better than those in industrialized countries should in fact 
be treated as negligibly low.
Here at least is some support in growth terms for the conclusion 
that even after embarking on industrialization and developm ent, 
not m uch developm ent has occurred in the Third World. This is 
not to say that it can not in the future, since the figures also show 
that China and East Europe as late 20th Century exam ples of 
countries in a similar position and with a similar goal, were able to 
attain high growth rates. There are several facts which appear to be 
related to this, and which we need to examine closely. One of these 
is that notw ithstanding some socialist announcements by some of 
them, all the Third W orld countries which in the period under 
study appear not to have experienced any significant growth rates 
are firmly within the capitalist socio-economic organization; China, 
N orth Korea and East Europe have not been, during the time of 
their high growths, although they have maintained some links with 
it.
It may come easily to m ind to conclude from this that the 
existence of socialism explains those high rates in China, N orth 
Korea and East Europe. Such countries have abolished private 
property, red istributed  wealth to a great extent, and have re­
organized their societies so differently that it is easy to assume that 
there is a connection between socialism and the high growth rates. 
We know that the fact has not been lost on dependence theorists 
either.
N ot being firm ly w ith in  the cap ita list socio-econom ic 
organization, however, does not necessarily mean being socialist,
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and, there are possibly other major policy orientations which have 
coincided with the socialist objective, and which are the main causes 
of high grow th rates. This line of thought may not have been 
pursued adequately by those in the dependence outlook who were 
already com m itted to a solution that entailed a break w ith the 
existing international system, and to a socialist revolution. Also the 
major p a rt of the theories by the dependence authors were 
form ulated w hen there was yet to emerge a large, Third W orld 
capitalist country with notably high levels of growth (although, of 
course this m ay not have m attered  m uch in view  of the 
'dependence' of such growth, which dependence theorists do not 
approve). Brazil and South Korea's growth have since come to light, 
show ing that sim ilar grow th rates are possible elsewhere, i.e. 
w ithout socialism.
3.2.3 Late capitalist industrializers in the Third World: The examples 
of Brazil and South Korea
H aving em barked on industrialization from about 1930, the 
Brazilian economy recorded some rem arkable growth in certain 
years. For the whole period between 1947 and 1977 the growth in the 
economy and in industry averaged 7% and 8% respectively. In the 
six years (1967-73) which covered the famous Brazilian 'economic 
miracle', the economy reached a growth rate of 13.3. Moreover, 
throughout the critical years of industrialization the capital goods 
sector was also increasing at a considerable pace, challenging the 
dom inant role of the consumer durables (Andrade, 1982: 182). The 
grow th of industry  in Brazil initially had less involvem ent of 
im perialism  in the form of transnational corporations, but later 
there was a lot of such involvement (Andrade, 1982). However at
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this time there was also an increasing state role in the economy, in 
both a supervisory and productive role (Trebat, 1983).
South Korea averaged a GNP growth of 9.3 between 1962 and 
1979. The industrial sector in particular reached a 17% growth in the 
same period. A special feature of South Korean growth has been its 
strength in m anufactured exports, whose share in the GNP rose 
from 5% to 34.1% in the same period. Like Brazil, a particular 
characteristic of Korea has been the extensive involvem ent of the 
state in the economy, despite the fact that both countries are 
formally m arket economies.
W hat seem s to have been re levan t am ong the late 
industria lizers who have sustained  high grow th  rates for a 
considerable length of time is the existence of the process of 
au tonom ous accum ulation, w ith different factors help ing  to 
facilitate that process. These may have included an abundance of 
natural resources, as in the Soviet Union, or a large export market 
for Japan. Both Yugoslavia and North Korea attained high levels of 
growth while accumulating autonomously, though not by autarky, 
from the world capitalist system. For those in the Third World who 
have industrialized without much of this autonomy, there are other 
accompanying explanations for their consistently high growth rates. 
These include the special international circumstances favouring 
them at a crucial time of their development. For example, their 
notable industrial growth occurred during a w orldw ide boom, and 
they had begun to industrialize relatively earlier than other late 
industrializers.Then they attracted more capital due to the existence 
of this initial industrial infrastructure, and because of a relatively 
cheaper labour power. These factors were especially beneficial to 
them because it was a time when the 'em igration' of industries
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from the ’centre’ was a more common phenomenon. This special 
link with business in the 'centre', or what could be referred to as 
their functional status in the system, as 'offshore production units', 
in turn helped them export industrial goods. The special market 
privilege granted to South Korea by the United States and Japan 
during the growth of its export manufacturing, not to mention the 
vast market of the surrounding region, is a case in point (Mitchell, 
1982). In short, these countries have had a special status in the 
system that logically is not possible for many Third World Countries 
(Emmanuel, 1974), and is akin to a kind of sub-imperialism (Marin, 
1972; Amin, 1977b). In addition to this, it seems that late capitalist 
industrializers who have shown success in the Third World 
involve the state in production (Trebat, 1983), practise industrial 
planning, and have created an awareness of the importance of 
curving out a truly national economy (Luedde-Neurath, 1980) and 
supporting industrialization.
Of course this industrialization still remains closely controlled 
by transnational corporations, especially in Brazil (Andrade, 1982), 
and this question remains on the agenda of the dependence 
framework. But the real test of an anti-dependence strategy is not 
the ideological posture a country adopts vis-avis imperialism, but 
the extent to which it uses circumstances around it to start an anti­
dependence process. This process involves taking measures to raise 
capital for building critical economic sectors that will sustain such a 
process, with the ultimate goal of autonomous accumulation.
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3.3 The importance of industrialization in an anti-dependence 
strategy
The importance of industrialization and, in particular, of the 
manufacture of capital goods, has been alluded to time and again in 
this thesis. Most theorists of development support it, but there are 
conflicting opinions on the type of industrialization to be advocated. 
The debate raised is complex, and, sometimes, very specialized. 
W hat we intend to do here is to introduce it merely to indicate a 
basis for our judgement on its role in dependence and development.
The examples of countries with high growth rates that we have 
quoted in this chapter have one thing in common. The high growth 
rates occurred when those countries embarked purposefully on a 
p rogram m e of industria lization . That the en tire  process of 
development in the now developed countries was clearly related to 
the increasing im portance of the industrial sector is accepted 
w isdom  (Clark, 1978: 10; Sutcliffe, 1984: 122-123). In general, a 
sustained  increase of m aterial w ealth above basic subsistence 
ultim ately involves the industrial production of goods, and the 
debate on whether to start a process of industrialization in a country 
today is relevant only because industrialization exists elsewhere, 
and can conceivably provide a non-industrial nation w ith  the 
necessary industrial goods (Sutcliffe, 1984:123). Even then, it is 
generally  agreed, unless a country  is extrem ely sm all and 
exceptionally well-endowed with natural resources which can be 
exchanged for all possible industrial goods indefinitely - some oil 
states come close to this - the growth of material well-being would 
be extrem ely slow. In theory, since industrialization em bodies 
greater and faster technological changes, the development of general 
hum an welfare would stagnate in a country w ithout some form of
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industrialization. BotK this and the tendency of the terms of trade of 
agricultural exporting countries to deteriorate make it imperative 
that some industrialization take place in any country.
Known skepticism regarding industrialization have often been 
objections to subordinating the agricultural sector to the needs of 
industry, without introducing technological changes in the latter to 
increase the m agnitude of its productivity - a legacy of soviet 
industria lization  and of some early theorists of developm ent 
planning, such as Lewis (1958). Now it is widely recognized that the 
scientific and technological developm ent of agriculture m ust go 
hand in hand with industrialization (Clark, 1978: 11). The apparent 
objection to industrialization by some dependence theorists such as 
Frank (1972) is, as we have seen, in reality an objection to the 
dependent nature of industry built in the third World under current 
economic arrangements.
In recent times some objections have been voiced against 
im port substitu tion  industrialization (represented in economic 
parlance sim ply as ISI), w hich typically characterizes early 
industrialization  in the Third W orld. Sometimes ISI is paused 
unfavourably  against som ething else called export orientated 
industrialization (EOI), which was itself an ISI before it changed its 
m arket focus in the South East Asian Countries (South Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and, more recently, Malaysia and 
Thailand) in which it is considered a success (Wangwe, 1983).
ISI is often associated w ith the replacem ent of im ported 
consum er goods by the domestic industrial production of such 
goods. This is so because most ISIs in practice are characterized by 
the production of consumer goods, with almost all capital goods left 
to importation.
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ISI is also often associated with im ported interm ediate inputs, 
and even raw  m aterials. This is because in the initial zeal for 
industrialization, the possible long term results of these are not 
considered seriously enough. But there is nothing to suggest that in 
princip le  ISI should regard such considerations as of little  
importance, and by now the experience of other ISIs should tell new 
ISIs that failure to weigh the problem  of im ported interm ediate 
inpu ts and raw  m aterials can have severe effects on foreign 
reserves, the cost of production, competitiveness, and eventually 
the entire production.
The real distinguishing feature of ISI is its concern with the 
quantitative increase in industrial activities dom estically rather 
than structural change. The proportions of contribution by the 
various industrial divisions are not its priority; neither are the 
inter-linkages of industry. ISI typically determines the establishment 
of an industry by looking at the level of the existing demand, or if 
the country will still have a decided advantage by processing instead 
of rem aining a major raw  m aterial supplier for that type of 
industrial activity.
The major areas of the debate on industrialization in which 
there is more disagreement include the choice of industrial activity 
(with a view to the structure that it m ight produce), the choice of 
production techniques and the nature of ownership (or the extent of 
state involvement in investment and in the running of industry).
In terms of the choice of activity there have been two major 
approaches, the first regards the choice of industrial activity to be 
governed by the extent of the dem and for which the industry will 
produce, w hether that dem and is domestic or external (Roemer, 
1972).
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In a newly industrializing country, usually the activities chosen 
on the basis of this criterion are dominated by consumer industries 
(such as textiles), since the greatest and most basic demand is for 
such goods. This is especially true if the target market is a domestic 
one. The predominance of consumer industries may not occur 
where the industrializing country has special resources whose use 
in industry can produce goods in greater demand elsewhere, and 
where a deliberate decision is taken to produce for such an export 
market. In both this and the instance in which consumer industries 
become predominant, usually the industry is considered to have a 
greater likelihood of profitability, since at least the market aspect of 
that profitability is guaranteed.
The other major approach does not necessarily ignore questions 
of profitability and demand, but pays more attention to identifying 
industries which are critical in any industrial sector - those which 
provide the greatest benefit to the economy and are central to the 
maintenance of growth in industrial activities in the long run. The 
original formulation of this approach was as follows. As 
industrialization proceeds, indeed as advances in modern life are 
made, there is a grater demand for machines, machine parts, spare 
parts of machinery, and construction and building materials 
(including steel and other metal-based construction materials). The 
growth rate in the future will be higher the larger the capacities of 
industries which produce these capital goods. As Dobb (1963:50) put 
it, this is because:
"...One will have a larger output of steel and machines in 
future years with which to construct and equip new factories 
and power plants and steel-mills. To this extent machine
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tools to make more machine tools will be more growth 
inducing than automatic looms or show-toe-laster."
One of the most notable contributions to this approach in recent 
times has been the work of Clive Thomas (1974). He argues that the 
requirement for an effective industrial development strategy is the 
identification and development of 'basic industries'. The concept of 
'basic industries' itself was not new when Thomas employed it, 
having been used before by others to refer to the capital-goods 
branch of industry. In Thomas' usage, however, the concept 
encompasses much more than this. There are, according to him, 
three criteria for preparing a list of basic industries. These are the 
value-added contribution of an industry, the likelihood of the 
continuation of demand for the products of an industry given a 
change in the income of consumers, and the extent of the linkage 
between a particular industry and others in the economy. By these 
criteria, the production of iron and steel, as of machines and their 
parts, particularly machine tools, receives one of the highest 
rankings. The initial list of basic industries is long; it includes 
textiles, industrial chemicals and many others. The list can only be 
given practical content and rendered more meaningful if it is 
reviewed in tandem with one of Thomas' 'Law of transformation’, 
namely that there must be a convergence between the pattern of 
domestic resources use and domestic demand. This means that, as a 
general rule, priority should be given to those basic industries which 
are at that time capable of utilizing domestic resources. Exception to 
the rule may be granted to basic industries that are at the top of the 
list, such as iron and steel and machine tools, provided that efforts 
are made to minimize the external dependence of such industries.
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In emphasizing the importance of basic industries, Thomas not 
only underlines their contribution to the long-term growth of an 
economy but also their 'strategic' value, since some of them (for 
example machine tools) are the sources of technological dynamism 
- the only true guarantee of economic independence in his view. 
This is the major reason why he advocates a basic industry strategy 
even for countries with a limited market; some industries are 
simply too important for national economic independence to be 
governed by market forces. To put it another way, Thomas marries 
assumptions of the importance of industrialization, and of basic 
industries in particular, with not only the objective of long-term 
growth but also one of the major goals of dependence theorisation- 
economic independence.
Opinion on the choice of technique, which refers mainly to the 
capital-labour ratio, has likewise remained divided. The main 
reason for advocating labour-intensive techniques of production for 
Third World countries is that they do not have enough capital and 
skills to invest and maintain productivity in expensive capital- 
intensive techniques, while they have cheap and abundant labour 
(Clark, 1978:15). The logical thing to do in these circumstances is to 
employ the least-cost factors to the greatest effect, thus the choice of 
labour-intensive techniques. On the other hand there are those who 
argue that labour-intensive techniques are usually characterized by 
outdated technology, and this more or less condemns those who 
choose them to backwardness to the extent that they no longer offer 
useful technological inform ation from which a newly- 
industrializing nation can learn (Emmanuel, 1982). In our view the 
choice of techniques should depend on both their rate of 
productivity as well as their capacity to generate new information. It
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should not be based merely on the need to utilize labour. After all a 
successful solution to the unemployment/ under employment 
problem ultimately depends more on the extent of the generation of 
industrial activity than on the labour intensity of a particular 
industry. Industries which create further industrial activity are 
usually capital-intensive, and can not be avoided because they are 
the engine of growth, as we saw earlier. This is further justification 
for the involvement of the state in industrialization, for it is often 
the only one able to invest in expensive capital-intensive industries 
(Tyagunenko, 1973). In practice the peculiarity of each industry may 
modify policy preferences from one establishment to another; there 
are areas in which labour-intensive techniques are equal to, or even 
more productive than, the capital-intensive type (Stewart, 1978; 
Perkins, 1981).
A question related to that of choice of technique is that of choice 
of scale. Usually small-scale is posed against large-scale industry. The 
arguments involved are similar to those in the choice of technique 
debate. This is because small-scale industry is usually also labour- 
intensive, while large-scale industry tends to concentrate technology 
and is therefore capital-intensive as a rule (Perkins, 1981). The main 
economic argument for large-scale industrial production is that for 
each type of industrial activity there is a threshold of scale below 
which production can not be profitable, that this threshold is beyond 
the capacity of most small-scale industry, and that the threshold gets 
higher as technology advances. Similarly, in most cases maximum 
economic benefits and faster industrial growth is derived from the 
best technology available, which also continually demands a higher 
threshold of scale of operations for it to be productive (Tyaguneko, 
1973: 14-15: Emmanuel, 1982). Once again, only the state can afford to
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establish such a scale of operation in small Third World economies. 
Nevertheless, where industrialization has not spread to the rural 
areas, and as long as capital remains scarce to small economies, 
small-scale industrial production complements larger operations, 
spreads technological know-how countryw ide, and keeps some 
production going, m aintaining a level of consum ption for rural 
people (Tyler, 1981; Sutcliffe, 1984).
Finally there is the question of the ownership of industry and 
w hether the state should be involved in its direction. There are 
those who treat this question in ideological terms, that is, either in 
defence of the principle of 'free enterprise' or of socialist/public 
ownership. The experience of South Korea and Brazil - where a 
pervasive state direction of industry is mixed with a committed 
espousal of free enterprise - suggests that public ownership or state 
involvem ent in industry  is a m atter of necessity rather than 
ideology for countries industrializing late. In fact both the ECLA- 
Prebisch doctrine and the planning approach of the conventional 
developm ent fram ework have long treated state involvem ent in 
industry in the Third W orld as a necessity. The need for a greater 
national control of the economy, which is more pronounced in the 
dependence fram ework, is an additional justification of this for 
some.
3.4 The relevancy of growth with equity
Frank (1969: 350-408) and  o thers had  hypo thesized  tha t 
underdevelopm en t, referring  to technological and econom ic 
backwardness in the larger part of a country, low income levels, and 
absolute' poverty (or imm iseration), continues despite relatively 
successful industrialization - in countries closely tied to capitalist
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metropoles. In Brazil, underdevelopment seems to have got worse 
in many parts of the country as such dependent industrialization 
gathered pace. As Andrade (1982:165) observes:
"In a metaphorical sense, Brazil is a frontier of the capitalist 
world. It is the empty lands to be conquered by the gun and 
turned into profitable business. In a more analytical sense, it 
is a young industrialized country where capital has spread 
in a blind rush, without developing the self-consciousness 
and institutions which could have attenuated its socially 
unacceptable effects. In any case it is a case of savage 
capitalism. But is it a success? From the point of view of 
growth, yes. The GDP grew at an average compound rate of 
7 percent a year from 1947 to 1977. From the point of view of 
the well-being of the Brazilian population, no. The majority 
of those with relatively stable jobs earn less today than they 
did twenty years ago".
Clearly no 'trickle-down' has taken place in Brazil after so many 
years of industrialization, and with a real 'economic miracle' in 
some years (CIIR, 1978; Tyler, 1981). This is the problem of 
industrialization without a socially-sensitive goal of distribution. 
Most theorists may no longer assume an adjustment mechanism 
through trickle-down (Arndt, 1983), but many would argue that 
industrialization entails a significant curtailment of consumption in 
the early years, so as to the maintain the pace of accumulation. This 
means lower wages and low prices to peasant producers where the 
state has made some kind of intervention in the economy. This can 
be in the form of direct force, as in the USSR in the 1920s and 30s, 
and in Latin America today. Or it can be in the form of state
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com pulsion which enlists the population 's acquiescence, as is 
believed to have been the case in Japan (Brofenbrenner, 1982).
On the other hand there are those w ho argue that cu rren t 
technology, if used efficiently, raises p roductiv ity  in industry  
sufficiently to begin tackling the distribution question immediately, 
and that the betterm ent of the quality of life is itself a param ount 
goal (Streeten, 1981; Sutcliffe, 1984). In fact even a purely economic 
justification for continually raising the level of consumption of the 
general m asses of the people can be found. A m ore even 
distribution of income helps create a w ider m arket for certain 
products, in turn increasing the possibility of the more efficient 
assem bly-line p roduction  of such goods (Tyagunenko, 1973). 
Uneven income distribution narrows the market for such goods and 
does not help mass production much.
Of course smaller economies face genuine problem s getting 
enough capital to finance their industrialization, but it m ay be 
necessary to incorporate into any anti-dependence strategy the 
acceptance of growth with equity in principle, so that whenever the 
usually  tight economic situation slackens, there is a positive 
rethinking of wage and commodity price adjustments. In addition it 
is necessary to m aintain a 'minimum' investm ent in basic hum an 
needs, including health and education, and to provide subsidies for 
the lowest poor (Streeten, 1981).
3.5 Conclusion
The material we have presented in these first three chapters enables 
us to understand an anti-dependence strategy of developm ent as 
one which includes the following.
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(a) Some level of awareness of the connection between the local 
economy and the global one, the role that the former objectively 
plays, and the contribution of that role to the problem s of 
development in the Third World.
(b) The rea lization  tha t the erad ica tion  of constrain ts to 
d ev e lo p m en t en gendered  by the  T hird  W o rld ’s ro le  in 
accum ulation entails the availability of capital, from the sam e 
constraining global system, and from a consumption-curtailing local 
mobilization of funds, both of which may prove difficult to realize.
(c) A certain form or level of localization of the economy in terms of 
ownership and m anagement be attained, to facilitate co-ordination 
and the movem ent towards greater autonom y in decisions which 
affect the economy.
(d) The need for planning in order to implement the program m e 
systematically and to avoid a waste of resources.
(e) A diversification of production (for example against reliance on 
the export of a single crop), and of trading and trade partners, to 
reduce vulnerability.
(f) A program m e of industrialization undertaken because it is the 
motor of growth and diversification of the entire economy.
(g) The inevitability of state involvement in industrial production 
because it possesses greater resources for investment in critical but 
expensive industries, compared to private entrepreneurs in small 
economies.
(h) The structuring of industry in such a way that it can engineer 
structural changes in the economy, and induce further structural 
changes within industry itself, for example by making it possible to 
move from a predom inance of the export of prim ary products to
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that of manufactured exports, and by introducing the capital goods 
sector to generate other industrial activities.
(i) Paying some attention to small-scale industry whenever possible 
since it can provide elementary industrial learning, especially in 
rural areas, and can help to raise the level of industrial culture 
around, in addition to being cheaper where it matches large-scale 
industry in efficiency.
(j) The adoption of the principle of growth with equity, since it has 
an economic function and is politically desirable.
The assessment on a strategy of anti-dependence may seek out 
these variables, but, at least in the formative years of such a 
programme, it will not be whether a country has come out of 
dependence, but whether it has started a process leading to 
autonomous development.
Footnotes to Chapter Three:
1 Dobb’s sources are Patel, S. J., 1961, in Economic Development and
Cultural Change. IX, 3; Gerschenkron, A., 1947, in the Tournal of 
Economic History. Supp. VII; and the League of Nations, 1945, 
Institutionalisation and Foreign Trade.
2 Official estimates of the rate of growth for 1928-1940 given by the
USSR was 18%. An American estimate put it at 14-15%, while a 
British estimate at Oxford had it at 15-16% (Dobb, 1963:15).
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CHAPTER FOUR: UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND THE CREATION 
OF DEPENDENCE IN TANGANYIKA
4.1. Introduction.
At independence in 1961, Tanganyika was one of a group of 25 
countries generally referred to as the poorest in the world. 
According to conventional economic indicators, the country's GDP 
was a mere 193.5 million pounds, and the annual income per head 
18.25 pounds (Stein, 1979). Moreover, 96% of its population of 
about 9 million still 'lived on the land', and died at the age of 35 on 
average (Stein, 1979). The 'industrial' sector employed only 22,000 
workers (excluding such agricultural processing as sisal 
decortication and cotton ginning), and its contribution to GDP was 
only 3.4% (Tanzania Govt, 1969). The picture of an extremely low 
level of productive forces in the country at that historical point is 
clear. There are other illustrations that paralleled, and were often a 
consequence of, the low level of development in the economic 
sphere. For example, shortly before independence, out of 300 
government administrative officers (considered the cream of 
manpower at that time), only 7 were Tanganyikans (Pratt, 1976: 92).l 
It should be noted that the government was the largest employer, 
and that relative to the level of education and income in the 
country, the administrative officers constituted some of the 'cream' 
of the country's manpower. Also in 1962 there was a professional 
manpower of 580, comprising architects, engineers, physicians, 
lawyers, geologists and other scientists, but only 30 people were 
Tanganyikans (Pratt, 1976: 93).
Due to the extremely low level of industrialization, the demand 
for manufactured goods could only be catered for through imports,
and the requisite earning of foreign exchange was dependent solely 
on the export of primary goods. In addition there was not a single 
instance of Tanzanian ownership or control of capital that could be 
considered significant in any sector of the economy. This economic 
vulnerability, itself an important aspect of dependence, was 
accompanied by a serious weakness in the government's financial 
position. For example, up to 1964, the Tanzanian government 
could still expect to get 78% of its Central Government expenditure 
as well as 52% of its investment expenditure from external sources 
(Stein, 1979).
One factor that can be considered to have accounted for this 
situation is quite obviously the history of the country up to 
independence. Some may argue that Tanganyika's colonial history 
explains it, while others may say that some resilient pre-colonial 
factor is responsible for the low level of development at 
independence. We shall briefly review that history here, 
emphasizing those factors that have a connection with the nature of 
development, and the evolution of an anti-dependence strategy in 
Tanzania.
4.2 The pre-colonial period
4.2.1 The incidence of egalitarianism.
At the time of German colonization in 1885, societies which came 
to comprise the territory of Tanganyika were largely agricultural.2 
The material forces of production were quite undeveloped, with 
only the simplest of tools, chiefly the hoe, being used to cultivate 
land. Production was largely for the immediate consumption needs 
of each production unit - the family. This does not mean that those 
societies were self-sufficient, i.e. non-trading. A significant amount
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of trade had been going on for many centuries both internally and 
externally with societies beyond East Africa (Sutton, 1977; Iliffe, 
1979: 6-88); the increase in the activities of European traders inland 
as well as in the exchange of ivory, rubber, salt and iron 
implements bear witness to this (Henderson, 1965).
The incidence of centralization in the state system and in the 
social organisation was markedly low (Iliffe, 1979: 21-25). The 
exception to this was in a few areas where external trade had 
become a dominant activity and whose leaders had acquired larger 
amounts of modern weaponry. Examples in this category were 
Uyao in the south, Unyamwezi in the west, and Tanga and Pangani 
on the coast. However, even here the tendency towards 
centralization waned almost as soon as trade and the military 
capability declined.
Corresponding to the low incidence of state centralization was the 
absence of land alienation, and, consequently, of classes engendered 
by this. The exception to this rule was Buhaya in the northwestern 
corner of the country, where feudalistic structures, including land 
alienation and serfdom, had appeared (Rweyemamu, 1973: 7-8; 
Hyden, 1980: 82-85). But feudalistic forms of production did not 
become dominant in that area either; some have estimated that as 
much as 90% of all land holdings still remained free of these forms 
(Mutahaba, 1969; Hyden, 1980: 82).
Slave trade had, of course, altered the situation significantly on 
the island of Zanzibar, where, with the addition of the race factor, 
the development of castes and even of classes based on the 
production of commodities was a firmer trend. Only in one 
community on the mainland could a similar occurrence be said to 
exist, and that was around Pangani, which had a noticeable
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incidence of the development of capitalist production. In this 
instance some slave traders amassed wealth and acquired slaves of 
their own so that they had labour at their disposal, which they then 
turned to producing sugar on plantations (Iliffe, 1979: 132).
Much has been made of the low incidence of centralized state 
systems and land alienation. By deduction from these factors it has 
sometimes been asserted that people did not own property, and that 
the concept of private property was non-existent. This has 
sometimes been generalized for the whole of pre-colonial Africa, 
and in the continent's early days of independence in the 1960's, 
such characterization became a familiar depiction of society on 
which to base future policies (Friedland and Rosberg, 1964). The 
supposed socialist orientation of Africans, and the development 
philosophy of 'African Socialism' can be said to be a direct result of 
the characterization of property in this way (Nyerere, 1966: 162-171; 
Friedland and Rosberg, 1964).
But is is clear that the considerable amount of state 
centralization, trade and social differentiation that existed in the 
famous Sudanic empires, as well as the feudal tendencies of the 
North-East (present-day Ethiopia and Somalia) and East-Central 
Africa (in the inter-lacustrine region), does not support the theory 
of a socialistic pre-colonial Africa (Oliver and Fage, 1962: 44-52; Abir, 
1968; Omer-Cooper et al, 1968: 276-279). For the rest of Africa 
(including what was to become Tanganyika), where this was not the 
case, it is not correct to equate the lack of differentiation, based on 
land tenure and the non-centralization of the state, with 
communalism (defined as a community's sharing in the production 
and distribution of goods). The absence of land alienation in these 
places simply meant that practically everyone could find a piece of
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land for independent cultivation. One study has provided 
indications that whereas individuals in pre-colonial African 
communities co-operated in some productive tasks, they did not do 
so in others. In this way they were not unique. The Russian 'mir' 
and the German 'mark' had a similar feature during the historical 
period in which they were supposed to be communal (Kopytoff, 
1964). Neither is it clear that the well known 'community 
ownership' of land in the immediate pre-colonial times in Africa 
(Gluckman, 1977), or in earlier times anywhere else for that matter, 
precluded individual possession of usable land (Rweyemamu, 1973: 
4; Mandel, 1968: 34-35). Similarly in the institutions and processes 
of decision-making, the absence of centralization meant only that 
grass-roots participation was the norm; it did not mean, as in the 
Rousseaun model, that everyone participated (Rousseau, 1973; 
Fralin, 1978).
4.2..2 Theoretical explanations of egalitarianism.
Attempts have been made at explaining the continued existence 
of egalitarianism in pre-colonial Africa, represented in the socio­
political and economic spheres by lower levels of centralization and 
land alienation. Iliffe (1979) notes a coincidence between what he 
calls 'hoe agriculture' (the form of cultivation in pre-colonial 
Africa) and low levels of economic differentiation throughout 
human history, but falls short of an explanation. Rweyemamu 
seems to attribute the prevalence of egalitarianism in pre-colonial 
Tanganyika to the nature of the market. He states that the market 
remained peripheral to Tanganyikan societies; that although they 
participated in exchange, people did not rely on the market to obtain 
the major part of their means of subsistence (Rweyemamu, 1973: 7).
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For Coquery-Vidrovitch (1976), however, it is not trade itself but 
the position of the 'ruler' in that trade that is critical in determining 
change or the persistence of 'egalitarianism'.3 Having downplayed 
the importance of technology as well as that of social and cultural 
structures, she argues that not only was long-distance trade vital in 
pre-colonial Africa, but also it enabled the 'ruler' to obtain a surplus 
product externally (by exploiting other communities rather than his 
own). This meant that there could be no pressure on the 
community to produce more of the surplus product since the ruler 
had already acquired his surplus (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1976: 105). 
She describes this situation as being in some sense that of a dual 
economy in which two 'modes of production' could be said to co­
exist, one community based, the other trade-based (Coquery- 
Vidrovitch, 1976: 104, 106). The trade-based 'mode of production', 
with the 'ruler' playing the central role in it, ultimately insulated 
the community-based one from the external pressures that would 
have broken it down.
If this indeed was the case, the 'ruler' would have had to possess 
the kind of unlimited power commensurate only with the most 
centralized state system to prevent trade from having an effect on 
society. We know that such was not the case even in the Sudanic 
empires, let alone those parts of Africa without the experience of 
centralization. But, more importantly, the theoretical proposition 
that the breakdown of egalitarianism was primarily dependent on 
the action of a 'ruler' is untenable.
There are many factors which contribute to the speed of the 
breakdown of an egalitarian society. Some of the well-known ones 
include geography - especially the proximity to important soil and 
water resources, better communication for the transmission of new
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knowledge, and the availability of important metals (Mandel, 1968).
In the past these factors no doubt provided the initial impulse 
towards the disintegration of egalitarianism due to the greater social 
product that they made possible. With the development of the tools 
of production and the knowledge to work them - and this is where 
the metallurgical revolution was probably critical - an even greater 
social product became available, permitting the freeing from direct 
production of a section of the population to specialize in crafts and 
in the exchange of goods. This ability of society to support a section 
of its population which does not engage in the direct production of 
the means of livelihood makes it possible to refer to it as having a 
surplus social product (Mandel, 1968).
It is not easy to ascertain the exact contribution of each factor 
considered to have provided the impulse towards the disintegration 
of egalitarianism, but once this had taken place the recurring factor 
in the actual disintegration seems to have been the type of tools of 
production used, combined with a deepening of the knowledge to 
use them; in short, technology. It is this factor that plays a 
determinant role, for without appropriate improvements in 
technology the surplus product available to permit specialization is 
greatly circumscribed. In a corresponding manner, the limited 
availability of a surplus product holds back a faster development of 
a privileged group from among the producers on the basis of which 
social classes are formed (Engels, 1950; Mandel, 1968: 23-71).
On the other hand, the consolidation of the privileged group and 
its continued expansion, or what others refer to as its reproduction, 
soon becomes chiefly dependent on exchange. Since exchange also 
promotes the need for and use of goods, it is in turn likely to lead to 
a further development in technology - for the purpose of producing
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more. In this way it becomes possible for exchange, by now the 
guarantor of the reproduction of the privileged group and a primary 
factor in the breakdown of egalitarianism, to dominate other factors, 
including technology. However, notw ithstanding the dominance 
of the m arket at some point, technology appears to be the constant 
factor involved in the changes. In a simple sense, extension of the 
m arket depends on the availability of more or better goods. If 
lim ited technology persists, this will not happen, and the market 
will in turn be limited.
Obviously several factors involved in the breakdow n of 
egalitarianism interact and influence each other, but the intention 
of the discussion here is to focus on the primacy of exchange and 
technology and the determ inant role of the latter. That the 
techno log ical factor p layed  the de te rm in ing  ro le  in the 
continuation of egalitarianism in pre-colonial Africa appears to be 
confirm ed by the findings of Goody (1971). The trade-based 
explanations are not satisfactory - Rweyemamu's for not paying 
adequate attention to technology, and Coquery-Vidrovitch's for 
totally discounting it.
4.2.3 Egalitarianism and the rate of change or development
Some writers have concerned themselves not merely with the 
a ttem p t to explain  w hat they see as the 'rep roduction ' of 
egalitarianism  before the advent of colonialism, bu t also w ith 
determining the extent of its contribution to what they perceive to 
have been a lack of development. Some consider it to have had a 
decisive and lasting role.
W riting about Tanzania to demonstrate a general case for Africa, 
H yden (1980) argues that there has not been much development
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throughout Africa's known history, and attributes this to the 
survival of an egalitarianism built on 'household self-sufficient 
production'. He indicates that this survival is now peculiar to 
Africa (Hyden, 1980: 9-12). According to him, what renders African 
'egalitarianism' almost permanently opposed to development is a 
collective psychology, or communal attitude, that is apparently 
inbuilt in each person in Africa - demonstrated by the Tanzanian 
case. Hyden's perception of the pervasiveness of this 
'egalitarianism' includes the present, covering even the non­
peasants living in the same country (Hyden, 1980: 9-33, 96- 123). 
The specific way in which these attitudes relate to the perceived lack 
of development is that undifferentiated peasants create a production 
ethic which shuns accumulation, and whose reason for production 
at all is merely the propagation of life in the basic biological sense 
(Hyden, 1980: 18-19). In this situation the loyalty of members of the 
society is towards their own clans with which they have stronger 
ties, rather than towards a larger rational unit such as the market; 
and their socio-economic and political decisions are propelled by 
the considerations of clan patronage rather than impersonal 
rationalizations. The sum total of these aspects is referred to as the 
'economy of affection' (Hyden, 1980: 17-18). These attitudinal 
aspects that make up the 'economy of affection' are considered to be 
opposed to development, and are therefore the major causes of 
'underdevelopment' (Hyden, 1980: 3-4).
It may be true that in pre-colonial times these were some of the 
attitudes of the people of Tanganyika and other places in Africa. But 
as attitudes, in the main they can only be the consequences, not the 
causes, of egalitarianism. Of course they could have an influence 
on development, but it is difficult to see how, as consequences
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dependent on the existence of egalitarianism , they could be 
successfully and perm anently opposed to development. For they 
w ould be bound  to change, as w ould  egalita rian ism , in 
correspondence with other changes in society - in the long run if not 
sooner. Above all, as will be revealed in the course of this chapter 
and others, it is untenable to argue that these supposedly anti- 
developmental attitudes have continued to exist beyond the pre­
colonial period, and that they overwhelm all tendencies tow ards 
development at the economic and politico-institutional levels.4
There is a need to emphasize that, in general theoretical terms 
there appears to be no justification for treating the phenomenon of 
egalitarianism  as a perm anent and overw helm ing barrier to 
development. It may be easy to be influenced by appearances; for 
example, during the time of colonialism egalitarianism existed in 
Africa, but not in Europe, which had attained a much higher level 
of developm ent generrally. From here it m ay be easy to 
subconsciously draw  the conclusion that egalitarianism is the prime 
factor im peding development. This idea is built into the work of 
Hyden (1980) and clearly expressed as such, but is to an extent also 
implied by Rweyemamu (1973) and Coquery-Vidrovitch (1976).
But in Europe, as in parts of Asia, the breakdow n of 
egalitarianism towards greater hierarchy and centralization was not 
always accompanied by development in the fuller social meaning. 
W hen cap ita lism  u ltim ate ly  ren d e red  the final b low  to 
eg a lita rian ism  in E urope, som e u n p reced en ted  levels of 
developm ent w ere also occurring. In considering the internal 
developments alone there is no doubt that, especially in relation to 
socio-econom ic system s, the na tu re  of the o rgan isation  of 
production played a significant role in bringing about the higher
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level of development under capitalism. However, in the main this 
was not caused by the absence of egalitarianism but by the 
application of science and technology. In other words, the issue of 
development was substantially separate from that of the presence or 
absence of egalitarianism.
In the case of Tanganyika it can be argued that the rate of 
development and the process of the dissolution of egalitarianism 
were influenced by several factors, including communication, 
technology and trade, each being dominant in different historical 
circumstances. More importantly it can be argued that 
notw ithstanding which of these factors was dominant, 
egalitarianism and development remained separate issues while 
they were both consequences of the nature of these other factors. In 
particular we might emphasize that it was these other factors, and 
not egalitarianism, which shaped development. This is what we try 
to show briefly below.
We saw earlier that considerable exchange activities took place in 
pre-colonial Tanganyika, yet the market's inroad into society was 
still incomplete. In such circumstances the role of the market in 
weakening egalitarianism was limited. But this limitation in the 
deepening of the market itself needs to be explained. It seems that 
for Tanganyika, as it was for much of Africa, communication 
difficulties played a considerable role in limiting initially the 
expansion of trade inland as well as the spread of technology 
(Raum, 1965; Bates, 1965; Iliffe, 1979).
But the technological factor in turn influenced the future 
characteristic of communication; in fact in the long run it was 
limited technology that became responsible for the slower 
improvement in communication.
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Interaction among inland regions improved near the beginning 
of the 19th century, and was accompanied by a surge in trading 
activities. This would have brought with it a greater possibility of 
the weakening of egalitarianism. However, the nature of the trade 
that became dominant at that time was such that it most likely 
precluded that process. The slave trade generated wars, killings, and 
unstable conditions of production in addition to the removal of 
able-bodied persons who would have been prime labour-power in 
their society. Slaves taken from Tanganyika in the period 1830-1873 
were probably as many as 21 million (Silver, 1982). It is generally 
acknowledged that slave trade was the primary negative factor in 
the regenerative capacity of the economy at that time and for many 
subsequent years (Alpers, 1967; Rodney, 1970; Rweyemamu, 1970: 9). 
We can specify the negative impact in the context of the present 
discussion as being its failure to stimulate technological 
improvements for production as well as the inhibition of a faster 
growth in real trade, since it did not stimulate real production. It 
did not permit the retention of society's surplus product by an 
internal privileged group either. Ultimately the series of negative 
factors generated by the slave trade placed a limit on the rate of 
development as well as on the weakening of egalitarianism. In fact 
it is likely that the slave trade increased the notional appeal of 
egalitarianism; the majority of the people moved towards increased 
co-operation as a form of defence against capture. One physical 
manifestation of this - increased villagisation - has been recorded by 
historians (Iliffe, 1979).
This account shows egalitarianism as being separate from 
development, and does not show it to be definitely opposed to the 
latter. It also shows that both were dominated or influenced by
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other factors. One more point needs to be mentioned here, 
although it will again be taken up later in the thesis. It relates to 
what some perceive to be a close connection between egalitarianism 
and change or development in present day Tanzania.
We have indicated that if we looked at human society in its 
entirety there was, particularly in the past, a relationship between 
egalitarianism and the level of development of the technical aspect 
of the productive forces, and with the level of exchange. But we 
have also pointed out that egalitarianism is itself explained by and 
dependent on these economic factors. Together with other 
institutions and attitudes, it constitutes what some call the 
'superstructural' aspects of society (Engels, 1950). The point about 
these 'superstructural' aspects is that they are normally influenced 
by changes in the economic aspects, and that when they appear to 
live on stubbornly beyond their relevant historical time, they either 
change their function to correspond to a new 'basis' or they persist 
only because they are not yet in conflict with the new 'basis' 
(Plekhanov, 1974). The significance of this last point is that the 
appearance of egalitarianism in present-day society does not 
necessarily mean that fundamental changes in the economic 
activities of its peasant population have not taken place.
4.2.4 Summary
In bringing out the explanations for the persistence of 
egalitarianism and its relation to change or development we have 
sought to highlight the following. Firstly, egalitarianism is not a 
fundamental factor in social change, and its modification or 
abolition is possible with a change in other factors. This position 
makes it possible to argue against two views (themselves in conflict
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with each other). The first view, held by some Tanzanian and other 
radical African nationalists at the beginning of the post-colonial era, 
is that egalitarianism in Africa was wholly progressive in the sense 
of being democratic and socialist. This view was correlated to 
another, namely that once a return to egalitarianism  was m ade, 
developm ent would be greatly enhanced. The second view is that 
egalitarianism  is by definition anti-development. The point we 
have m ade in the section is that egalitarianism  is neither an 
ou trigh t socialist form of organisation nor a perm anent an ti­
development factor. We have paid greater attention to the second 
view  because, a lthough  the first had som e influence on 
developm ent policies in Tanzania it has gradually been m ore or 
less abandoned while the second has wide currency at present.
As for the period immediately preceding colonialism, we need to 
stress only the following. The levels of the tools of production and 
of exchange in Tanganyika were relatively low. In the main, these 
factors accounted for the limited availability of a surplus social 
product, which in turn was the major explanation for the lack of 
social differentiation. To this lack of social differentiation 
corresponded various notions and practices of egalitarianism , 
including decentralised institutions and processes of decision­
m aking, com m unity ow nership of land, and co-operation in 
production in some instances. These features rem ained in spite of 
the increasing m arket activity and the form ation of classes in 
production on the coast at the end of the pre-colonial period, but 
th is suggests ne ither the prevalence of com m unalism  nor 
stagnation at the onset of colonialism.
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4.3 The colonial period:
Colonization in Tanganyika started with the granting of a 
protectorate status to a large area bordering the north-east coast 
which had been acquired through 'treaties' by a group of German 
entrepreneurs led by Carl Peters. In partnership with German banks, 
Peters' group formed the German East Africa Company, which, 
apart from trading, expanded colonial acquisitions in its more 
important colonial-administrative role. The company's military 
capacity was, however, inadequate for the suppression of local 
resistance, which first took the form of a full scale military 
engagement along the coast in 1888. Therefore in 1891 the German 
government took direct control of colonization and administration. 
From 1891 to the end of the Maji Maji War of 1905-1907, German 
occupation proceeded inland amid many wars of resistance, and 
this period is customarily treated as a military one with little 
information on production and exchange.5
What is of interest to us is the effect of colonization on socio­
economic conditions in Tanganyika, and, in so far as it relates to the 
issue of development, the effect of colonial political structures and 
decisions. Two major factors appear to have had an overwhelming 
influence on socio-economic conditions. The first, which was 
prevalent in, but not confined to, the early colonial period was land 
alienation. The other, which was dominant throughout the 
colonial period, was the development of commodity production.6 
Let us briefly look at these two factors.
4.3.1 Land Alienation
Land alienation started in the Usambara highland region close to 
the north-east coast, where the German East Africa Company
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claimed to have concessionary rights and the land to have been 
sparsely populated (Iliffe, 1979: 126). The company leased and sold 
some of its land to settlers, but retained much of it for plantation 
agriculture. More than 56,819.2 acres of some of the best land in the 
country was held by the company in Usambara (including parts of 
present-day Tanga) after the initial selling-off (Iliffe, 1979: 127). 
Subsequently Usambara became the main area for plantation 
production.
Not all European-acquired land was in large tracts designed for 
plantations. Some of the settlers preferred smaller farms on which 
they could undertake a variety of agricultural activities. But even 
smaller farms could be obtained only through land alienation. In 
fact the smaller farms appear to have had a proportionately greater 
impact on the welfare of the local people than the larger company 
estates. The reason for this is that whereas estates may have 
included a large proportion of what their owners considered to be 
virgin land - it could have been merely fallow - the smaller farms 
often alienated cultivated land (Iliffe, 1979: 142).
By 1912 there remained very little land in the Usambara region to 
alienate in favour of Europeans, and the local people were severely 
hit by land shortage. In addition, since fallow land on which the 
local agricultural system depended was no longer available, food 
production declined (Iliffe, 1979: 143).
The other effect of land alienation, of course, was the coming into 
being of a sizeable group of landless people. Some of these became 
squatters, but many turned into labourers on both the plantations 
and the smaller farms. In fact labourers for Europeans were ’created' 
simultaneously with the taking of local lands.
It appears, though, that it required more than the mere economic
135
compulsion of landlessness in Usambara to guarantee the 
availability of labour to farms, and it is recorded that labour 
shortage was one of the reasons settler agriculture moved westwards 
to the Kilimanjaro, Arusha and Meru areas (Henderson, 1965: 144; 
Iliffe, 1979: 142).
Land alienation had occurred in Kilimanjaro, Arusha and Meru 
by 1907. Here the process towards dispossession appears to have 
been of a more determined kind than in the Usambaras; to the 
extent that labour shortage was considered to be one of the problems 
in the Usambaras, the process and planning of land alienation in 
the newer areas were deliberately designed to cut off the local 
people from access to farming land beyond the immediate 
perimeter of their households.7 It was believed that this hemming- 
in approach would create an ever increasing labour force to satisfy 
settler farming needs. About 197,632 acres of good farming land had 
been alienated in Kilimanjaro by 1913. Out of these, the settlers 
cultivated only 14,822.4 acres (Iliffe, 1979: 144). Taken in Meru were 
93,168.4 acres. This constituted most of the arable land in the area.8 
Again squatting and labouring on settler farms became a feature in 
these newer areas, as it was in the Usambaras. So did generalized 
hunger (Iliffe, 1979: 144). However, at about the same time, the 
colonial government initiated a policy direction that slowed down 
the process of land dispossession.9
The partial restrictions placed in the way of land dispossession 
emerged out of a debate among colonial policy-makers which has 
sometimes been inaccurately presented as one between those who 
favoured a plantation colony and those who wanted a commercial 
one (Henderson, 1965: 148). In economic terms the needs of settlers 
at that time can be summed up as having been the creation of an
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abundant and cheap African labour force. They thought that this 
goal could only be fully achieved if, in addition to direct labour 
compulsion, land alienation was thorough and Africans were 
prohibited from growing cash crops (Iliffe, 1979: 153-155). On the 
government side, the new policy direction that was developing 
could be seen as a short term response to the break-neck speed of 
land alienation of the initial years and its disastrous consequences. 
Two related factors were now to be considered from the point of 
view of German welfare. Firstly, what the settlers had set out to 
grow on large-scale estates, namely coffee, had not been suited to 
the Usambaras, and therefore European commercial farming in 
Tanganyika had not yet become productive.10 Secondly, those 
settlers who started mixed farms on which they produced saleable 
food crops for the plantation population did not know the local 
conditions well, and they too had failed to take off (Iliffe, 1979: 128, 
143). Clearly only the local people could keep production going at 
acceptable levels, at least in the short run, and that required some 
protection from severe landlessness.
In addition the colonial government did not want another war 
with the local people. Both the settlers and the government in 
Tanganyika were convinced that the local people were about to 
fight back against land alienation to protect what they perceived as 
their very existence. Most settlers, and others in Germany itself, 
thought that only a more resolute form of suppression of local 
discontent would guarantee them land, cheap labour and freedom 
from competition by local commodity producers (Henderson, 1965: 
149; Iliffe, 1979: 149). Perhaps the government would still have 
gone along with this, considering the then escalating strength of the 
settlers in terms of numbers and organisation, as well as the great
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amount of support for them within Germany (Iliffe, 1979: 151). But 
a war about the possession of land could have easily aroused the 
passions of other local people outside the northern regions, and 
could have swamped the entire country. Economically and 
militarily this would have been highly undesirable, especially with 
the lessons of the Maji Maji War still in memory. In particular, it 
would not have been immediately foreseeable how the value of 
production by a settler sector, which at that time consisted of less 
than a thousand farm owners, might supplant that of the combined 
Tanganyikan producers who numbered about five million 
(Henderson, 1965: 155; Iliffe, 1979: 141).
It has also often been reported that one of the reasons for the 
government to slow down land alienation was a keen commitment 
to prevent the development of a working class in Tanganyika. 
Perhaps the government did not make such a clear social cost 
calculation, but the phrases used by some officials, such as 
Rechenberg, governor of Tanganyika at that time, appear to lend 
credence to this theory. In opposing further land alienation in 
Kilimanjaro, for example, he mentioned that he was guarding 
against the proletarianisation of the people living there (Henderson, 
1965: 148; Iliffe, 1979: 144). We shall see later whether there was a 
relationship between proletarianisation and the emerging policy on 
land tenure and commodity production. But we can say that this 
policy had important consequences reaching far into the future.
4.3.2. Further development of commodity production in the 
agricultural sector
The new policy has sometimes been described as a compromise, 
constituted by governmental intervention and assistance to large-
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scale planters in securing labour on the one hand, and lim ited 
governmental promotion of commodity production by Africans for 
external markets on the other. 11 The impact of the latter onn the 
future make-up of Tanganyika is now generally considered to be of 
great importance, and it deserves extended presentation.
A factor that went hand in hand with commodity production was 
taxation. One of the im portant consequences of the compulsion of 
local people to pay tax, which was almost always done in cash, is 
that it brought most of them into the fold of the wider market, at 
the same time as it spurred those already incorporated to expend 
m ore energy in producing for the external market. Initially, the 
need to obtain the cash to pay taxes in order not to fall foul of the 
colonial authorities was probably the m ost im portant reason for 
those less incorporated in the market to adopt cash crop production. 
But later it was obvious that by devoting further efforts to the 
activity, personal prosperity  could ensue. Concom itantly the 
refusal of the early colonial governm ent to depend solely on 
settlers, and the attitude that Germany needed raw  m aterials no 
m atter who produced them (Iliffe, 1979: 154), facilitated the spread 
and intensification of cash crop production. A new element of petty 
commodity production was that peasants were not being pushed 
and induced simply to produce food for an 'external' m arket, but 
also to grow for the overseas market those crops that were likely to 
give them a regular and fairly stable income because of the greater 
dem and for them in the new European industrial age.
It can be said that the economic inducement to widen commodity 
production first appeared in a significant way via the rubber and 
sisal p lan tations of the N orth-East. M any food grow ers in 
Tanganyika had long supplied the Caravan Trade routes that ran
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through the centre of Tanganyika, as well as the wider overseas 
market mediated by Zanzibar. Now some of them began to supply 
the plantations too. Those taking advantage of this opportunity 
were, of course, the ones living near the plantations themselves, 
and it is not surprising that the majority of the suppliers were the 
nearby Bondei. But the stimulation to commodity production was 
wide and significant enough to win over many Wanyamwezi of 
Western Tanganyika, 'traditional labourers' throughout the time of 
the Caravan Trade, to immigration into the northeastern parts in 
order to produce food for sale to the plantations (Iliffe, 1979: 152).
4.3.3. Contrasting government behaviour towards peasant 
commodity production
In order to hasten the production of important raw materials, 
some encouragement was given by the government to local people 
in certain areas to produce directly for the overseas market. Cotton 
growing in Tanganyika is the best example of this.
At the turn of the century the demand for cotton by Europe's 
textile industries was still rising, as was its price in the international 
market. In addition, at that time Germany apparently sought to free 
itself from American suppliers, and therefore initiated a great drive 
to produce the crop in its territories. In Tanganyika, this is 
demonstrated by at least two massive plantation projects for cotton 
established by German companies around Ruvu and Kilosa between 
1907 and 1912. The projects collapsed and failed. Their failure is 
generally considered to have convinced the government and other 
German interests that large-scale farming of cotton was not practical 
in Tanganyika, and that therefore this all-important crop could only 
be grown by small-holder producers (Iliffe, 1979: 145). The
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mobilization of the latter towards this end in subsequent years was 
quite phenomenal by the standards of governmental involvement 
in the economy at that time. Iliffe (1979: 155) has written that 
between 1909 and 1913 cotton lint exports from Mwanza, the chief 
small-holder cotton-growing area, rose from 123 bales to 3,735.
Coffee is another crop which the government encouraged the 
local people to grow for the overseas market. However, in the strict 
sense of the word, this encouragement appears to have been the case 
only in Bukoba, the second chief coffee growing area in Tanzania 
today. In the main coffee-growing area of Kilimanjaro, the 
government attempt to deepen cash crop production was tempered 
by the demands of the settler population, who were themselves 
growing coffee and thus opposed to competition with the local 
people. 12 Some of the settler-induced laws that the government 
instituted vis a vis the Kilimanjaro people could have completely 
stopped the latter from growing coffee. For example, the 'card 
system' obliged a local person to work for a European for one month 
in every four at a fixed wage.13 On the other hand, the government 
fixed the wage on African-owned farms just below the level of 
inducement to labour. By drawing labour away from the locally- 
owned holdings to expatriate farms while limiting the wage-rise 
possibilities, these laws supplemented land shortage and aggravated 
the problems of commodity production for the local people in the 
area.
This contrasting approach of the government to the 
intensification of commodity production - active encouragement 
on the one hand and covert prohibition on the other - remained a 
feature for a long time in the colonial era. It seemed to correspond 
to the nature and location of settler economic activity, and was not
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confined to German colonial rule. For example, throughout the 
British period the people of Kilimanjaro struggled to be accepted as 
competent coffee growers, and it appears that only the formation of 
their co-operative movement in 1925 ensured their survival as 
commodity producers, vis a vis the government and the settlers 
(U.K. Govt, 1937: 207; Iliffe, 1979: 276-278; McCarthy, 1982: 95).14 
'Non-encouragement without prohibition' was later followed by the 
British government in other areas that took an interest in coffee 
production, but all of them were firmly persuaded not to grow the 
Arabica type already grown by the settlers and the local Kilimanjaro 
people, who were by now being accepted as coffee growers.
In later years the British colonial government took steps to 
prohibit coffee-growing in the newer areas of Arusha, Meru and 
Pare, which adjoined Kilimanjaro; coffee trees were uprooted and 
nurseries destroyed in Upare (Iliffe, 1979: 289- 290). In the early 
1950s the negative government reaction to the production of certain 
commodities by local people briefly spread to sisal. In response to a 
rise in world prices, the peasants of Lake Province, situated at the 
far end of the country from the sisal plantations, produced 
significant amounts of the crop, which the government continually 
discouraged until the local industry itself petered out in response to 
a later price fall (Ehrlich, 1976: 301-302).
Government's contrasting policies were not confined to the 
economy. Administrative measures and educational policies also 
showed the government promoting progress at times, and impeding 
it at other times, as the following examples indicate.
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4.3.4. Indirect Rule and the reduced enthusiasm for economic 
growth and transformation
In a simple way, indirect rule can be defined in relation to direct 
rule, which is the governance of an indigenous population by an 
alien colonial authority in a centralized and assimilationist way. To 
the extent that the German colonial government in Tanganyika 
used some indigenous people for local administration and was not 
assimilationist, though clearly centralized, it practised a limited 
form of indirect rule (Henderson, 1965: 147; Iliffe, 1979: 319). 
However, indirect rule as practised by the British administration in 
Tanganyika since 1925 was markedly different from this model.15
To start with, it was not seen as satisfactory merely to decentralise 
authority and devolve power to local or locally-constituted units of 
administration. It was important that the indigenous participants 
were people perceived as having traditional authority or legitimacy 
- real or 'manufactured' (Iliffe, 1979: 322-334). Above all, Africans 
were to be left as undisturbed as possible, as long as their activities 
did not prevent the government from running smoothly.
Obviously there were administrators who believed that indirect 
rule was an ideal method for the preservation of the identity of 
Africans, and most presented it officially as such. Other 
administrators favoured it for reasons of pragmatism and 
expediency, which, apart from avoiding the greater administrative 
costs of direct rule, consisted of securing order and stability.
The interpretation of indirect rule as a system of 'divide and 
rule', based on, among other things, the promotion of tribal 
differences is well known and correct. Indirect rule achieved order 
and stability by precluding cross-tribal organization and unification. 
But there were other consequences. Indirect rule entailed the
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reconstruction of chiefly authorities which were new in substance 
but traditional in form. The colonial government created local 
governing councils known as Native Authorities. These were made 
up of traditional rulers and headed by a chief, all of whom were now 
appointed by the government (Clagget Taylor, 1963: 51). Initially the 
native authorities had minor legislative roles such as the making of 
by-laws, and were independent of each other. But soon the British 
colonial government extended their roles, strengthening them 
more than in any other phase of colonialism (Clagget Taylor, 1963: 
49; Iliffe, 1979: 356-357). As anticipated by the colonial government, 
the effect of this was not only to confine the participation of the 
indigenous population in politics and other important issues to 
local affairs (Iliffe, 1979: 356) but also to deny the educated and 
traveled Africans any influence in the community (Iliffe, 1979: 322). 
If fully achievable, a further effect of this in developmental terms 
would have been the construction of an edifice capable of insulating 
society from new knowledge. That did not happen, but the 
contribution to the slowdown in overall development is likely to 
have been quite significant.16
We must recall that the context in which all this took place was 
one of local resentment to alien rule, as well as a distrust for much 
of what was new and modern, which appeared to be linked with it. 
Indirect rule as described above created the perception among the 
chiefs that the colonial authorities were now returning 'their land' 
and restoring 'their sovereignty'. This perception became the 
ideological forte of the new traditional authorities. In the meantime 
the colonial authorities went about discrediting those with ideas of 
change. It is the atmosphere of change that the system of indirect 
rule repressed, especially in the inter-war period of the British
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administration of Tanganyika.
The decision to leave Africans as 'undisturbed' as possible also 
had a great impact on the pace of educational development. Both at 
the level of official thinking and in implementation, the 
educational direction which became dominant was one that 
emphasized localism, simple agriculture and the acquisition of only 
simple literacy tools. It was not unusual for colonial officials to 
discourage Tanganyikans from enrolling at a school certificate level, 
lest they become 'political agitators'. The first Tanganyikan to enrol 
at school certificate level at Makerere, situated in Uganda, did so in 
1930. In the next four years only 'a handful' of others joined, 
having obtained primary education outside the country. Up to the 
1950s Tanganyika's enrolment quota at Makerere was frequently 
not filled. The educational situation was so bad that at some point 
even the local traditionalists complained that Africans were not 
being taught beyond a certain standard in order to suit particular 
colonial ends (Iliffe, 1979: 339-341, 445). But the indirect rule
considerations continued to influence government attitude towards 
African education even when, after the Second World War, there 
were attempts to plan towards improvement in Tanganyika's 
development (Iliffe, 1979: 438-439).17 A description by Iliffe (1979: 
326) sums up this period well: "Indirect rule became a means of 
social control rather than social progress...."
4.3.5. Commodity production, change and differentiation among 
peasants
While there were many actions by the Tanganyikan colonial 
government that did not encourage progress, this did not by any 
means result in a complete lack of change or development.
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Obviously the rate of progress was extremely slow, but 
improvements took place in many aspects of life. In some areas, 
notably health, the improvement was directly a result of 
government action. Even in education, improvements on a 
quantitative scale continued to be made by the government. It can 
be noted that the expanded acreage and increased agricultural 
'productivity' of the late 1940s and early 1950s occurred at a time 
when, on the basis of the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare 
Act, the British government adopted the post-war policy of a 
'modernizing imperialism’, through which colonial governments 
became relatively more positive about development (Creech-Jones, 
1951, U.K. Govt, 1955).
Some improvements were bound to take place irrespective of the 
official attitudes and actions. In particular, once the economy's link 
with the external demand for raw materials was strengthened, as it 
was in the colonial period, peasant commodity production was in 
general bound to increase. Historical evidence shows a steady (and 
sometimes spectacular) increase in the production of sale crops 
introduced in colonial times, as in the case of copra, sesame and 
groundnuts in the early colonial period, and coffee and cotton in 
later times (Henderson, 1965: 144, 153; Iliffe, 1979: 274-295, 453). This 
was largely due to the normal 'economic rationality' of responding 
to comparatively favourable price regimes, as well as to the more 
general expectation of the betterment of life through increased 
participation in the commodity economy.
Other important changes among peasants also took place 
throughout the colonial period, notably in the organisation of 
productive activities, and even in the methods of production. For 
example, the introduction of cash crops that were in great demand
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outside the country not only led to the cash crop 'mania' that the 
colonial authorities at some point were quite uneasy with, but also 
to the rapid spread of capitalist relations in production. The 
Tanganyikan case of the initial expansion of commodity 
production, in fact, demonstrates that the freeing of labour from 
land, and the long duration of capitalistic gestation are essential to 
capitalism only in its establishment as a 'self-propelling' mode of 
production; in new areas, capitalist relations emerge without these 
preconditions. In the Usambaras and Kilimanjaro, African 
employers of labour emerged as soon as the production of the new 
crops was adopted by them. In Ujiji, which was situated in the 
heartland of the region supplying migrant labour, and historically 
considered to be the least developed, rice was being produced on 
farms their owners rarely worked. The local pioneers of cotton 
growing in the southern and eastern parts of the then Lake Region 
were all employers of labour who did not work on their farms at all, 
as indeed was the first indigenous coffee producers on the western 
side of the region, and some of those around Kilimanjaro. In this 
example the first growers of the new crops were also the pioneers of 
capitalist relations in production. This is because they were chiefs 
and opinion leaders who were exempted from compulsory labour, 
becoming virtually the local agents of government and settlers for 
the mobilization of labour, and thus having some labour at their 
disposal for exploitation. One entrepreneur in the Bukoba District 
of the Lake Region had in 1907 proposed a joint venture with a 
settler in which the latter would have provided the monetary 
capital while he provided the labouring men (Iliffe, 1980: 282). In 
later years capitalist relations among commercial food producers, 
notably around Isimani in the then Southern Highlands region,
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became common (Awiti, 1975).
Of course capitalist relations among peasants on a wider social 
scale were not regularized yet, and here the fact that wage labourers 
were generally less detached from land, and that the extremely 
short period of capitalistic commodity production had not provided 
adequate accumulated capital to support it, delayed the 
regularization. But it is clear that capitalist relations were no longer 
alien.
There were other changes. Between the late 1940s and early 1950s 
increased productivity and expanded acreage became possible on a 
wide scale through the use of fertilizers and tractors, the pioneers 
here being Isimani in the south and Arusha-Mbulu in the north. 
Lorries too, for carrying produce, were bought in relatively large 
numbers at this time. The enthusiasm of the local people for the 
new methods of production was high enough for some of them to 
put funds in pools for the hire or purchase of tractors (Iliffe, 1979: 
454-455; Raikes, 1975; Awiti, 1975).
There were times when the local people resisted important 
modern innovations. We have pointed out earlier that this was 
often the logical reaction of a conquered people. However, some of 
the innovations that appear to have been resisted at the level of the 
economy did in fact clash with other rational (often economic) 
criteria. For example in the late fifties the enthusiasm for tractors 
and ploughs began to wane in some areas of Tanganyika because 
there was evidence that these ultimately brought up the infertile 
subsoils while making it harder to terrace the farms against erosion 
- both of which were a threat to future production. This 
apprehension must be read in the context that there were still many 
unknowns regarding the entire set of the new methods of
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production.
These examples are opposed to the view, prevalent in the 
colonial years and popular am ong settlers, of the econom ic 
irrationality and unchanging conservatism of the African peasant 
producers. According to the theory, African peasant producers were 
neither interested in acquiring more goods, nor in bettering their 
lives through a disciplined participation in economic activities 
(Stahl, 1961: 72; Wrigley, 1965: 230; Jones, 1977: 112-113). A variation 
of the view assumes that peasants always place a higher value on 
pre-capitalist forms of culture in relation to transformational goals. 
It therefore perceives peasants as rationally forsaking economic and 
developm ental goals in pursuit of 'superior' egalitarian objectives 
and leisure (Hyden, 1980: 18-19). That peasants are insensitive to 
economic progress is taken as a given fact.
Several studies have shown that the 'theory' of an intrinsic 
economic irrationality peculiar to African peasant producers is 
untenable (Henderson, 1965: 188; Jones, 1977; Sabot, 1979: 32-33, 57). 
The Tanganyikan examples given above dem onstrate that there 
was enough enthusiasm  for commodity production and change, 
and that a significant am ount of differentiation took place among 
peasan ts, even w hen colonial policies in som e instances 
discouraged this.
4.3.6. Other factors in the ’underdevelopment’ of Tanganyika 
4.3.6.1 The uncertainty surrounding the status of Tanganyika as a 
dependency
It has often been stated that in the interwar period the status of 
Tanganyika, as a trust territory rather than a colony in the formal 
sense, initially stood in the way of better economic commitment by
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British nationals. The deportation of resident German investors 
and the expropriation of German property which took place at a 
time of such little commitment also added to the atmosphere of 
economic neglect. Moreover, in the 1930s a discussion of 
Tanganyika's status was revived, with Germany apparently 
interested in regaining it. There are historians who argue that the 
sense of uncertainty created by this discussion, and the mandate 
status, prevented a number of important investments from taking 
place (Ingham, 1965: 579; Iliffe, 1979: 302). That may well have been 
the case, but there were other factors which also placed difficulties 
in the way of savings and investment, especially in the long term. 
4.3.6.2 The dominance of the economy by non-local interests
The domination of the economy by non-local interests had 
several aspects. One of these was the absence of an internally-based 
authority with autonomy to influence the determination of the 
income of local producers. Others included the dominance of the 
export sector in the economy, and the domination of this sector by 
expatriate farmers.18 These aspects are easily illustrated by the way 
they manifested themselves in wages and commodity prices.
(a) Low wages in the economy
During the colonial period wages were extremely low. Obviously 
profit considerations by employers and the cynical repression of 
colonial conquest accounted for this. It is interesting to note, 
however, that most settlers and some government officials had 
found and adopted a view they believed to be an economic 
justification for low wages, namely that African wage labourers had 
definite cash goals beyond which they would not offer their labour. 
Such employers had become convinced that more pay would only 
make it possible for labourers to achieve the cash target in a shorter
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period of time (Sabot, 1979: 33).
Under colonial rule, low wages meant many incidences of half­
pay (and sometimes even less) that accompanied the numerous 
occasions of (forced) labour conscriptions. Notable among such 
incidences was the system of labour gangs of the 1920s and 30s for 
the construction of public utilities, and that of the 1940s for the sisal 
plantations in aid of the war effort and post-war reconstruction 
(Ingham, 1965: 583; Iliffe, 1979: 371-372).
Where 'full' wages were paid, it is still possible to establish the 
fact of low wages by closely estimating the shortfall between real 
cash earnings and presumed fair wages during particular time slots 
of the colonial period. Iliffe arrives at the conclusion that wages 
were low for much of the colonial period partly by working out 
calculations of this kind (Iliffe, 1979: 354, 452, 469).
The fact of low wages is also demonstrated by the continuation of 
the non-wage sector as a source of the means of livelihood for wage 
labourers (Sabot, 1979: 63), which remained a feature of the 
Tanganyikan labour force throughout the colonial period.
The significance of the shortfall in income, resulting from 
subjective decisions by the government and the settlers to pay low 
wages, is the fact that the community of employers (including 
settlers) was largely expatriate.19 When this expatriate characteristic 
of the potential investment group is related with the generally 
negative attitude towards further or long term investment in 
Tanganyika, it becomes clear that in the long run the shortfall was 
income foregone with little hope of it ever being ploughed back.
The shortfall may also have been negative to the expansion of 
production. Wages which were consistently low would not have 
encouraged the increased and varied consumption that is necessary
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to ensure that production constantly improves and expands.
(b) Commodity prices and the economy
Similar conclusions can be reached regarding commodity prices. 
These were often kept below world levels. For instance, coffee 
prices were below world levels for quite a considerable length of 
time, a result mainly of a fixed contract with the British Ministry of 
Food, prompting some leaders of the Kilimanjaro Native Coffee 
Union (KNCU) to complain in 1951 that they were receiving only 
2/3 of the value of their crop (Bowles, 1980: 175). Sisal prices were 
also constantly below world averages. In the 1941-1948 period, 
Tanganyikan sisal was sold through a bulk purchase agreement with 
the British government, which often resold the sisal to the United 
States at twice the growers' price (Ehrlich, 1976: 300, 304; Iliffe, 1979: 
344). The sisal arrangement alone is estimated to have caused an 
economic loss of 11 million pounds to Tanganyika.20
Cotton also suffered a price shortfall. Here the relevant statistics 
alone show that the magnitude of 'short-changing' cotton growers 
was greater than in the other commodities. For example, cotton 
prices paid to the Tanganyikan government were below world 
levels throughout the 1943-1952 period. This resulted from the long­
term contracts with the Raw Cotton Commission of Britain. But 
also the Tanganyikan government in turn often paid peasant 
farmers less than 1/2 of the price obtained for Tanganyikan cotton. 
Bowles has taken a closer look at this aspect and found that in the 
1949-50 season the government had paid growers 25 cents per 
pound while it had itself taken 30 cents per pound. This practice 
provided the government with 5.2 million pounds from cotton 
alone in the three years 1949-1952 (Bowles, 1980: 176). Officially, the 
government intended that these funds be used to develop the
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particular crop industry, or agriculture as a whole. In practice, 
however, most of the funds were simply transferred to Britain for 
investment (Bowles, 1980: 174, 176) .21 For Tanganyika, a 
consequence of this was, once again, lost investment.
There was another dimension to this shortfall of income to 
local producers. Frequently expatriate farmers were paid different 
prices. For instance, it appears that during the period, the few 
expatriate farmers engaged in cotton growing received the full unit 
price paid for Tanganyikan cotton, or twice what the local growers 
got. In fact there were many ways of providing better prices or 
income to expatriate growers of the same crop, or for crops chiefly 
grown by expatriate farmers, such as sisal, and, especially during the 
2nd World War, wheat, maize and beans. In the latter category of 
crops the practice was disguised under schemes such as export tax 
reductions, guaranteed high prices if large amounts were produced, 
and planting subsidies if large areas were planted.
In view of the incidence of income shortfalls affecting indigenous 
producers, it seems inescapable to conclude that local farmers were 
subsidizing the expatriate ones (Bowles, 1980: 167-168). Barring for 
the moment consideration of the blatant discrimination that 
accompanied this 'subsidization' in the colonial era, it may be 
argued that the practice is common even today in all countries, 
provided the branch or crop sector being subsidized is critical to the 
economy and the measure is temporary. Similarly there were those 
who sought to justify this 'subsidization' by regarding expatriate 
farmers as being involved in the all too important export sector or 
closely connected with it. The point though is that, with the 
assistance of governmental intervention in the exchange arena, 
more capital went to the expatriate community (including the
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government) which, in view of the community's reluctance to 
commit large or long term investments to Tanganyika, resulted in a 
capital outflow then and in the future.
4.3.7. The consolidation of dependence in the colonial period
In Tanganyika, as in many other countries, the most important 
step towards the creation of dependence was the formal 
subordination of the local population involving in the main the 
control of major institutions and decision-making processes by a 
foreign power. For it is this classically political act (i.e., formal 
subordination) which breaks the ground for making decisions and 
erecting structures of great economic significance. But it was the 
subsequent decisions and structures that were critical to the pace of 
development and to the establishment of the crucial aspects of 
dependence.
So far we have been discussing those specific colonial actions (and 
omissions) that could be said to have been negatively disposed 
towards development. In what follows we focus on those directly 
related to dependence. They too, as we shall see, can be considered 
to have made a contribution to a poor state of development, but we 
highlight them here for their role in the consolidation of 
dependence at the economic level.
4.3.7.1 Monetary institutions and processes
One of the prominent aspects of the monetary system of colonial 
Tanganyika was the absence of restrictions on the remittance of 
funds outside. This was facilitated by the lack of exchange control 
within the territory, and by the completely subordinate status of the 
country's currency and banking system in relation to British 
interests (Elkan and Nulty, 1976: 332). Perceived by nationalists as
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being a determinant factor in the development of a future 
Tanganyika, the monetary system was to become a priority area for 
change after independence, and was initially central to the non­
dependence strategy that emerged (Nsekela, 1983).
Understanding 'monetary dependence' in Tanganyika requires 
an appraisal of the East African Currency Board and the related 
monetary arrangements.
Established for Kenya and Uganda in 1905, and covering 
Tanganyika as well from 1920, the Board had control over the issue 
of currency and, to an extent, over its use for credit purposes. The 
most significant and controversial aspect of the Board's authority 
was the rule that it could only issue additional amounts of East 
African currency if there were equivalent sterling assets held by East 
Africa in Britain. This emanated from the general British policy in 
many of its dependencies, that currency be backed pound for pound 
by sterling assets (Elkan and Nulty, 1976: 332; Loxley, 1979: 76), and 
thus in a sense the East African Currency Board was only a regional 
agency for its implementation. The official reasons for the adoption 
of this 'sterling-exchange standard' included the need to provide a 
smooth convertibility of the currencies in question, which in turn 
presumably offered a greater access to cheap borrowing by the 
dependencies on the London credit market, as well as the 
stabilization of local economic conditions through the curtailment 
of monetary expansion (Hazlewood, 1967: 102; Nsekela, 1983: 4; 
Elkan and Nulty, 1976: 332). In reality credit availability for the 
dependencies was in no way facilitated by this arrangement. It took 
only a short time for the demand on the London market to become 
too great. Moreover, lending to persons or institutions in the 
dependencies rem ained dependent on other financial
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considerations, such as creditworthiness - a criterion that, for the 
obvious reasons of low income and comparatively low investment 
security, was heavily biased against the dependencies (Hazlewood, 
1954: 304, 314).
It has been argued for Tanganyika that in fact more capital 
flowed out of the country than came in (Nsekela, 1983; Iliffe, 1979: 
302), and that this was directly related to the nature of the monetary 
system. In curtailing monetary expansion through the restriction of 
the issue of currency, the monetary system no doubt helped hold 
down inflation (Loxley, 1979: 76), while its insistence on a '100% 
backing' of the local currency by sterling assets ensured an 
astounding stability in the balance of payments situ a tio n  
(Hazlewood, 1954: 298; Nsekela, 1983: 6). In reality this monetary 
stability was never a positive achievement, and we can show this by 
discussing this factor alongside other effects of the monetary system 
in terms of long term developmental possibilities.
The debate about the developmental consequences of the 
monetary system brings out three main questions. These are 
whether the 100% backing of local currency by sterling significantly 
restricted the entry of imports and investment funds necessary for 
greater developmental undertakings; whether the arrangements 
favoured the 'export enclave' and helped cement the orientation of 
the entire economy towards (primary) export production; and 
whether such a monetary system led to currency and credit scarcity 
to the extent that prices, exchange and production were retarded.
Although it is possible to find writers who have answered all 
three questions in the negative (Earle, 1954), most of those who 
have studied the issues theoretically and empirically are drawn 
towards the affirmative ('Analyst', 1953; Hazlewood, 1954). Among
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the latter, only the last question receives a qualified affirmation 
(Newlyn, 1952; Hazlewood, 1954). The qualification is that although 
the arrangements led to currency scarcity generally, they did not 
necessarily lead to credit scarcity in some territories, and as such the 
total money supply was not scarce.
Consideration of these three questions hinges on the fact that 
further currency issue in the dependencies had to be obtained only 
through increased exports or a decrease in imports, or both. The 
currency, to put it another way, had to be paid for in foreign 
exchange (Hazlewood, 1954: 294).
It was therefore important to forego importation to a great extent 
merely to avoid the contraction of the currency in circulation in a 
dependency, and the British authorities, including the Tanganyika 
government, ensured strict enforcement of this policy. This explains 
the apparently 'excess' foreign reserves that Tanganyika had 
throughout the colonial period (Hazlewood, 1967; Nsekela, 1983). 
The funds were instead used elsewhere, for it was part of the 
arrangement, strictly enforced by such agencies as the East African 
Currency Board, that most of the reserves be invested outside the 
territory which owned them, mainly in Britain (Hazlewood, 1954: 
293; Nsekela, 1983: 4). There can be no doubt that these reserves, 
useful elsewhere, would have been important as investment funds 
in large developmental undertakings in the territories which 
owned them.
It is also clear that since further currency issue depended on an 
increase in the export type of production, the foreign exchange 
earner, resources were drawn towards this sector. Hazlewood (1954: 
303-304) shows that this bias towards the export sector was usually 
accentuated by the expatriate nature of the other currency-creating
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agency, i.e., foreign investment funds, since investing in export 
production guaranteed profits that were redeemable in sterling 
pounds in future. With a low long-term investment priority tag 
placed on it, Tanganyika was not an exception to this trend 
(Seidman, 1972: 40-41). Later, we shall indicate how helpful the 
monetary arrangements were to the repatriation of expatriate funds 
when the nationalist wave of impending changes appeared to 
threaten them.
In considering whether the monetary arrangements were 
deflationary, we should keep in mind the assumption that such 
restriction on the issue of currency makes it scarce, depressing prices 
and arresting economic activities. We should recall that a similar 
opposition was voiced against the similarly 100% backed 'gold 
standard' in the early decades of this century, to which the colonial 
monetary system was likened (Analyst, 1954). There seems to have 
been the case in Tanganyika of a stifled exchange when, in addition 
to the limited issue of currency by the Board, the government 
prohibited the use of local exchange equivalents. It was aimed, 
according to official policy, at the elimination of barter trading, and 
at the unification of the territorial market by the use of a single pan­
territorial currency. Of course it would be difficult to gauge the 
extent of the 'deflationary drag' as a direct result of this, but it seems 
to have been significant: the local people were acutely aware of the 
scarcity, and therefore they conducted a great deal of currency 
hoarding. In a study devoted to money operating in Tanganyika up 
to 1940, McCarthy (1976) has demonstrated the case of a currency- 
induced 'deflationary drag', enabling him to conclude that
"If one can regard the constrained articulation of a 
comprehensive, flexible transactions universe as a genuine
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form of underdevelopment, and if one can accept the notion 
that undergrowth results, in part, from limiting the vitality of 
exchange, then the place to begin the emphasis shift ... is the 
arena of shackled exchange." (McCarthy, 1976: 648).
McCarthy (1976) is right in noting that, at a particular historical 
point in Tanganyika, exchange was prominent in influencing the 
process of development (in this case slowing it down). But then he 
goes on to project this as the major explanation for 
underdevelopment while understating its benefit to imperial 
interests (or even discounting it altogether). The final (and in our 
view erroneous) p icture which he produces is that 
underdevelopment was chiefly the work of a currency-hoarding 
local population facilitated by a ’job-bungling' Tanganyikan section 
of the British bureaucracy.
While a slowdown in economic activity is strongly implied, there 
is another way of looking at the currency scarcity. Even though the 
Tanganyikan government may appear in the historical record not to 
have planned for this result, it seems to us that the aggravated 
scarcity was in fact an additional method of inducing peasants to 
produce for export. The relationship between currency and export 
production can not be conceptualized only at the general level: 
individual peasants could only acquire their medium of exchange 
(or cash) if they sold more export crops. It can be stated then, on the 
basis of this, that the the most pronounced effect of the 'deflationary 
drag' was on local markets and home production.
Currency scarcity was supplemented by the extremely low credit 
levels in Tanganyika, which were also skewed in favour of the 
export enclave (Seidman, 1972: 41). This was in part due to the 
expatriate nature of the financial institutions, which made them
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reluctant to extend funds to long term undertakings, and to local 
people (Loxley, 1973; Loxley, 1979). The low credit levels were also 
due to governmental intervention, through regulations which 
effectively barred Africans from borrowing (McCarthy, 1982: 37-49).
In the mid-1950s, British monetary policy relaxed from the 
rigidity of the earlier period, and the East African Currency Board 
was given authority to effect a fiduciary issue of currency in 1955. 
This of course meant that for the first time the Board could facilitate 
government financing of major developmental projects. But it was 
still a long way away from being responsive to local needs: the 
prescribed ceiling on the issue, 10 million pounds initially for the 
whole of East Africa, would yield only a small amount. In any case 
the maximum was never reached in the actual distribution. The 
investment by the East African Currency Board in the governments 
of East Africa was mostly in short term treasury bills, and it has 
been estimated that for the whole period after the relaxation, only 
1/6 of it was in (the long term) securities of these governments. The 
rest of the investment remained in the London securities 
(Hazlewood, 1967; Nsekela, 1983; National Bank of Commerce, 
1977).
From the above discussion, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
the colonial monetary arrangements played a significant role in the 
establishment and consolidation of dependence, as well as the 
continuation of underdevelopment 
4.3.7.2 Trade
If taken alone, trade flow statistics are misleading indicators of the 
magnitude of dependence, but they contribute significantly to its 
representation. One of the better documented aspects of trade flow 
is the volume of trade with the major buyers and sellers. In
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Tanganyika each colonial power tried through various mechanisms 
to become both the principal buyer and the major seller, so that the 
territory's major trading partner was always the colonial power 
administering it, save for the transitional interlude after the 1st 
World War. Thus, despite the 'open-door' commercial policy 
attached to the territory’s mandate status (Ingham, 1965: 550), British 
imports rose from 27% of the total in 1936 to 47% in 1948. The 
general multilateralism spearheaded by the United States reduced 
the British share after 1948, but it was still a high 37% in 1961 (Iliffe, 
1979: 470). The percentages of Tanganyika's exports which went to 
Britain in the same years were 23, 52 and 36 (Stein, 1979; Iliffe, 1979: 
470). These high percentages demonstrate the creation of a 
significant amount of vulnerability to a single powerful country, 
and of a pattern that would be self-perpetuating and hard to change 
in times of adversity.
4.3.7.3 Agriculture
During colonialism, the primary export sector was greatly 
influenced by trends in other economies. Both the volume and the 
value of export crops fluctuated from time to time depending on 
the lowering and raising of demand and prices, which in turn were 
dictated by trends in the consuming countries. This is nowhere 
better illustrated than by the fortunes of Tanganyika's chief export 
crop, sisal. Tonnage for this crop rose markedly between the wars 
following the disasters that struck its major rivals at the time, 
Mexico-based henequin and Manilla hemp. But prices fell during 
the depression years, and Iliffe (1979: 343) has made an interesting 
sketch of how closely sisal price followed foreign economic trends, 
linking it with capacity utilisation in U.S. industry during those 
years. Then the demand, and the price, rose between 1947 and 1951
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due to post-war industrial recovery, and the rush for the stock­
piling of important raw materials (especially in the U.S.) following 
the Korean War of 1950. As Appendix 1 indicates, the highest rise 
was in 1951, when the price for sisal went up by 167% from the 
previous year. In 1952 the price began to fall, achieving the heaviest 
fall in 1953 when it came down by 183% from the previous year. It 
did not recover for the remainder of the colonial period, partly due 
to new competition from synthetic fibres, as Appendix 1 shows. In 
view of the dominance of sisal, and the country's resemblance to a 
monocultural economy, these fluctuating trends had immediate 
and significant effects on other internal aspects of the economy. 
Iliffe (1979:344-345) has documented such effects by examining levels 
of employment and of food production.
The externally determined behaviour of the agricultural sector, 
represented by sisal trends and its internal consequences, can be 
understood better by splitting this external orientation into two 
aspects. The first one is that production is dominated by exports 
(high levels of which create vulnerability to a foreign buyer, 
especially where the latter has a monopolistic position. In 
Tanganyika's case this may be demonstrated by the fact that in 1954, 
exports were 46% of monetary GDP, and probably constituted 1/4 of 
all productive activity (Iliffe, 1979:470). The second aspect is that 
production is primary and not industrial. Although some studies 
have usually tended to emphasize the former, it is the latter aspect 
which is critical, for it is this that makes the external orientation 
vulnerable to trends in manufacturing economies. As seen earlier, 
the significance of external orientation is the weakness of primary 
production in its relation with manufacturing, which tends to be the 
case as specialization advances, first in the national and then in the
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world economy. Proof of dependence then rests less on the fact that 
the export sector is dominant, and more on the fact that what is 
exported is primary and the country remains non-industrial. This 
is what gives the problem its structural and resilient character. In 
the following paragraphs we examine the pace of industrialization 
in colonial Tanganyika, a subject which sheds additional light on 
the point made here.
4.3.7.4 Dependence and industrialization in the colonial period
During German colonization, no manufacturing plants were 
built. There was, of course, a relatively extensive use of machines, 
and the employment of a more or less specialist and stable labour 
force in certain sectors, notably in the railway-transport sector. This 
may have brought into being an embryonic 'industrial' working 
class, but there was no industrial sector as such at that time.
In many parts of the Third World, significant industrial activity 
took place in the 1930s, gathered pace through the Second World 
War, and continued to expand after the war. Often the government, 
indigenous or colonial, played an important role in promoting 
industrialization, either as a necessary reaction to the depressed raw 
material markets in the industrialized countries, or in order to cater 
locally for a particular war need (Hirschman, 1968). However, it 
seems that on this aspect the colonial government in Tanganyika 
fell short of normal expectations. For example, whereas in the new 
post-war conditions the Imperial government in London now 
demanded the drawing up of development plans which emphasized 
modern productive projects such as industry, the Tanganyika 
government ignored the new thinking and continued to rank 
primary education and elementary agricultural projects ahead of 
industry. 22 It seems clear also that the establishment of several
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important industries was vetoed by the government, either because 
they were perceived to be threatening the growth of British 
companies in Kenya, or because they could have destabilized an 
established industry in Britain itself. Examples of this were the ban 
placed on the manufacture of sisal twine in Tanganyika, and the 
refusal to allow the establishment of a textile mill in the mid-1930s 
(Iliffe, 1979: 301-302, 439; Bowles, 1980: 182-183). The importance and 
viability of these two industries in Tanganyika were by this time not 
in question, but, as representatives of the British codage industries 
expressed it to the Secretary for the Colonies, such undertakings 
were a menace to their own home market (Rweyemamu, 1973: 128- 
129).
Nevertheless, in the normal course of the expansion of business, 
a few factories were established in the late 1930 and in the 1940s. 
Almost all were subsidiaries of Kenyan-based industries that were 
themselves in turn subsidiaries of ’metropolitan" industries. The 
most important industry established in Tanganyika in the 1930s, in 
terms of capital employed and the scale of operations, was the 
brewery industry. Among its shareholders were Kenya settlers, but 
the most important ones were British companies (Seidman, 
1972:38). Also established in the 1930s was the milling industry, 
dominated by the relatively large-sized Unga Ltd, which was based 
in Kenya but operated throughout East Africa. The 1940s additions 
were the Metal Box Company, a subsidiary of the British company 
of the same name; Tanganyika Packers, jointly established by the 
Tanganyika government and the British company known as Liebig 
to produce meat extract; a paints factory owned by Robiallac; and a 
Coca Cola bottling factory. Further expansions in the milling and 
brewing industries were also undertaken in the same period (Iliffe,
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1979: 301, 407). Textile production did not take place in the country 
until the late 1950s, and even then it was only on a very small scale.
While the subsidiary nature of this 'late industrialization' is 
obvious, it can also be noted that industrial activities were 
unintegrated and confined to the consumer goods sector. That 
there were no capital and intermediate goods industries is clear. As 
suggested by general theory, to the extent that industry in colonial 
Tanganyika came late, was extremely small in scale and did not 
comprise critical industrial activities, it can be said that a structural 
m echanism  for the reproduction of dependence and 
underdevelopment was already in place. Ultimately, future policy 
on how to counteract these was likely to be tested by the way in 
which the question of industrialization was tackled.
4.4. Conclusion
We have generally presented the material in this chapter as 
evidence that many of the actions of colonial authorities in 
Tanganyika, and aspects of dependence founded after the formal 
subordination of the local population, were not conducive to 
development. But neither in theory, discussed in the previous 
chapters, nor in this material, have we proposed that dependence 
excludes growth. Moreover, it is clear that in a general sense there 
was more progress at the end of colonial rule than at the beginning.
In regard to the colonial government's negative disposition 
towards development, we have not suggested that it was somehow 
in its nature to scheme and make sure that development did not 
occur. It is entirely possible that any colonialism with the same set 
of considerations at that time would have behaved the same way. It 
may be that such behaviour was characteristic of a phase of
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administration which was overwhelmingly concerned with the 
stability and control of dependencies. In this way it ensured regular 
even if not optimal production - the phenomenon that has been 
referred to as 'the bureaucratic economy' (McCarthy, 1982).
It goes without saying that it is not possible to tell the exact level 
of development that would have been attained in Tanganyika had 
colonial behaviour been positively disposed towards development 
in those aspects in which it was not. The evidence in this chapter 
simply suggests that greater development than occurred was 
possible.
The findings of this chapter about colonial actions, and about 
dependence, can not be said to constitute the entire explanation of 
underdevelopment in Tanganyika, except when, as in some uses by 
Frank (1972) underdevelopm ent is taken to mean the 
unemployment and 'immiseration' resulting directly from capitalist 
expansion and colonial expropriation of land from local owners. 
To the extent that underdevelopment merely refers to a low level 
of productive forces and implies 'undercapitalisation' (in money 
and technological terms), colonial actions and dependence are not 
the only explanations for its existence in Tanganyika, as the 
beginning of this chapter indicates. What the evidence suggests is 
that the negative actions contributed greatly to the persistence of 
underdevelopment in the colonial period through to the 
independence era. This is especially so in regard to the policy actions 
and the structural characteristics of the economy that had a 
potential for long-term effects on development, including the 
nature of monetary arrangem ents and the absence of 
industrialization.
One of the major lines of thought which we think the material in
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this chapter has refuted is that which sees the colonial era as not 
being responsible for underdevelopment in Tanganyika in any way, 
a thinking represented by, among others, Hyden (1980).
The material in the chapter also provides some of the important 
reasons why it could be possible in the independence era to argue for 
change in the anti-dependence direction. It also provides some 
insights into certain characteristics of the change when it occurred, 
such as the pre-occupation with financial institutions at the 
beginning of the change, and even its socialistic thrust when the 
change gained momentum. The change itself is presented and 
analyzed in the next chapter.
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Footnotes to Chapter Four:
1 These are figures for 1959, but the situation had only marginally
improved in 1961 (Pratt, 1976: 92).
2 As opposed to pastoralism, for example.
3 Coquery-Vidrovitch's argument is similar to that of Rweyemamu
only in saying that African economies were internally 
unaffected by exchange.
4 A more comprehensive critique of Hyden's idea, which is not
possible here, can be found in an article by Mamdani (1985).
5 Except that the Maji Maji War has sometimes been treated as an
isolated incident, quite separate from other wars of resistance to 
German occupation. The reference to it by some writers as a 
rebellion is an indication of this: it carries the inaccurate
message that the war occurred after the local people had
accepted colonial rule. Sometimes this is also indicated by the 
citing of the major causes of the war as the African rejection of 
cash crops and taxation. Yet available evidence suggests strongly 
that military resistance was continuous up to the end of Maji 
Maji, and that cash crops and taxation were only the immediate 
factors among many causes of the war (Henderson, 1965; 
Gwassa, 1973).
6 That is, the increase in production for sale. The phrase 'cash crop
production' can also be used to mean commodity production, 
but in Tanzania it has often meant the production of major
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export crops.
7 The local settlem ent pattern  in these areas had consisted of
hom esteads on the p la teau  su rro u n d in g  the hills and 
mountains. The homesteads had some farms around them, but 
being smaller, they were never relied on to satisfy production 
needs. Thus larger farms beyond the homesteads in the valleys 
below had been created.
8 M eru's small rem ainder of arable land, located close to the
households, was much less watered. Thus dispossession almost 
immediately led to destitution.
9 Usambara, Kilimanjaro and Meru were the nerve-centre of settler
farming; conflict connected with land alienation was acute there 
and related policies tended to reflect that situation. Settlers were 
also present, and alienated land, in the Southern Highlands, 
M orogoro and Bukoba, but they were few in these areas 
throughout the German period. With the increase of European 
im m igration in the 1930s, land was again reopened for 
alienation. The areas m ost affected this tim e w ere W est 
K ilim anjaro, the Southern H ighlands and M bulu District. 
A lthough evidence available m ust be treated w ith caution, it 
appears that land alienated under British adm inistration alone 
had increased to 1,157,246 hectares by 1937, and to 1,284,647 
hectares by 1959, from the base figure of between 660,961 and 
882,978,69, assum ed to have been the land alienated under 
German adm inistration.
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10 Later, coffee in the Usambaras was abandoned and grown instead
in Kilimanjaro and Bukoba. The large Usambara plantations 
were then used for rubber production. But soon Tanganyika 
was outcompeted by South-East Asia, and rubber production was 
abandoned in favour of Sisal, which together with cotton, had 
been found by the Amani Biological-Agricultural Institute to be 
ideal to the country.
11 The German colonial government's intervention in the labour 
market and assistance to settlers in securing labour included 
direct compulsion in some areas, the enforcement of often 
unjust contracts heavily weighted against labourers, and a 
particular application of labour laws (Iliffe, 1979: 151-163).
12 Iliffe (1979: 155) quotes one settler as saying, "We don't need black
capitalists, we need black workers."
13 The 'card system' was also enforced against the local people
living around the Usambara and Bondei plantations. The 
number of obligatory labour days may have differed slightly 
(Iliffe, 1979: 153- 154; Henderson, 1965: 144).
14 The relevant co-operative movement, the Kilimanjaro Native 
Planters association (KNPA), formed in 1925, was in 1933 
reconstituted, by government intervention, into the 
Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union (KNCU).
15 The British model appeared to have been well worked out in
advance, having based itself on the written ideas of a policy­
maker, Lord Lugard, and the apparently experienced
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experimentation in other dependencies, especially Nigeria.
16 Even the 'plant more crops' government campaign of 1931, one
of a few which might appear to have favoured development in 
that period, was noted for its repressive form of 
implementation and for its concern with revenue rather than 
local welfare (McCarthy, 1977: 591-598; Iliffe, 1979: 349-350).
17 For example, funds allocated to education continued to be less
than the levels recommended by the London office, and four 
years of agriculture-oriented primary education were still being 
considered adequate inspite of increasing African opposition 
(Iliffe, 1979: 439, 444-445).
18 If we sketched the status of the settler sector in Tanganyika's 
agricultural production, we would find that although it was less 
significant in overall GDP, it was nevertheless dominant in 
export production, commanding about 55% of the total (Ehrlich, 
1976: 294; Iliffe, 1979: 301). In terms of value, the sector itself was 
highly dominated by the plantation production of Sisal.
19 Although this makes nonsense of the use of the 'settler' concept,
there is no doubt that almost all settlers remained expatriate in 
the sense of having stronger ties outside than inside 
Tanganyika. They often perceived an imperative to remit funds 
outside. A minor but illustrative example of this perception 
was the view that Europeans had to bring up their children 
outside Tanganyika due to their 'biological needs' and to 
allocate some funds towards this end. The government gave
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recognition to this and took it into consideration in working out 
the tax obligations of individual European payers (U.K. Govt., 
1937: 200).
20 That is, equivalent to 120% of the average annual value of 
exports in the years 1941-1948, or 244% of the average annual 
government revenue of that time. Calculated from tables in 
Ehrlich (1976: 297, 308, 317).
21 These shortfalls in earnings were also fairly common in other
colonial territories. After the 2nd World War, Britain was 
desperately trying to marshall the necessary resources for the 
rehabilitation of its economy. It thus became more blatant and 
deliberate in using the shortfall mechanism to raise some funds 
through the colonies. This now went hand in hand with the 
well known Marketing Board mechanism which, though 
officially designed to oversee the stabilization of prices of 
primary export produce, became primarily the agency for the 
retention of the colonies' earnings in England, and for acquiring 
badly needed US dollars for Britain (Fitch and Oppenheimer, 
1966: 40- 46). Most of the colonies' earnings were held in British 
government securities at low interest, and they lost their value 
considerably over time. Overall, the depreciation and the delay 
in investing such large amounts of funds in the colonies can be 
considered a significant squandering of development 
opportunity. Enormous economic losses through Marketing 
Boards have been shown to have occurred in other colonial 
territories, notably in Ghana and Uganda (Fitch and
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Oppenheimer, 1966: 41,46; Lury, 1976: 230-232).
22 In the British sphere of influence, the enthusiasm  for planning 
and developm ent in the dependencies, which began in the 
m iddle  of the 2nd W orld W ar, was influenced by the 
im pending im perial loss of India, and it resulted  in the 
recognition of the im portance of im proving income and 
welfare to maintain industrial consumption a n d  s t e m  
rebellion in those dependencies.
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CHAPTER FIVE: MAJOR POLICIES FOR AN ANTI-DEPENDENCE 
STRATEGY OF DEVELOPMENT IN TANZANIA
5.1. Introduction
The year that marked a turning point in Tanzania's post-colonial 
development was 1967. It was then that an official announcement 
was made outlining a new direction of development that would be 
devoted to attempts to eliminate dependence. The outline, in the 
form of guidelines adopted by the governing (and only) political 
party, became and has remained influential in the formulation of 
all other policies that have a development content. In what follows 
we shall try to provide an account of the outline - called the Arusha 
Declaration - and that of subsequent policies in regard to their 
perception of dealing with dependence.
5.2. Background to the Arusha Declaration.
Before giving an account of the policies, it is useful to review 
briefly the circumstances that led to the Arusha declaration, as an 
attempt at explaining why it came about in Tanzania at that time.
5.2.1. The long term causes.
5.2.1.1 The leaders' philosophical and ideological disposition.
The existence of dependence is in a sense an obvious cause for the 
formulation of an anti-dependence strategy of development. But 
actual anti-dependence may only take place if there is a perception, 
within the general population or the leadership, of its negative 
characteristics. With insignificant levels of education, most 
Tanzanians were generally unaware of dependence other than in 
terms of political subjugation. Therefore in this issue, as in many
others that became important in the post-colonial period, the role of 
creating and raising an awareness was played almost exclusively by 
the leadership. The leadership itself was dominated at the level of 
ideas by one person, Julius Nyerere. This was partly due to Nyerere's 
own personal attributes, including charisma (Pratt, 1976; Mohiddin, 
1980), and his higher level of education. It is for this reason that, in 
describing the early phase of Tanzanian development policies, many 
writers have concentrated on Nyerere's statements, although one 
can detect a tendency for some writers (Pratt, 1976; Mohiddin, 1980; 
Yaeger, 1982) to overrate his personal role in actual decisions in 
relation to that of his colleagues, and to underrate the influence of 
material circumstances in the evolution of the ideas and decisions 
of the leadership as a whole.
With the possible exception of an article by Nyerere in 1959 
warning of the dangers of external aid (Nyerere, 1966: 73-74), there is 
no evidence in his or any other leader's pre-independence views to 
show that changing the structure or direction of the economy was 
envisaged.
However, Nyerere and other African leaders shared a stance 
which, though vaguely perceived in other respects, was clearly 
nationalist and anti-capitalist. It may be said that this stance was a 
likely result of being anti-colonialist. But the stance was also 
strengthened by the 'economic' ideas of pan-Africanism, and, to a 
lesser extent, the cultural ideas of negritude (Nelkin, 1964). These 
combined to become the source of the brand of nationalist anti­
capitalism that its various authors, including Nyerere, came to call 
African Socialism. It was also strengthened, philosophically, by the 
social-democratic anti-capitalism of fabianism, with which Nyerere 
and a few other founder leaders of the Tanganyikan independence
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movement were closely associated (Iliffe, 1979: 447, 508-508).
5.2.I.2. Egalitarianism and other social circumstances.
The role of the philosophical disposition of leaders in the 
working out of a new direction in development has sometimes 
been exaggerated to the detriment of other factors. The political 
party in Tanzania as well as a few independent observers, including 
Pratt (1976), are examples of those who tend to overstate the role. It 
seems to us that other circumstances prepared the leaders and the 
population at large for the reception and sustenance of the ideas of a 
new direction in development, and that, in comparison, their 
philosophical disposition was more complementary than 
fundamental.
It has been suggested that a factor which facilitated a change of 
development strategy by Tanzanian leaders was the lack of an 
entrenched bureaucracy. This factor is usually put in a comparative 
perspective, with neighbouring Kenya as the contrasting case. A 
variant of the argument is that there was no attempt to recruit and 
train Africans in Tanganyika to enter the colonial bureaucracy at 
higher levels, thus rendering the incoming post-colonial 'elite' 
insufficiently disposed towards protecting 'the system' and its 
structures (Pratt,1976: 14-18).l However, the problem we face with
this argument is that it does not address the question whether this 
reluctance on the part of the colonial government to create a 
responsive African section of the bureaucracy was peculiar to 
Tanganyika; there is no data to show that the case was different in 
Kenya. In fact it would appear from the same source of evidence 
that colonial behaviour in this area was a general policy covering 
the whole of East Africa (Pratt, 1976: 14-18). Thus the point about the
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degree of African incorporation into the colonial bureaucracy in the 
two countries and its relevancy to the future leadership's interest in 
change or status quo is of minor relevancy.
What seems to be more important here is the fact of British 
attempts to win over the future Kenyan leadership just before 
formal decolonisation. Kenya's independence came two years after 
Tanganyika's. In the intervening period Tanganyika's leaders made 
statements about 'economic independence’ and 'socialism' which, 
though still unclarified, were unsettling to colonial authorities. 
Coupled with Kenya’s central role in the economies of East Africa, it 
can be assumed that British capital and the colonial government 
increasingly saw the need to 'pacify' African leaders in Kenya in 
some way before decolonisation became effective. There is evidence 
of a flurry of activities of this kind in the last years of Kenya's 
colonial government (Mohiddin, 1980). An even stronger version 
of the argument is that the colonial bureaucracy was larger in Kenya 
(Bennett and Smith, 1976). This bureaucracy was to be part of the 
new government for some years after independence, and, in 
opposing changes, could rely on the affinity and support of a settler 
community that was by now far bigger and stronger than 
Tanzania's.
In the same comparative mould, we find an argument which 
says that colonial authorities groomed the future Kenyan leading 
class for integration with the centres of the old order by making 
them property owners with a stake in the status quo. It is said that 
there was no equivalent attempt in Tanganyika, and that when 
similar moves were initiated there it was too late for them to bear 
fruit (Mohiddin, 1980). Part of the evidence for this argument can 
be found in the development-orientated activities of the colonial
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government in the 1950's. The 'economic development of native 
peoples' had become a stated postwar policy for all dependencies, 
and the development of a local middle class based on, and 
continually being strengthened by, the existence of a wealthy 
peasant class was henceforth anticipated even for Tanganyika (U.K. 
Govt, 1955; Iliffe, 1971). The intensity of government action in this 
area, however, was greater in Kenya than it was in Tanganyika 
(McWilliam, 1976; Kenya Govt, 1954).
Each of the factors mentioned above may have been relevant in 
supporting the leaders' change of direction in Tanganyika. 
However, an underlying and continuous source of inspiration for 
all these factors appears to have been a greater appeal of 
egalitarianism in Tanganyika, which offered a more formidable 
ideological ammunition against capitalism than the pre-Bolshevik 
Russian narodism to which it has been likened (Mueller, 1980). 
The appeal of egalitarianism was strong not only because the 
capitalist revolution was incomplete, especially in terms of land 
tenure and social differentiation, but also because the notion had 
become a form of cultural opposition to the colonial phase of 
capitalism. That Nyerere (1966: 162-171) couched his early anti­
capitalism in these cultural terms was in part due to the existence of 
egalitarianism as a cultural expression directed against foreign rule, 
and, by extension, against some of its attendant social and economic 
characteristics.
Another factor which is likely to have provided a supportive 
role in keeping anti-capitalist ideas alive had its source in the 
unified and national character of the independence movement. 
The significance of this was the degree to which the conflicting 
interests of the major socio-economic groups were balanced.
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W ithin the nationalist movement there was a relatively strong 
petty-bourgeoisie, which consisted chiefly of a few intellectuals 
(mostly teachers), civil servants and traders. Some of the founders of 
the nationalist m ovem ent who rem ained at the centre of its 
activities throughout the pre-independence period, and whose class 
location in the econom y was petty-bourgeois, included  the 
following. There was Julius N yerere, a graduate teacher and 
P resident of the nationalist organisation, TANU; A bdulw ahid 
Sykes, Abbas Sykes and Ally Sykes, ex-armymen in trade and at the 
top of the leadership of the Tanganyika African Association (TAA), 
which was a precursor of the nationalist organisation; Samuel 
Cham sham a, a clerk; and Steven M hando, a graduate teacher. 
Others were Saadani Kandoro, first a clerk, then a trader and TAA 
organiser; Paul Bomani, a trader; Ham za M wapachu, a social 
worker; Dossa Azizi, an ex-army man who had become a trader; and 
John Rupia, trader and treasurer of TAA in the early 1950's when 
active political mobilisation by these leaders began to take place. 
There was also Oscar Kambona, a teacher; Selemani K itundu, a 
trade and early nationalist organiser; and Bibi Titi Mohammed, the 
nationalist organiser responsible for a phenomenal recruitm ent of 
women into the movement, also a trader. Iliffe (1979: 542) notes 
that in 1956 Clem ent M tamila, chairm an of the nationalist 
organisation 's central comm ittee, was also the chairm an of 
Tanganyika African Traders Union (TATU), an African trading co­
operative competing with Asian and European wholesalers in the 
import-export trade. It is clear that traders were well represented in 
the leadership, though this list does not reveal all their strength. 
Obviously m any traders could not continue at the top of the 
leadersh ip , w hich dem anded  fulltim e com m itm ent as the
179
movement gathered momentum, but some remained powerful 
opinion leaders at local levels.
An examination of the trading sub-group in the nationalist 
movement yields an interesting observation. It was this 'fraction' 
that could be expected to become the basis of support for a capitalist- 
based status quo. However, due to some racially-based commercial 
restrictions, the African section of the sub-group - which was 
potentially the most important - had been severely frustrated and 
aggrieved in its development (Ghai, 1965; Shivji, 1976; Mamdani, 
1976). This meant that up to the early years of independence when 
it had yet to establish itself at the level of the economy, the African 
section had in general an ambivalent - some would say acquiescing 
- attitude towards an assault on existing economic structures.
This attitude was made all the more possible by an equally 
strong trade union and peasant presence in the nationalist 
movement, especially after the dock strikes of the late 1940's (Iliffe, 
1979: 395-404; Iliffe, 1980), and the peasant resistance to certain 
agricultural measures in the early 1950's (Cliffe, 1964; Maguire, 
1969). Data on the strength of peasants in the Tanganyikan 
nationalist movement in its early years is not easily available. 
Apart from the fact that one expects a mass nationalist movement 
in a predominantly peasant society to be influenced by the concerns 
of peasants, the only sound empirical proof of this appears to be the 
support its leaders gave to spontaneous peasant acts of resistance in 
the 1950's. A compelling example of this association is provided by 
the militant involvement in, and articulation of, peasant grievances 
by Bhoke Munanka in the then Lake Region where he was a 
nationalist organiser (Iliffe, 1979: 503-507). The association between 
labour and the nationalist movement was more direct and is easier
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to study. Well known leaders of the independence movement who 
had roots in labour organisations included Michael Kamaliza, a 
minister of labour in the early cabinets who was co-founder of the 
African Commercial Employees’ Association in 1951 and the 
Tanganyika Federation of Labour (TFL) in 1955; and Rashidi 
Kawawa, Prime Minister in many cabinets, formerly of the 
Tanganyika African Government Servants Association (1944) and a 
co-founder of the TFL. More important was the fact that even 
though forbidden, trade union involvement in politics and in the 
nationalist movement was a pronounced feature of its existence 
from the late 1940's, so that in reality it was part of the nationalist 
movement before the latter was formally organised into a political 
party in 1954. Moreover, unionism grew rapidly after the 
formulation of the TFL. It is estimated that by 1961 the unionised 
section of labour in Tanganyika was 42% of the total, while it was 
only 12% in Uganda and 8% in Kenya (Iliffe, 1980: 299). To the 
extent that leaders of organised labour in the nationalist movement 
represented a large constituency, labour influence on the movement 
was bound to be considerable.
The presence of the worker-peasant element provided the 
nationalist movement with an anti-elite and pro-masses tradition 
(Maguire, 1969; Bienen, 1970), thus creating a great potential for 
support in attempts at structural changes. It is this tradition which, 
along with the other factors mentioned before, provided support for 
the leadership's philosphical leanings.
5.2.2. The short term causes.
The immediate causes of the new thinking corresponded to 
certain post-colonial developments. These included a new
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perception of the nature of inherited structures and their role in 
development, new socio-economic trends, and new relationships 
with major world powers.
5.2.2.I. The inherited structures.
a) The continuation of the colonial legacy in the financial sector.
Partly due to the prominence of financial and monetary matters 
that particular colonial policies produced, and since industrial 
development was largely neglected, it was the financial sector that 
came sharply into focus when the nationalist government took 
over. The issues that became contentious in the sector could be 
grouped into two major aspects: the inequality involved in 
transactions between Tanganyika and external interests, in 
particular the dominance of the latter in financial matters and the 
repatriation of funds, and what was viewed as the stubborn refusal 
by externally-based institutions to introduce reforms.
At independence most of the financial institutions were 
branches of externally based companies, and a few were created by 
the colonial government to cater for special financial needs of the 
expatriate community. The largest financial institutions were the 
commercial banks. Three of these - the Standard Bank, the 
National & Grindlays Bank and the Barclays DCO - could be 
considered really large. They had their headquarters in London, but 
had operated in Tanganyika since 1916, establishing a combined total 
of 33 local branches. The the fourth largest bank in Tanganyika was 
the Ottoman Bank. It started its operations in the country in 1957, 
but was incorporated in Turkey, with head-quarters in London and 
Paris. It had three branches. There were three smaller externally- 
based banks with headquarters in Holland, India and Pakistan. In
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1963 the total assets of all the commercial banks were 37.7 million 
pounds.
There was one special purpose bank, the Land Bank of 
Tanganyika. This had been created by the colonial government to 
provide high risk, long term finance to expatriate farmers. In 1962 
it had a balance of 1.6 million pounds of loans outstanding. In 
addition, the Post Office Savings Bank (which had 1.6 million 
pounds in savings), and some pension funds, provided a form of 
saving and banking.
As mentioned in the last chapter, all the expatriate financial 
institutions operating in Tanganyika found it desirable to invest 
most of their 'surplus' funds abroad. This was partly due to the 
colonial monetary arrangements enforced through the East African 
Currency Board that we talked about in Chapter Four. In the case of 
other institutions, such as the Post Office Savings Bank and the 
pension funds, there was a law specifically requiring them to invest 
overseas. Also the fact that most of the institutions in the financial 
sector were branches of overseas institutions reinforced their 
propensity to invest abroad. With the uncertainty that nationalism 
and independence created, a more direct repatriation of funds took 
place as many expatriate individuals and companies scaled down or 
wound up their activities in Tanzania (Loxley, 1979a). All these 
factors demonstrated to nationalists the importance of exchange 
control.
b) The initiatives of the new government 1961-1967.
The new government was predictably concerned with speeding 
up development. The task that it viewed as a priority in pursuance 
of this goal was the mobilisation of funds. However, fund 
mobilisation inevitably required that it be accompanied by another
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task - the establishment of a national control over the use of funds 
and issue of currency. The government's focus on the financial 
sector was therefore on these two tasks. Its first significant action in 
the financial sector, however, was not so much one of mobilisation 
of funds as of a re-orientation of lending practices. Thus in 1961 the 
Land Bank of Tanganyika was replaced by the Agricultural Credit 
Agency (ACA) with a view to providing loans to Tanganyikan 
farmers. The ACA was succeeded by two institutions: In 1964 the 
National Co-operative Bank (NCB) was established with the 
primary aim of taking the business of seasonal crop finance and 
general banking for the growing co-operative movement away 
from the expatriate commercial banks. In the same year the 
National Development Credit Agency (NDCA) was created 
specifically for direct lending to farmers. Both the NCB and the 
NDCA, however, depended on the expatriate banks for their 
personnel and some of the funds. Earlier, in 1962, the government 
had co-sponsored the Tanganyika Development Finance Company 
Limited (TDFL). The other partners in this institution were the 
Commonwealth Development Organisation of Britain, the Federal 
Republic of Germany and, from 1965, a Dutch finance company 
called N ederlandse Financiering M aatschappaij voor 
Ontwikkelings-landen N.V. Government sponsorship not 
withstanding, TDFL was established as, and still is, a privately run 
commercial institution to provide equity, loans and managerial 
consultancy to local private investors (Clark, 1978: 101).
Mobilisation efforts began in earnest with the creation of the 
national insurance corporation (NIC) in 1963. The government 
held the majority 50% of the shares while the rest were held by the 
private insurance companies with which the NIC was designed to
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compete (Loxley, 1979a). In comparison with the colonial period, a 
major policy improvement in the insurance area was that the NIC 
was now required to devote the major part of its investment or 
'surplus' funds to the acquisition of securities of the Tanzania 
government (Loxley, 1979b). A similar requirement was to apply to 
a new POSB. Soon after, in 1964, the government established the 
National Provident Fund (NPF). This was a compulsory 
superannuation fund providing savings and some capital to the 
government. A year later, the Tanganyika Bank of Commerce 
(TBC) was established. The nucleus of the TBC was the business of 
the now defunct Ottoman Bank. Through TBC the government set 
out to gain experience in commercial banking, and to put the 
accounts of governmental and government-affiliated bodies under 
Tanzanian control. 60% of TBC's share capital of 500,000 pounds 
was held by the government, the rest by the expatriate commercial 
banks operating in the country.
A considerable amount of government control in the financial 
sector was achieved with the creation of the Bank of Tanzania at the 
beginning of 1966. The purpose of creating the bank was to 
strengthen governmental power in exchange control (which had 
been established jointly by the three East African governments a 
year earlier), and to introduce central banking facilities for the more 
vibrant economy that was envisaged (Bank of Tanzania Act, 1965). 
(c) The initial results of government initiative.
In general terms the new financial institutions were not able to 
compete effectively with the more established and larger externally- 
based institutions. The nature of operations of the latter was not 
affected by these changes either. The new institutions were too 
dependent on the old ones (for funds, manpower and operational
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guidelines), and were too small, to outcompete and supplant the 
expatriate institutions (Loxley, 1979a: 78). Yet there were important 
nationalist gains. Firstly, the new institutions made possible the 
immediate availability of development funds to the government 
and to Tanzanian peasant farmers. Secondly in providing a certain 
level of supervision in the financial sector, especially in relation to 
banking, and by introducing exchange control, the government, had 
begun to have control over monetary resources. These resources 
were important for the planning of development. Both these factors 
made possible for the first time what Loxley (1979a: 79) has called 
surplus retention and expanded investment. A different effect of 
changes in the financial sector, however, was that they provided the 
government with an insight into the difficulties of 'changes within 
the system', especially those based on competition with large 
external interests operating in the Tanzanian economy, while at the 
same time proving to be the only springboard for ’bolder' changes 
that came later. It was this experience which began to bring home 
the reality of the doctrine of a free market in a 'small' economy, 
where a local entrepreneurial social group is virtually non-existent, 
and large external institutions are already dominant. The lesson 
was that greater Tanzanian control of funds, and the availability of 
these funds for planned development, could not be achieved 
without greater governmental intervention.
Although it has been emphasised that this experience was gained 
in the financial sector, and that further changes in the economy 
were at that stage still being perceived chiefly in terms of that sector, 
this is not to say that there was no nationalist concern for the 
industrial sector. As we shall see, the government initiated 
significant developments in that area as well. The difference with
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the financial sector was that in the industrial sector there really 
were no policy changes, only incremental developments. More 
importantly, experience in the industrial sector had little bearing on 
the major change of development strategy that came in 1967.
5.2.2.2. New socio-economic trends.
It is well known now that independence provided an opportunity 
for some members of the local population of former colonies to 
move up into the positions vacated by members of the colonizing 
society. This also happened in Tanzania, but soon the leadership 
was alarmed by what it perceived as an acceleration of the growth 
of elites and (capitalist) exploiters threatening to tear up the entire 
social fabric. The anti-elite and anti-capitalist tradition that had 
characterised the nationalist movement and had not stopped 
growing, prompted the leadership to seeing this development as a 
serious problem. In some instances the trends considered 
undesirable would have been better described as the unchanged 
colonial legacies rather than new trends, the new element in them 
being only the participation of Tanzanians. An example of this was 
the salary structure, which still accounted for a very wide gap 
between the top salary and the minimum wage - a ratio of 26:1 in 
1966, after it was brought down from 50:1 in 1961 (Nyerere, 1977: 
Pratt, 1979).
Also still unchanged was the housing situation, in which 
colonial forms of stratification and segregation were manifest. This 
left large, relatively luxurious and spacious houses in the former 
'European' and 'Indian' areas, but shanty and crowded units in the 
'African' areas. The top level salariats had, of course, moved into 
most of the housing in 'European' areas, but, with this exception,
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the 'non-A frican' areas rem ained relatively closed. M oreover, 
landlords in these areas were by now gaining greatly by the 
continuing spread of m odernisation (including a faster growth of 
the urban population after independence) which created a greater 
dem and for office and residential space. Here the government was 
by far the largest client, and was likely to continue being so. In all 
areas, including the African one, a new class of 'non-industrious' 
rentiers was perceived to be growing. In the wake of this, greater 
am ounts of w orkers' incomes were likely to be spent on ever- 
increasing rents. The rents were unlikely to be matched by wage 
rises from the government, the largest employer, considering its 
commitment to planned development and expenditures. It was 
also considered that this trend would not necessarily lead to the 
construction of more or better housing for the lower income 
groups, only to higher rents.
But the rise of the 'rentier' class and the likelihood of a 
progressive destitu tion  of w orkers were not the only issues 
involved in this developm ent. The other was that a large 
proportion of the 'rentier' class was made up of the leadership of 
the nation - high ranking politicians, government bureaucrats and 
managers. The problem was exacerbated by the greater accessibility 
of financial institutions to those better integrated in the financial 
system at a time when Tanzanians were being encouraged to seek 
credit; leaders were sim ply better placed to benefit from this 
encouragem ent than peasants or ordinary urban workers. Thus, 
many housing loans given to people in the leadership category 
became a basis for real estate speculation and landlordism (Nyerere, 
1977; Green, 1979).
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Another important development was the co-operative 
movement, based in the rural areas and mostly affecting peasants. 
The main element of the movement was the producers' co­
operatives. Retail trading was not as significant, hardly accounting 
for 10% of co-operative activites. The movement in Tanzania was 
extremely important if only for the sheer size of its membership 
and the percentage of the primary produce marketed by it. By 1965 
there were about 1,500 producers' co-operatives with a total 
membership of about half a million, twice the size at independence, 
handling close to 50% of exports. The government was committed 
to expanding it well beyond this, so that it might ultimately handle 
all primary produce except the two plantation crops - Sisal and Tea. 
Close to 90% of the movement was engaged in the two most 
important exports after sisal, namely cotton and coffee. These crops 
were grown in some of the most populous areas in the country.
The early co-operatives were started by both the farmers (to 
safeguard their integrity as commodity producers and ensure a 
relatively stable price) and the colonial government (for bulk 
purchasing and as an additional measure of political control). In all 
cases co-operatives were led by the wealthier or better educated 
members - embryonic capitalist farmers in the case of the early co­
operatives^ The 1950's witnessed a very rapid growth in the 
number of new co-operatives. These grew almost exclusively out of 
an intense dislike for middlemen.3 Because of a number of racially- 
oriented trade ordinances, the Asian monopoly of the trade sector, 
and the generally low literacy and numeracy skills of the majority 
of producers, middlemen in colonial Tanganyika had engaged in 
crude forms of exploitation, among which the best known was 
shortweighing (Ghai, 1965; Coulson, 1977c). To some of the
189
em erging African traders, co- operatives were the only avenue 
towards the acquisition of a stake in the trade sector, and it is not 
surprising that many co-operatives were started, and all came to be 
dom inated , by these traders.4 For the m ajority of m em bers, 
however, the co-operative movement offered them the possibility 
of a relief from being blatantly cheated by m iddlem en in the 
exchange arena, and this is the major explanation for its rapid 
growth (Tanzania Govt, 1965).
The m ovem ent had m any problem s, among which were 
corruption and bad financial m anagem ent (Tanzania Govt, 1966; 
Saul, 1975).5 But there was one major problem which caused the
Tanzanian leadership greater worries. While enjoying government 
p ro tec tion  after independence, co-operatives soon becam e 
oppressive and exploitative of peasants. The structure of co­
operative unions allowed the leadership to get entrenched, thus 
m aking it extremely difficult for changes or a new leadership to 
emerge (Tanzania Govt., 1966: 34). The decision-making process was 
undemocratic, both by original design and by this entrenchment of 
the leadership . By 1966 m ost o rd inary  farm ers felt that the 
leadership  of the co-operative m ovem ent d id  not serve them  
(Tanzania Govt., 1966: 33-35). Since peasants lacked education and 
other resources, they could neither democratize the movement by 
them selves, nor m ake it m ore responsive to them  in the 
distribution arena (Saul, 1975). The feeling, once again, was that 
only governm en ta l in te rven tion  to re s tru c tu re  the  w hole 
movement could redress the situation.
5.2.2.3. New relations with major world powers.
Other factors which hastened the break with past development
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strategy were international in character. These were related to 
Tanzania's emerging foreign policy in its generality, and to her 
reaction to particular events which took place in the international 
arena at that time.
In broad terms, it is usual for economic considerations to have a 
determining influence on the nature and conduct of foreign policy. 
In order to induce conformity, it was common for economically 
stronger powers to exert pressure on countries whose international 
politics were considered disagreeable. Tanzania soon found that 
there were obstacles to the conduct of an independent line in 
international relations without a matching independence in 
economic matters. When it refused to give up its independence in 
international relations, the economic pressure applied by some 
world powers brought this connection to light in a dramatic 
fashion, showing in particular that externally-based interests were 
taking advantage of the fragility of a primary-products export 
economy and the lack of local control of important economic 
institutions.
In brief, the Tanzanian government allowed liberation 
movements from Southern African countries to establish bases in 
Tanzania when peaceful forms of struggle for freedom became 
proscribed, condemned American and Belgian political intervention 
in independent Congo (now Zaire), accepted what was still a 
negligible amount of aid from 'communist China', in addition to 
its traditional 'Western' sources, resisted pressure from the Federal 
Republic of Germany not to establish diplomatic relations with the 
German Democratic Republic, condemned 'the West', and especially 
Britain, for its reluctance to stop the Rhodesian Smith Regime from 
instituting minority rule, and, generally, adopted a non-aligned as
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opposed to a Cold War position on international issues (Pratt, 1976: 
134-152). The 'West' frequently made its displeasure known to the 
Tanzanian government about these issues. Finally, a loan of 7.5 
million pounds was frozen by Britain, part of an aid package worth 
85,000 deutshmarks was withdrawn, and another aid package was 
suspended by West Germany. Britain and West Germany were 
respectively the first and second most important unilateral sources 
of aid to Tanzania at that time (Pratt, 1976: 140-141, 149). These 
events took place in the years 1964-66.
The British and German actions greatly affected the funding of 
Tanzania's first Five Year Develpoment Plan (1965-1969). This was 
at a time when two of the country's most important exports, sisal 
and coffee, were suffering a decline in demand and were not 
expected to recover in the foreseeable future. The government now 
found it imperative to raise the local share of the investment budget 
of the plan (which had been firmly pegged to the expectation of a 
foreign aid inflow) from around 48% to about 70%. It could, of 
course, do this by borrowing from financial institutions operating 
inside the country, but a lot of the funds had already been 
repatriated at independence, and, in other instances, the 
government simply did not have the leverage to secure loans.
5.3 Authoritative statements and policies on the expected direction 
of development in Tanzania.
5.3.1. Pre-Arusha statements.
Some of the articles and speeches by the Tanzanian Head of State 
in the 1961-1967 period reflect a disatisfaction with the development 
strategy being pursued or traditionally expected to be pursued, and 
they are an indication of what was to follow. At the beginning of
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1963 Nyerere was saying that Tanzania needed (private) capital 
investment 'on our terms, which are fundamentally social', and 
that the country needed factories 'not to improve the scenery' but to 
improve the lives of the people (Nyerere, 1966: 209-211). In the 
same year he raised for the first time the theme of 'the growing gap 
between the 'rich North and the poor South', and suggested that 
only 'African unity' may guarantee rapid development by 
providing economies of scale and other advantages of a larger 
economy (Nyerere, 1966: 212-214). He went on to say that at the 
international level the economic arrangements between North and 
South might be modified by the opening up of the North's markets 
to the products of the South rather than the provision of aid. He 
also said that apart from these possible avenues, the poor countries 
might be forced into 'isolationism' (Nyerere, 1966: 231-251). In 
February, 1965 he reiterated the need for Tanzania to welcome 
private investment while at the same time cautioning against 
conspicuous consumption, which he referred to as the 'limousine 
lifestyle' (Nyerere, 1966: 318, 332).
A major policy statement was made by Nyerere in the same year. 
In its wider coverage it called for the diversification of exports. Its 
main focus, however, was the sisal 'industry'. By 1965 the price of 
sisal was falling steadily, and the government could not foresee a 
respite, considering that competition from synthetic fibres was not 
likely to lessen. The large-scale expatriate producers had abandoned 
their growth plans, and they reduced production volumes 
drastically so as to cut costs. The government on the other hand had 
decided that the sisal earnings reduced by falling world prices would 
be increased through acreage expansion. To do this, more small 
producers would have to be involved in sisal, and the government
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would need to have some control of the 'industry'. It was in fact 
argued in the policy statement that the sisal 'industry' was too 
important to leave in the hands of foreign large-scale growers 
(Nyerere, 1966: 322-325). This policy direction was similar to certain 
tenets of the more general, but still-to-come, Arusha Declaration.
In another major article in 1966 Nyerere spoke against investing 
in luxury consumer goods where it was possible to invest in capital 
goods which, he argued, were the only guarantee of wealth in the 
future. In the same article he expressed a disatisfaction with foreign 
aid, saying that loans and credit take too long to finalize and have 
undesirable conditions attached to them. Observing that 
investment by local sources was more possible than usually 
imagined, he announced that Tanzania was now going to try to 
practise more self reliance (Nyerere, 1968: 157-174).
These articles and the one major policy statement on the sisal 
industry show that, in resonance with the direction of the material 
and philosophical conditions in the country in the 1961-1966 period, 
a strategy of non-dependent development was crystallizing, at least 
in leadership circles. They incorporate major subjects raised by a 
strategy of non-dependent development as we have described it: 
unequal world relations at the level of the economy, the importance 
of capital goods investments, the questioning of external aid as the 
panacea for 'under-capitalization' and underdevelopment, the 
barriers in the way of a primary products export economy, the 
importance of national control of a sector or industry considered 
critical to development, and the desire to make the betterment of 
the quality of life part of a development programme rather than to 
expect it to be merely a result of growth measures.
The entire 1961-1966 atmosphere of an anti-dependence strategy
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now culminated in the Arusha Declaration.
5.3.2. The Arusha Declaration: the broad policy of self reliance and 
'socialism*.
The document containing the declaration was subtitled Socialism 
and Self Reliance, and it was based on a draft by Nyerere, which was 
amended by the National Executive Committee of the party 
(Nyerere, 1968: 231). It was accepted by that committee on the 29th 
of January, 1967 and published on the 5th of February that year. The 
highlights of the documents are as follows.
(a) It reiterates a principle familiar to members of the party, that the 
state has a duty to intervene actively in the economic life of the 
nation so as to ensure the well being of all citizens, which in turn 
requires that the government must exercise effective control over 
the principal means of production and facilitate the collective 
ownership of resources.
(b) It directs that the major means of production and exchange be 
publicly owned (the actual words used are 'under the control of 
peasants and workers'). The major means of production and 
exchange are defined broadly to encompass land, forests, minerals, 
water, oil, electricity, news media, communications, banks 
insurance, export-import trade, wholesale internal trade, iron and 
steel, machine tool, arms, motorcar, cement, fertilizer, textile and 
any big factory on which a large section of the people depend for 
their living, or which provides essential components of other 
industries, as well as large plantations especially those providing 
essential raw materials.
(c) It is skeptical of the role of money, if a literal translation from 
the original Kiswahili version is taken. Bearing in mind that this
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section was written as a direct reaction to the frustration over aid 
expectations and plans, the skepticism was over basing development 
programmes on foreign investment and external aid, and over a 
high propensity to import goods. Note that this section does not 
urge that aggregate levels of external capital be reduced, as is 
popularly believed; it merely advises that all aspects of it be 
thoroughly scrutinized.
(d) The document is also skeptical of basing development on 
industry. It is a clear example of the disillusionment with external 
sources of capital, since the industrial sector had been the one most 
dependent on them. The document advised that emphasis be 
placed on bettering the lives of peasants and developing agriculture. 
Although nothing in the text shows that it was opposed to 
industrialization, many who have written on Tanzania are correct 
in saying that, at least in theory, this was the basis for expecting that 
agriculture, rather than industry, would be the main factor in 
bringing about further development. In later years the leadership of 
agriculture over all other sectors in the process of development 
would be continually alluded to by politicians, including Nyerere, 
though never elaborated upon beyond this assertion.
(e) Part V of the declaration, called the Arusha Resolution, 
contained the Leadership Code, so-called because it forbade party 
leaders and other politicians from owning a business and having 
more than one source of income (including holding shares in a 
company and renting houses to others). Soon after, the code was 
extended to cover all salariats from the junior management level 
upwards; for example, it covered graduates employed straight from 
university. It was designed to supplement formal salary-scale 
changes in the regulation and distribution of income between
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groups in the workforce, and to close non-wage avenues for 
widening income gaps. It was also expected to help make more 
funds available for projects of national importance, and can in this 
sense be seen as an attempt to rectify the received image of Third 
World leaders engaging in self aggrandisement to the detriment of 
national development. In the previous year university students 
had in fact obliquely accused Tanzanian leaders of such self­
aggrandisement, and Nyerere had immediately responded by cutting 
his own salary by 20% and that of other higher government officials 
by a substantial margin (Pratt, 1976: 232-235).
(f) Other aspects of the declaration were not directly related to a 
strategy of non-dependent development. For example, it expressed a 
commitment to Freedom and Equality, had a long list of civil 
liberties pertaining to the individual, and it quoted the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights as one of its main inspirations.
5.3.2.I. The strength and omissions of the Arusha Declaration.
In terms of gaining control of the economy, the declaration was 
explicit enough in spelling out the first important step to be taken, 
namely the nationalisation of important aspects of the economy. At 
the same time it remained general and even ambiguous on other 
aspects of the economy, and of the development strategy, for 
example about external capital and private investment. Also, some 
important omissions from the document could be observed, one of 
which was the silence on the nature and role of human resources 
that were to be prepared for the carrying out of the strategy. This 
was perhaps as it should be in overall policy, leaving the elaboration 
and details to subsequent and supplementary policies. One thing is 
clear though, that the generality and ambiguity of the document in
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these areas left the leadership with a fair amount of space in which 
to make pragmatic decisions.
The refusal to speak in favour of industrialization was, 
however, an important omission. The tilt towards a preference for 
agriculture as against industry was popular but an excessive reactive 
response to the frustrations of yesteryear, likely to prove misguided 
in developmental terms. A policy mistake could still be avoided in 
this area, of course, due to the inbuilt ambiguity of the section 
(which could work either way), and to the fact that industrialization 
was not explicitly opposed. But the ambiguity could, and was likely 
in view of the direction of the tilt, act to prevent an early working 
out of the relevant industrialization programme.
The self reliance part in the declaration, representing more 
directly the anti-dependence drive, was accompanied by a 
commitment to the construction of socialism. The leadership has, 
of course, always seen the two as being complementary to each 
other. Yet there was a danger of blurring the anti-dependence 
direction in this. The danger arose, on the one hand, from the 
technical difficulties of working out an implementation process of 
self reliance involving powerful external economic interests and 
complex developmental questions. On the other hand the danger 
was embodied in the relative ease with which apparently socialistic 
measures could be instituted - owing to their popular appeal, and 
the availability and simplicity of their implementational inputs. 
There was a possibility that the socialistic mood of the time would 
eclipse a focus on self-reliance, thus denying the latter a better 
elaboration and greater commitment.
The Leadership Code has been a source of controversy for some 
time. In the circumstances of the time the code appears to have been
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necessary. The need to curtail easy access to funds for personal use 
was there, and the leading politicians were convinced that existing 
laws and other control measures were failing to stop the trend 
(Green, 1979). However, there are in Tanzania, especially in the 
emerging indigenous business community, those who argue that 
the Leadership Code contained from the start the ability to stop the 
growth of a local entrepreneurial class, which may have been right 
for socialism but not nationalism. They argue that the code stopped 
the only group of indigenous people - the educated top and middle 
level salariats - capable of a quick mastering of the operations of 
m odern business at a time when the existing (Asian) 
entrepreneurial class was becoming less inclined to expand business 
in Tanzania. They go on to argue that since it is always harder for 
new entrants in a business sector to succeed, and because national 
independence could not have immediately eradicated the legacy of 
colonial restrictions, all middle and top level employees opted for 
the security of their jobs, instead of entrepreneurship. Corrupt self­
aggrandisement might have been better dealt with simply by the 
institution of new and harsher criminal laws, thus avoiding the 
politico-ideological curtailment of the employees' option of business 
association. Some argue that this exclusion of an important group 
from the business sector was always likely to lead not only to a 
disproportionate growth of bureaucracy, but also to 'a country 
devoted to the administration of the national product rather than 
its creation'.6
5.3.3 Other major policies and the clarifications of the Arusha 
Declaration: 1967-72.
Several clarifications and restatements of the declaration were
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made in the period following the announcement. There were also 
major policy statements that, apart from being a follow-up to the 
declaration, had their own separate identities due to the importance 
and specialty of the fields they addressed, such as agriculture and 
education. Other policy statements did not directly follow from the 
declaration but came from a new awareness of issues, as well as 
from the need to give a different emphasis to aspects of 
development not thought of before, for example the issue of 
workers' participation in industrial decision-making in the 
M wongozo policy document, and grass roots participation in 
planning in rural areas embodied in the Decentralisation policy. 
The main sources of the clarifications were speeches, articles and 
official reports to the party by Nyerere, while most of the party and 
government policy statements were also initiated by him, as in the 
period leading to the declaration. From 1967 onwards, most policies 
tended to address the subjects of self-reliance and socialism 
simultaneously, from a conviction that they were inseparable, but 
here we have tried to extract only those aspects that have a bearing 
on the strategy of non-dependent development.
In the same month that the declaration was announced, and as 
the process of nationalisation was taking place, Nyerere explained 
the implications of the policy for private capital. He clearly stated 
that nationalisation did not mean the exclusion of privately owned 
industry. He stressed that some areas must be exclusively public 
while others should have both public and private ownership, with 
the public being the majority shareholder. The rest of the economy 
was fully open to private industry (Nyerere, 1968: 251-256). Soon 
after, he stated that nationalisation was simply an expression of 
economic nationalism not peculiar to Tanzania but 'natural' to any
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country, whether socialist or not (Nyerere, 1968: 262-266). This was 
followed by yet another clarification of the declaration on the role of 
external capital and the implication of self reliance for international 
relations. In an article published in August, 1967, Nyerere stated 
that self reliance was not isolationism, and that overseas capital and 
manpower were still very much needed where it could make 
Tanzanian efforts more effective. In the same article he addressed 
the question of the relationship between industry and agriculture 
and gave a hint of the government's position on what would in 
later years be the 'appropriate technology’ debate. He went slightly 
further this time in expressing a preference for concentrating efforts 
in agriculture relative to industry, a preference already hinted at in 
the declaration itself. Stressing that development would be 
through agriculture, he added that 'new industries and mechanised 
farms will be the exception, not the rule' (Nyerere, 1968: 315-326). 
To complement this policy standpoint he also announced that a lot 
of effort would be geared towards the promotion of small scale 
industries. He even suggested, although the tone in which it was 
said was merely reflective, that obsolete machinery in 
industrialized countries may be more appropriate to Tanzania than 
modern machinery.
Another opportunity for Nyerere to explain the relationship 
between agriculture and industry came in June, 1968, in a speech 
given in North Korea. Here the rationale for preferring agriculture 
to industry was provided (Nyerere, 1973: 45).
"We have to build our economy concentrating first on 
agricultural development. That is the industry we have, and 
which can be expanded without existing resources of capital 
and manpower. It is from the surplus we create in the
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agricultural industry that we shall develop our industrial 
sector. Of course, this does not mean that we are 
uninterested in industrial growth, for agricultural 
development itself demands not only processing plants, but 
also the manufacture of simple tools, of fertilizers, etc. It is a 
question of emphasis and of priorities."
While inaugurating the Urafiki Textile Mill, constructed in 
Tanzania and funded by Chinese aid, Nyerere (1973: 47) explained 
the government's position on how aid in general would be 
reconciled with the commitment to be self reliant.
"Our struggle for self reliance does not mean hostility to the 
people of other countries, nor a rejection of the help they are 
willing to give us when that help enables us to become more 
self reliant in the long run."
One of the issues which Nyerere has been known to support 
throughout his political career is regional co-operation. On several 
occasions in 1970 he once again committed Tanzania to the pursuit 
of regional co-operation. What is worth noting in his 1970 tackling 
of this subject is his conviction that regional co-operation was 
important in the struggle to break out of dependence (Nyerere, 1973: 
159-189).
A document rivalling the Arusha Declaration in importance was 
Mwongozo, published by the party in January, 1971 (TANU, 1971). It 
was a comprehensive document covering many issues, including 
regional co-operation, defence and security, foreign policy, the role 
of the party and its relationship with the government, foreign trade, 
national accounts, democracy and participation. A product of times 
in which nationalist fervour was high, especially since there were 
fears of an invasion from one or more of the former colonial
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powers, and influenced greatly by the radical wing of the party, it 
was noted for its more militant tone, compared with the Arusha 
Declaration or any other policy document. Its highlight was the 
emphatic support for the 'masses' as the determinant of the 
country's destiny. The notable sections of the document were 
paragraphs 15 and 28. Paragraph 15 reads:
"Together with the issue of involving the people in solving 
their problems, there is also the question of the habits of 
leaders in their work and in day-to-day life. There must be a 
deliberate effort to build equality between the leaders and those 
they lead. For a Tanzanian leader it must be forbidden to be 
arrogant, extravagant, contemptuous and oppressive. The 
Tanzanian leader has to be a person who respects people, 
scorns ostentation and who is not a tyrant."
This paragraph was responsible for the birth in Tanzania of the 
concept of workers' control, which had a potential of affecting the 
running of organisations and the efficiency of production. 
Although the concept had been hinted at by a 'Presidential Circular' 
in 1970, no policy document, other than Mwongozo, took up this 
issue. In paragraph 28, Mwongozo stated:
"For a people who have been... oppressed, exploited and 
humiliated by colonialism or capitalism, 'development' 
means 'liberation'. Any action that gives them more control 
of their own affairs is an action of development, even if it 
does not offer them better health or more bread. Any action 
that reduces their say in determining their own affairs or 
running their own lives is not development and retards 
them even if the action brings them a little better health and 
a little more bread... In considering the development of our
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nation and in preparing development plans, our main 
emphasis at all times should be the development of people 
and not of things. If development is to benefit the people, 
the people must participate in considering, planning and 
implementing their development plans."
The anti-dependence thrust in its general sense was clear in this 
paragraph. But the other significance of paragraph 28 was that, more 
than any other policy statement before or after, it legitimated the 
primacy of social considerations in the working out of development 
programmes or in the appraisal of projects.
Both paragraph 15 and 28 were understood to confer rights, 
respectively, to workers to take part in all decisions of an enterprise 
and to villages to initiate and take part in the planning of 
development projects affecting them.
Some of the important themes of Mwongozo mentioned above 
were covered by other documents equally well. For example, grass 
roots participation in development planning was the major theme 
of the Decentralisation policy of 1972, while earlier in 1968 the 
Freedom and Development document had referred to the 
importance of people-centred development (Tanzania Govt, 1972; 
Nyerere, 1973: 58-71).
One of the major policy documents that dealt with special areas 
was on education. The Education and Self Reliance document of 
March, 1967 directed that the education system be changed to 
eradicate the colonially-induced elitism of the educated. In 
particular this document addressed the need to orientate primary 
and secondary education towards an appreciation of agriculture, the 
fostering of co-operative and people-centred values in contrast to 
values conducive to social stratification, and the creation of
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conditions for uniting mental with manual work (Nyerere, 1968: 
267-290). The document remained at a general and philosophical 
level. It was left to the relevant ministry to work out the details.
The other document which dealt with a special area was 
published in September, 1967. The document, titled Socialism and 
Rural Development made it clear that in the long term rural 
Tanzania would be composed of villages in which shared 
production and distribution was the norm. Since this document 
was against the use of force in the creation of socialistic villages, a 
point stated emphatically in Freedom and Development, it was 
clear that only a gradual, voluntary collectivism in agriculture was 
envisaged, though Nyerere expected that past egalitarian attitudes 
would help popularize and speed up the process (Nyerere, 1968: 337; 
Nyerere, 1969; Nyerere, 1973: 58-71). But what was noteworthy about 
the policy of villagisation that Socialism and Rural Development 
spelt out was not only a greater commitment to the intensification 
of rural co-operation, but also the rationale for it. Nyerere saw co­
operative village production as a form of, and a basis for peasants' 
experience in, large scale farming. This perception has rarely been 
cited in literature, but in fact Nyerere accorded it equal weight with 
the socialist explanation throughout the early years of the policy. 
For example, in a major article on socialism written in 1970 he still 
referred to an Ujamaa (socialistic) village as a unit designed to 
provide experience of large-scale farming, arguing that 
development can only come from large scale farming. He 
mentioned that such farming comes in three forms: capitalist, state 
and co-operative, and that Ujamaa Village farms constituted the 
latter form (Nyerere, 1973: 156).
At this stage there was yet to emerge a major policy document
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that dealt exclusively with industrialization, or a detailed statement 
on the nature and direction of future industrialization measures.
5.4. Conclusion
By 1966 Tanzania was steadily moving towards a more defined 
strategy of non-dependent development. This trend was brought 
about by the following factors.
(a) The obstacles to national co-ordination and independent action 
fostered by some of the enduring colonial structures, such as the 
financial system.
(b) The limited but visible success in carrying out some ad hoc 
nationalist decisions in the economic sector, which appeared to 
promise greater success if an all-embracing national strategy was 
designed.
(c) The philosophical or intellectual orientation of the important 
section of the leadership, which questioned the inherited direction 
of development.
(d) The deepening of this philosophical orientation, as the inherited 
but unsuitable structures proved stubborn to reform and 
controversial socio-economic trends came to light.
The spark for the fomulation and adoption of the Arusha 
Declaration came from two main sources.
(a) The strained relations with major world powers, some of whom 
had used their leverage in financial assistance to Tanzania to try to 
induce a change in the country's policy trends.
(b) The government's inability to secure development funds both 
due to the cut in external financial assistance and to the legacy of 
financial institutions in the country.
The major policies that define the strategy of non-dependent
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development in Tanzania are in the Arusha Declaration of 1967 
and the 1967-1972 documents that clarified and supplemented it, the 
essential elements of which are the following.
(a) The strategy clearly called for the nationalisation of all important 
areas by using developmental and strategic criteria in addition to 
that of the economic value of the relevant area.
(b) Contrary to what has often been assumed, the strategy still 
welcomed private investment, both local and external. But because 
of the overriding commitment to nationalisation, and the 
accompanying pledge to the construction of socialism in Tanzania, 
there is no doubt that the strategy was bound to create greater 
hesitation in the minds of private investors than before.
(c) External aid was to be closely scrutinized and selectively accepted 
in relation to the direction of major policies and subsequent sectoral 
considerations. The policy did not set out to reduce levels of aid as 
has often been suggested.
(d) It directed that estimates for expenditure on development plans 
be based more on locally-controlled sources of finance than 
previously.
(e) Private accumulation of capital by middle and top level 
employees was forbidden by a leadership code.
(f) The strategy ushered in an era of commitment to people-centred 
development, including grass roots and workers participation. This 
not only brought with it an additional criterion for project 
appraisals and the performance of enterprises, but also challenged 
conventional organisational arrangements in a way likely to have 
far-reaching effects on the productivity of enterprises.
(g) Its rural sector policy is in our context noteworthy not for its call 
for the establishment of Ujamaa villages, but for its other
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developmental concern, namely that the village would be the 
location where modern large-scale farming could be experienced 
and learned by peasants.
(h) The strategy's education and training policy was at this stage 
confined to a commitment to the eradication of elitism in the 
educational system. This was no doubt im portant but 
developmentally inadequate, for it did not spell out its perception 
of the critical type of skills needed, or which sectors had a priority 
for the training of manpower. There was still a possibility that this 
could be drawn up by the relevant ministry.
(i) Industry had a lower priority than agriculture in the strategy. 
This was the policy with the greatest potential for holding back 
efforts towards non-dependence, and towards development, 
especially because a definite industrialization programme was not 
mentioned. Even a restructuring and modernisation of agriculture 
was not mentioned beyond the expectation that the provision of the 
existing range of inputs would be improved. Of course here too 
there was still a chance that the relevant ministries or other 
institutions would come up with new, com prehensive 
programmes.
Footnotes to Chapter Five:
1 It was seen in the last chapter that the colonial administration did 
not make high level education a priority in Tanganyika. Partly 
as a consequence of this, no Tanganyikan was appointed to the 
then prestigious civil service position of district officer until 
1957.However it appears that this delay was also due to the
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government's reluctance to put educated local people in the 
service even when they had become available (Pratt, 1976: 14-18, 
266; Iliffe, 1979: 446).
2 Early co-operatives included the Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative
Union (KNCU) in coffee, formed in 1933, the Ngoni Matengo 
Co-operative Marketing Union (NMCMU) in tobacco, formed 
in 1936, and the Bugufi Coffee Co-operative Society (BCCS) in 
coffee, also formed in 1936.
3 The largest of the new type of co-operatives was the Victoria
Federation of Co-operative Unions (VFCU), formed by cotton 
farmers in 1955.
4 This point has been made for cotton co-operatives in Uganda too
(Mamdani, 1976).
5 The poor accounting systems of the co-operatives brought them
into considerable conflict with the lending institutions based in 
the capital, since they did not keep good records of peasants who 
borrowed through them.
6 Personal communication with some businessmen in Dar-es-
Salaam and Mwanza.
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CHAPTER SIX: INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND ITS 
RELATION TO THE STRATEGY
6.1 Introduction
This chapter attempts to evaluate the extent of implementation 
of the strategy of non-dependent development at the national level. 
It focuses on the industrial sector. This is because of that sector's 
place in the economy and development, and also because of the 
greater availability of data than in the case of the other sectors. The 
main criterion for judging the extent of the implementation is the 
contribution of major activities to the process of structural change, 
in this case the process of constructing a non-dependent society. 
This is supplemented by a criterion based on changes in aggregate 
levels of activities, such as are represented by output figures. For 
these reasons, what is here regarded as part of implementation 
includes follow-up policies or working guidelines designed to give 
practical effect to the strategy, as well as performance represented by 
output figures. But output figures are looked at not merely for their 
indication of the direction of change - whether there has been an 
increase or decrease in levels - but also for the major structural 
trends.
The chapter is conceptually dealt with in three parts. The first 
part covers the period 1961-1969. This seeks to identify the guiding 
principles for the establishment of industries, as well as indicating 
the extent of industrial activity and its nature in that period. The 
section thus states the principles, and then evaluates the 
implementation of those principles for industry in the period 1961- 
1969 before moving on to consider the next period, 1969-1981. 
Although these periods are considered separately, presentation
follows the same pattern. The last part provides a summary and 
some concluding observations.
6.2. Guiding principles for industry 1961-1969
Decisions on industry in Tanzania in the pre-Arusha period have 
long been regarded by writers as having been ad hoc. This has often 
meant not merely that they did not follow policy, but that there was 
no specific policy to regulate them. In a sense this is correct, but 
there were what one may call working guidelines for industry that 
were specific to the period. These evolved chiefly from the 
recommendations of two outside bodies - the World Bank and 
Arthur D. Little Inc., a private American consulting firm.
The World Bank mission to Tanganyika to study ways of 
increasing industrial development did its work in 1960. The Bank 
called for an extension of the existing incentives to external 
investors to include, for example, a tax exemption of 20% of income 
for industrial plants and machinery. It also recommended the 
expansion of export primary production, and gave a go-ahead to the 
completion of existing industrial projects in cigarette and beer 
production, and in the manufacture of footwear. With its other 
recommendations, the Bank was quite innovative, if compared to 
the colonial government. There were three such recommendations. 
First, that where possible the processing of export products be 
undertaken; suggested products that could be processed were sisal, 
cashew nuts, coffee and meat. Second, that a certain degree of 
import-substituting industrialization be established. Third, that a 
public company, the Tanganyika Development Company, be started 
to promote and oversee important national investments (IBRD, 
1960).
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The recommendations of Arthur D. Little, Inc. were essentially 
similar to those of the World Bank, although it seems that, in 
contrast with the Bank, it was keen to discourage Tanganyika from 
stepping up its industrial activities in any significant way, citing 
Nairobi in Kenya as a better established and adequate 
manufacturing centre for East Africa (Seidman, 1972: 109-110).
In general the new government embraced the existing approach 
to industry as inherited. In its first Five Year Development Plan, 
1964-1969, it incorporated the recommendations of the World Bank 
and Arthur D. Little, Inc. (Tanganyika Govt., 1964). In short, if the 
government then had to choose between industrial activities, its 
preference would have been for those that processed exports and 
those that produced domestically the consumer goods that were 
until then imported. Yet it was recognized that no strict adherence 
to this preference was required in practice. This is partly because at 
this stage the government believed that industry was best left to 
private enterprise, and trusted that market forces would produce 
the appropriate industrial activities in Tanzania without any 
significant governmental regulation (Tanganyika Govt., 1964; Pratt, 
1976: 174). In some way therefore the government felt that the right 
industrial establishments would be those that on the basis of a cost- 
benefit analysis appeared to promise an optimal rate of return, the 
highest addition to GDP and therefore, the greatest contribution to 
growth. This is the choice of industrial activity sometimes referred 
to as a 'maximum growth strategy' (Roemer, 1972).
6.3 Industrial establishments up to 1969
To understand the extent of industrialization in the 
independence period, it is important to know the base from which
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it started, which largely means identifying the nature of the 
industrial base built in the colonial period.
Traditionally, activities classified under industry have included 
small operations using very little capital, engaging fewer than ten 
employees and, sometimes, using no machinery in production 
(Silver, 1982: 65, 82). The classification has also usually included raw 
material preparation where it involved some use of machinery, 
such as sisal decortication, cotton ginning and tobacco processing (as 
distinct from, say, sisal twine, cotton textiles and cigarette 
manufacture). This was prevalent in the records of the colonial 
period (Silver, 1982: 63, 65, 72). One effect of this was to magnify the 
extent of industrialization by exaggerating the number of industries 
and of employees within it. For example, as early as 1933 colonial 
records gave the number of industrial establishments in 
Tanganyika as 321, employing a total of 17,797 people. The 
respective figures for 1952 were 2,178 and 52,030 (Silver, 1982). The 
statistical surveys of industrial establishments in the independence 
period have reduced this problem to some extent by excluding some 
obvious types of raw material preparation, such as sisal 
decortication, from industrial classification, and by raising the 
minimum number of workers required for an establishment to be 
included in an industrial census. In this way the number of 
establishments, estimated by colonial records to be 3,088 in 1955, was 
found to be only 429 in 1965.1
It should be emphasized here that the major problem with 
colonial records was not that they included primary processing in 
industrial activity, but that they included 'routine and necessary' 
raw material preparation which did not entail manufacturing.
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In determining the extent of industrialization the principal 
criterion should be that a degree of manufacturing is involved. This 
criterion includes the value-added primary processing of raw 
materials as well as implying the use of machinery. The criterion 
should be supplemented by that of size, in terms of both capital and 
employment.2
A reworking of the data of the colonial period, possible because 
often the activities were itemized separately in the original reports, 
would present a totally different picture of the extent of 
industrialization. By the above-mentioned criteria, it would be 
imperative to exclude what was listed then as 'primary processing' 
from the industrial classification. This is largely because there was 
no industrial plant that manufactured cotton textiles, cigarettes, or 
sisal twine and other sisal-based manufactures. Accordingly, we 
would deduct 17,048 from the 1933 total number of workers (17,797), 
or 95.8% of the total, for these were all in primary processing in 
which, incidentally, sisal alone accounted for 13,334 people, or 
74.9% of the total (Silver, 1982: 62-63). In 1952, despite the steady 
decline of its share over the years, 'primary processing' still 
accounted for 62.9% of the industrial work force, all of which could 
of course be reclassified as non-industrial.
Also excluded would be almost all maintenance jobs that existed 
mainly on the railways. No manufacture of products was involved 
in this area in the colonial period.
Such manufacture, however, took place in the production of 
simple consumer items such as soap, clothes, wood-works and food 
preparation (rice, flour, oil, sugar and meat). But it should be noted 
that in terms of scale, value and the technology employed, these
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were very simple industrial establishments, and that even the more 
believable 1965 total of 429 still included many of these.
The criteria, and the probable reclassification (which as we have 
seen can produce a radically different picture of industrialization), 
help us reach the conclusion which we first stated in Chapter Four, 
that the only significant industrial plants at the beginning of the 
independence era were those operated by companies involved in 
brewing (the East African Breweries), meat canning (Tanganyika 
Packers), the bottling of soft drinks (the Coca Cola Company), the 
manufacture of packing containers (the Metal Box Company), food 
manufacture, mainly in the form of grain milling (Unga Ltd., 
through its subsidiary Tanganyika Millers), and the production of 
paints (Robbialac). Together they accounted for 75% of the value of 
all manufacturing (IBRD, 1960: 128). Their relatively advanced 
techniques of production, their comparatively high capital-labour 
ratio, and the greater scale of their operations clearly set them apart 
from the rest of industrial establishments. But, though large in 
Tanganyika, their industrial operations were quite small by world 
standards. More significant was the fact that the products of the 
majority of them were not suited to the generation of further 
industrial activity in the country, prompting reference to them 
sometimes as export-orientated, or even luxury (Rweyemamu, 
1973:125-128,171-172).3
Nevertheless the data available on industry-related activities give 
some hints on the direction of those activities over time. For 
example from the colonial records we learn that, as the 
independence years drew closer and the country had had some 
considerable experience in those activities, the share of primary 
'processing' in the total declined and the production of simple
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consumer goods as well as repair and maintenance activities 
increased, as Table 1 below indicates. The change could in this 
sense be said to have been not merely incremental but structural as 
well.
Table 1: INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS IN TANGANYIKA: SELECTED 
YEARS, 1945-65
1945 1956 1961 1965
No. % No. % No. % No. %
Agri. processing(a) 61 60.40 133 45.39 172 41.45 221 38.84
Food manufacture(b) 19 18.81 69 23.55 104 25.12 136 23.90
Other consumer and 
Industrial goods (c) 21 20.79 91 31.06 138 33.33 212 37.26
Total 101 100.00 293 100.00 414 100.00 569 100.00
(a) includes wood products and plywood but excludes furniture and fixtures.
(b) includes grain milling, jaggery and sugar refining, tea and coffee processing.
(c) includes maintenance and repair.
SOURCE: Silver (1982:78); Rweyemamu (1973:112)
The 1961-1969 period was one of great change in industrial 
activities. The incremental change in the period still reflected the 
structural trend already evident at the end of the colonial era, 
namely a declining proportion of primary processing in the total, 
and an increase in the share of consumer and other industrial 
goods. But at that time it was the quantitative increase itself that 
was considerable. Table 1 shows that the number of establishments 
created in the four years of independence alone was one-third of the 
total. Similarly large increases in the volume of industrial
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production in that period demonstrate the significance of the 
quantitative change. Table 2 gives some indication of the magnitude 
of change in levels of production for a number of product lines.
Table 2: PRODUCTION IN SELECTED INDUSTRIES, 1962-68
Industry Unit 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968
Textiles ’000 sq. yds 6,225 8,930 12,126 17,121 18,277 34,519
Beer ’000 gallons 1,962 2,249 2,673 4,139 5,120 5,413
Cigarettes million 1,144 1,535 1,869 2,049 2,044 2,137
Paints gallons 95,357 96,981 162,573 221,020 274,623 317,948
Plywood '000 sq ft. 2,004 6,573 7,794 10,247 8,808 10,658
Sisal twine tons - 658 5,778 10,138 14,887 16,454
Saw milling '000 cu. ft. 3,676 4,675 5,029 5,026 4,585 5,029
Wheat flour tons 23,378 29,818 38,433 39,714 41,159 42,238
Pyrethrum extract tons 99 107 174 200 287 187
Canned meat tons n.a n.a 11,109 9,162 9,520 6,716
Cement tons - - - 49324 144,612 153,894
SOURCE: Rweyemamu (1973:121)
6.3.1 The beginning of large-scale industrial production
The increase in industrial activity was characterized by the 
establishment of large-scale industries.4 Notable among those 
with net assets worth over Sh.1,000,000 at the time of their 
establishment were the following. The Tanzania Portland Cement 
factory at Wazo Hill in Dar-es-Salaam started production in 1966, 
the same year that an oil refinery was completed in the same city. 
The cement factory had a capacity of 130,000 tons of cement per 
annum while the oil refinery, built at a cost of Sh. 100,000,000, could 
process 600,000 tons of crude oil per year. The Kilombero Sugar 
Company took over a small factory in Morogoro at about the same
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time to produce sugar on a large scale. The manufacture of 
cigarettes by B.A.T. Tanzania (later the Tanzania Cigarette 
Company) had been started in Dar-es-Salaam in 1965, and the 
existing brewery plant in the same city was expanded greatly and its 
operations highly mechanized in the same period.
The manufacture of modern dairy products commenced in 
Arusha at Northern Dairies in 1966, and in Mara Region at the 
Mara Dairy Company in the same year. Coastal Dairy Industries 
was established in Dar-es-Salaam in 1967. The manufacture of 
footwear by Bata (later the Tanzania Shoe Company) had started in 
1965, the same year the production of packaging paper and 
corrugated paper boxes commenced at Kibo Paper Industries in Dar- 
es-Salaam.
There was one large-scale plastic goods manufacturing company 
in the period, Tanganyika Tegry Plastics, established in Dar-es- 
Salaam in 1962. There was also one tyre manufacturing company, 
with net assets worth Sh.69,000,000, established at the end of the 
period (in 1969) at Arusha. Other large-scale industries established 
in the period included a steel rolling mill in Tanga in 1966, a soap 
factory and a vegetable oil industry in Mwanza in 1967, a leather 
tanning factory in Moshi in 1968, the manufacture of farm 
implements in Dar-es-Salaam in the same year, and, with net assets 
worth Sh. 122,000,000, the manufacture of fertilizers in Tanga also in 
1968.
With the exception of a small export capacity in the oil refinery, 
Mara Dairy Company and the tyre factory, all large-scale factories 
were geared towards the local production of goods previously 
imported in large quantities. It was for the same purpose that in the 
mid 1950s the Phillips Electronics company was granted a
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monopoly in the production and marketing of radio sets in 
Tanzania.
Large-scale operations specifically geared towards the value-added 
processing of agricultural products for export could be found in the 
re- drying of tobacco, and in the production of cashew kernels. In 
the former case, The Tanzania Tobacco Processing Company set up 
a plant in Morogoro in 1968, while in the latter case a plant had 
been built in Dar-es-Salaam (TANITA I) in 1965.
The activity in which investment was concentrated, however, 
was the textile industry. Although textile industries had an inbuilt 
capacity to cater for home production as well as export, in the early 
years they tended to specialize in the home market. Tanganyika 
Textile Industries, which had existed in Dar-es-Salaam since 1959, 
began factory operations after independence, and expanded into a 
large-scale concern in 1967-68 after the establishment of the large 
integrated cotton textile mills, from which it could get the 
previously imported yarn (Jones, 1981). Tasini textiles in Dar-es- 
Salaam had been established in 1961. It was later merged with one 
of the integrated mills, the Kilimanjaro Textile Corporation (Kiltex), 
which was established in Arusha in 1966. Kiltex was set up at a cost 
of Sh.50,000,000 and had an initial workforce of 800, which was 
expected to grow to 2,000. Also set up in 1966 were the other two 
integrated mills. These were the Friendship Textile Mill (Urafiki) 
in Dar-es-Salaam, and the Mwanza Textile Mill (Mwatex) in 
Mwanza, set up at a cost of Sh.50,000,000 and 80,000,000 respectively. 
Each had a capacity to produce 24,000,000 linear metres of cloth per 
annum. Urafiki started with a workforce of about 2,000, expected to 
grow to over 4,000. Mwatex had a workforce of about 1,000, but it 
was expected to reach 1,900. Other cotton textile mills established
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around 1966 included the Tanganyika Dyeing and Weaving Mill in 
Dar-es-Salaam, and Calico Textiles, also in Dar-es-Salaam. In 1969 
the manufacture of blankets by Blanket Manufacturers began in Dar­
es- Salaam. These were all much smaller than the integrated mills 
(with a workforce of 300-500 and an annual production capacity of 
2,000,000 - 5,000,000 metres each), but they were still larger than 
most pre- independence industrial establishments.
An integrated project for the cultivation of kenaf, the processing 
of kenaf fibre and the manufacturing of kenaf bags and hessian 
cloth for agricultural uses was started in Moshi in 1969 but was not 
fully operational at the end of the period under consideration. The 
large-scale manufacture of sisal products started in 1965. In that 
year the Tanganyika Sisal Spinning Company at Saza Road, Dar-es- 
Salaam, and the Tanzania Sisal Spinning Company at Pugu Road, 
Dar-es-Salaam, began the production of sisal twines and flume 
tows. They were joined in that activity by the Tanganyika 
Industrial Corporation, which established a plant in Tanga in 1966. 
The Tanzania Bag Corporation started the manufacture of sisal bags 
in Moshi in 1967.
6.3.2. The reasons for the upsurge of industrial activity in 1961-69
Several factors can be mentioned as having facilitated such a great 
increase in industrial activities in the period under consideration. 
Clearly one of these is the fact that sufficient local demand already 
existed and could sustain large-scale local production. Rweyemamu 
(1973: 122-130) has observed that the domestic production of some 
goods, notably textiles, was in fact long overdue, and that this 
explains why such a large industrial capacity suddenly emerged. 
The other factor was simply that the new government, and in
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particu lar its bureaucracy, looked at industria lization  more 
positively than the colonial governm ent did. The governm ent 
clearly followed the advice of the World Bank mission (IBRD, 1960), 
as can be seen from the list above, to increase the value-added 
elem ent in agricultural exports, and to introduce some im port- 
substitu tion  m easures. This relatively m ore positive a ttitude 
tow ards industrialization is indicated by other m easures taken by 
the governm ent in the period. For example, it rejected in practice 
some of the advice of A rthur D. Little, Inc., w hich, though 
supporting some industrialization in Tanzania, leaned towards the 
view that there should be a division of production functions in the 
East African m arket such that Kenya (which had  a lead in 
industrialization) retained that of industry. In the renegotiated East 
African economic comm unity, Tanzania argued against making 
Kenya the centre of all industry in the community and proposed 
that each country specialize instead in certain individual industries; 
through this, the tyre industry was located in Tanzania, with the 
en tire  East A frican m arket theoretically  reserved  for it. 
Furtherm ore, the government undertook to attract foreign private 
capital by legislating on the rights of a foreign investor. The 
Investm ent Protection Act, 1963 guaranteed that 'full-value' 
compensation would be paid to owners of industry in the event of 
na tionalization . This was supp lem ented  by a governm ent 
undertaking to perm it the repatriation of the relevant portion of 
earnings by foreign investors in Tanzania, which was covered by 
the Foreign Exchange Control Act, 1965. It should be noted in 
relation to this, however, that fiscal incentives were exactly the 
same as those offered by the colonial government earlier, and that 
they were worse from the point of view of the foreign investor than
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in comparable countries (MinCom, 1974: 48-49; Silver, 1982: 74-75). 
Both legislation and the existing fiscal incentives remained 
unaffected by the Arusha Declaration.
The government of Tanzania (MinCom, 1974) and some writers 
(Pearson, 1969: 187-189) believe that an additional factor in 
stimulating industrial development was the creation of a publicly- 
owned development organization, the National Development 
Corporation (NDC) in the case of Tanzania, formed in 1965. This is 
because it concentrated on equity participation, and in this way 
offered quasi-governmental protection to all its partners. In 
addition, Rweyemamu (1973) has argued, intense competition by 
foreign suppliers or buyers in large, commercially viable branches 
of industry, such as textiles, combined with high tariff walls erected 
by the post- colonial government, induced many of them to 
participate in industrial ventures in order to secure a foothold in 
the protected market.
6.3.3.The structural characteristics of industry in the 1961-69 period
The list of large-scale enterprises indicates that, although nearly 
every ISIC division was represented, new industrial capacity was 
dominated by textiles and food manufacture. In general, this 
picture was representative of the whole industrial sector in that 
period. Appendix 4 roughly supports these conclusions for the year 
1965, in which the contribution to employment levels was 48.1% by 
textiles, 20.3% by food processing, 10.9% by all metals and their 
products, and 20.7% by all other industries. The respective figures 
for output were 40.0%, 29.7%, 9.0% and 21.3%. The figures for 
metals and their products have not been re-worked downwards by 
the industrial re-classification criteria suggested earlier. If this was
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done the contribution of metals and their products would look 
m uch smaller.
6.3.4. Some drawbacks of the nature of industrial plants in 1961-69 
Many negative remarks have been made on some specific plants 
set up  in Tanzania in the 1961-69 period. Most of the blame is 
directed tow ards the NDC, which was both the partner and 
'overseer' in the joint ventures that characterized large-scale 
industrial production. Some of the criticism appears to admonish 
the NDC and the government for allowing former overseas owners 
to retain significant percentages of equity participation, and for 
perm itting  form er suppliers of m achinery to m aintain  their 
foothold in a particular industry even after the Arusha Declaration 
(Seidman, 1972; Shivji, 1976). But it should be noted that nowhere 
in the Arusha Declaration and similar documents did Tanzania set 
ou t to elim inate the participation  of overseas com panies, 
im perialist or otherw ise, and that the NDC was specifically 
instructed  to seek equity participation or joint ventures with 
foreign capital (which is mostly private) even after Arusha (Min 
Com, 1974). Once the role of the NDC had been defined in this way, 
the extent of equity participation by the overseas partner, and the 
choice of the supplier of machinery, was always going to depend on 
the status of the industry in the whole economy and in relation to 
perceived national strategic interests, the nature of the product, and 
the know ledge available to Tanzanian negotiators about their 
partners or their machinery suppliers.
In our view the more interesting comments which have been 
m ade are those which emphasize not so much that imperialism 
(through the participation of major foreign capitalist companies)
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still operated in Tanzania, but that serious errors of judgement 
were made during the establishment of some industries, which 
have lessened the usefulness of those industries to the 
development of the economy. Such comments have dealt with 
aspects like management contracts with foreign managing agents, 
the technical suitability of machinery, marketing arrangements, and 
the nature of inputs. The issues raised are best dealt with by other 
subjects of specialization. Below we only mention the industries 
and areas in which there is a general recognition that mistakes were 
made where they probably should not have occurred. Although 
most of the effects of the decisions could only be recognized in the 
next period, they had their roots in the 1961-69 period.
(a) Unsuitable machinery:
One of the areas of concern in this regard has been the suitability 
of machines supplied - in terms of their durability, technological 
capability and their capacity for employment-creation. The 
production of bags, mainly for agricultural uses, provides an 
example in this area. The machines for the manufacture of sisal 
bags by the Tanzania Bag Corporation were supplied by an Italian 
Company called Gardella SPA. From its establishment in 1967 to 
1973, well beyond the period under consideration, the corporation 
ran at a loss - a total of Sh. 3,000,000 (Jones, 1981: 195). The main 
reason for the loss was the frequent break-down of machinery - 
Gardella SPA received Sh. 600,000 in spare parts orders annually - 
and the difficulties of obtaining spares (NDC, 1971; Jones, 1981: 195). 
This meant that even by the fourth year of operation the factory 
operated at only 61% of installed capacity (NDC, 1971).
It appears that when Gardella SPA was engaged by Tanzania, it 
was widely known elsewhere to be an unreliable supplier. What is
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interesting is that two years after the establishment of the sisal bag 
factory, Tanzania engaged Gardella SPA to participate in the setting 
up of another project for bag production, worth Sh. 65,000,000. 
Gardella SPA managed to interest the Tanzanian government in 
the cultivation of kenaf under irrigation near Moshi. It then sold a 
three-year supply of kenaf seeds to Tanzania even though they can 
keep for no more than a year. Next Gardella SPA supplied 
machinery and technical know-how to the Sh. 21,000,000 
accompanying Kenaf bag factory. Jones (1981: 197) notes that the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) was at this time warning 
African governments against dealing with Gardella SPA.
The main problem with the kenaf bag factory was the inability for 
it to operate at capacity; seven years after it was set up it still could 
not reach a 50% capacity utilization (Jones, 1981: 198). Again this 
was due almost entirely to an unusually high rate of the breakdown 
of machinery and long delays in the supply of spare parts. The 
kenaf plantation itself failed due to low yields and a poor 
conversion rate from crop to processed fibre, and was abandoned in 
the 1970s, thus necessitating the importation of fibre at an annual 
cost of more than Sh. 7,000,000 (NDC, 1973; Jones, 1981: 198).
The two bag factories continued to produce a total of 
approximately 3,000,000 bags per year even in the next period when 
they were supposed to be fully operational (NDC, 1971; 1973). This 
was only 25% of the 1966 estimate of domestic demand. At the 
planning stage it was thought that the total domestic demand 
would eventually be met by the output of only one of the factories, 
the Tanzania Bag Corporation. The unreliability of machinery and 
its attendant costs were showing that this was far-fetched. The 
inadequacy of the machinery in this case was related to poor
225
Standards of manufacture. The other known case of huge losses that 
were related to the old age of the machinery was that of the 
Tanzania Instant Coffee plant in Bukoba, established in 1966, in 
which a critical component could not work for four consecutive 
years.
Another instance of the acquisition of unsuitable machinery can 
be found in cashewnut hulling. The supplier of machinery to the 
first large- scale cashewnut processing factory in Tanzania, TANITA 
1, was an Italian company called Oltremare SPA. The main 
problem with the machinery was its low outturn of whole kernels. 
The price of kernels - which are a predominantly export crop - can 
come down to 135% less of the world market price if they are 
broken (MDB, 1982: Annex 5), thus unsuitable machinery in kernel 
production can be very costly to the economy. One fact about kernel 
production is that small- scale (labour-intensive) hand methods 
still produce the best kernels. This is because the necessary removal 
of the semi-toxic and corrosive Cashewnut Shell Liquid (CNSL), 
and the lack of a standard size of nuts, make it extremely difficult 
for mechanized processes to produce whole kernels. In spite of this, 
Tanzania went ahead and built the first and largest mechanized 
plant in the world (Rweyemamu, 1973: 129).
It has been stated, in defence of the decision and Oltremare's 
reputation, that Tanzania had no alternative but to use the still 
experimental large-scale mechanized processes, since wage rates 
were up to 300% more than in India, the major processing 
competitor (Rweyemamu, 1973: 129; Jones, 1981: 180). Moreover, it 
would increase the economic viability of the investment in 
cashewnut processing, it could be argued, if the production of 
kernels went hand in hand with the recovery of CNSL, which is
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highly valuable and has multifarious industrial and other uses. 
The recovery of CNSL is best done in highly mechanized plants. 
These considerations are perhaps the reason why, in spite of the 
generally poor performance of the first, eight more large-scale 
mechanized plants were built afterwards, with the participation of 
Oltremare, the CASHCO organization of Japan and the World Bank 
(MDB, 1982: Annex 5).
In terms of employment-creation, examples of controversial 
decisions concerned a large-scale mechanized bakery in Dar-es- 
Salaam, and the initially capital-intensive Mwatex. A decision to 
build an automated bread factory was made in 1969. The Canadian 
International Development Agency had a major interest in the 
project as the foreign exchange lender. The contract for the project's 
execution was awarded to Angus Butler Engineering Company 
(consultants) and Baker Perkins (machinery suppliers), both of 
Canada. It was a condition of the loan agreement that the execution 
be done by Canadian companies (Coulson, 1977d: 1979), one of those 
tied aid packages which the Arusha Declaration denounced. It 
appears that not enough evaluation was done during the 
exploratory stage. Coulson (1977d: 181) shows that a similar 
automated bakery could have been built by Baker Perkins' 
international competitors for half the price, that several smaller 
labour-intensive bakeries with a total capacity equal to that of the 
automated factory could have been established for a third of the 
price, and that the automated alternative, with its complex 
electronically-run single oven, was far more vulnerable to 
breakdowns and to the spare parts supplier than would have been 
the case with smaller bakeries. In addition the automated bakery 
employed only about a fifth of the probable number of employees of
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smaller bakeries of equivalent combined capacity (Coulson, 1977d: 
181).
It has been argued in defence of the automated bakery, that it 
eliminated the serious problem of adulteration of bread, which 
apparently was becoming the practice of small bakeries at that time 
as consumption went up without a concomitant rise in wheat 
supply levels (Green, 1978).
Mwatex was built and run with the equity participation of the 
National Development Corporation (40%), the Victoria Federation 
of Co-operative Unions (40%) and a Franco-Swiss consortium, 
Amenital (20%). Amenital provided consultancy, a managing 
agency and machinery (NDC, 1971). From the point of view of the 
overall economy, and in comparison with the Chinese-built 
Urafiki, Mwatex had several shortcomings from the beginning, and 
many published works (Rweyemamu, 1973: 123-124; Shivji, 1976: 
176-177; NDC, 1971; NDC, 1973) have made these a well known 
story in Tanzania. They included inadequate planning for 
infrastructural facilities, which resulted, for example, in chronic 
water and power supply interruptions, from which Mwatex had not 
recovered by 1983. Other shortcomings were unfavourable loan 
repayment conditions, and continuous production shortfalls due to 
a more frequent breakdown of machinery as well as delays in the 
supply of (imported) intermediate inputs such as chemicals. What 
is more relevant to note here is that, as we saw earlier, while 
having the same production capacity as Urafiki, Mwatex was 60% 
more costly to establish, and created the equivalent of only 50% of 
Urafiki's employment. Five years after being established, Urafiki 
had reduced its expatriate staff by almost 100% through localization, 
while Mwatex had reduced it by only 40% (NDC, 1971).
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(b) Poor pre-establishment preparation
We have already alluded to the poor feasibility studies in some of 
the cases we have mentioned. In others this problem seems to 
have been the most prominent one. In the case of the Tanzania 
Fertilizer Company (TFC), a poor feasibility study led to an under­
estimation of the foreign exchange and interest rate fluctuations in 
Germany, the home of the equity partner Kloeckner Industrio 
Anlagen GmbH and the source of the necessary loan, resulting in 
such a high interest rate and large principal that the factory was 
rendered financially unsound from a very early phase of its 
existence (Coulson, 1977b). The debt burden (equivalent to 82% of 
assets) has been one of the major reasons for TFC's continuous 
operational losses. Other major causes, which could have been 
identified in a more careful feasibility study, included an under­
estimation of the price of imported inputs (among which was 
phosphate rock, the basic raw material), the lack of proper 
infrastructural facilities, and an over-estimation of demand (NDC, 
1974: 66; Coulson, 1977b).
An over-estimation of potential supply appears to have been a 
major factor in the feasibility study for the mechanized production 
of milk products by the Mara Dairy Company (Jones, 1981: 159), 
which was set up with the assistance of the government of 
Denmark. This has meant that the company's two large-scale 
plants have a permanent idle capacity. The same feasibility study 
did not properly identify the characteristics of the market for its 
products. For example, the company produces butter, ghee and 
other products by sophisticated industrial means in a predominantly 
rural and peasant location, where the demand for them is low and it 
is far cheaper to make them at home. This was probably not
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considered a serious shortcoming, since originally the company 
intended to export part of its output, and to capture the larger urban 
markets in Tanzania. But the communication outlet for the area 
has remained one of the poorest in Tanzania, which affects sales 
and, consequently, production levels.
The major product of one of the dairy plants is ultra heat-treated 
milk (UHT), which keeps for more than six months at normal 
temperature. This would have been a very useful product indeed 
in an area generally lacking residential refrigeration facilities. 
However, with poor transport and the lack of profitability of the 
other milk products, UHT milk was bound to be priced out of reach 
of ordinary people; in 1982 half a litre of UHT milk was being sold 
at Sh. 10 - i.e., about half the daily average wage.
(c) Import-dependent inputs
Import-substituting industrialization is generally associated with 
a heavy reliance on imported intermediate inputs and raw 
materials. Tanzania's industrial plants established in the period 
1961-69 were no exception to this. Jones (1981) has drawn and 
discussed a list of these recurrent industrial inputs, many of which 
could have been either made in Tanzania or eliminated from 
industrial processes altogether by being substituted with cheaper or 
locally-obtainable equivalents, had there been enough preparation 
for industrialization. The fertilizer factory in Tanga illustrates an 
aspect of this discussion. The factory produces triple super­
phosphate, ammonium sulphate and three forms of NPK 
compound fertilizer (obtained by adding potash, ammonia and urea 
to the made up single super-phosphate and raw triple super­
phosphate fertilizers).
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The major raw  m aterials and interm ediate inputs for these 
types of fertilizers are rock phosphate, sulphur, potassium sulphate 
and ammonia. They were all imported at the start, and throughout 
thel970s. The annual requirements for these inputs in 1968 were, 
respectively, 110,000 tons, 30,000 tons, 15,000 tons and 12,000 tons. 
W hen imported, their costs in the initial years were approximately 
Shs. 14,850,000; 5,700,000; 6,105,000 and 4,236,000 respectively - a total 
of Sh. 30,891,000 per annum (Coulson, 1977b; Jones 1981: 90). The 
annual costs for these materials in the 1980s had risen to about 120 
million shillings. These high costs cause a considerable drain on 
foreign exchange reserves, and therefore a serious consideration of 
possible local sources of the materials should have been param ount 
when the establishment of TFC was contemplated.
Potassium sulphate is not available in Tanzania, so it had to be 
im ported. Both su lphur and ammonia could theoretically have 
been produced in Tanzania, mainly through subsidiary processes of 
oil refining (which is why Dar-es-Salaam, the location of the 
refinery, was the site originally proposed for the fertilizer factory). 
This would have entailed additional investments at the refinery, 
making it a more complex plant than the planners were prepared 
for at that stage. More importantly, these subsidiary processes at the 
refinery w ould have yielded only a small p roportion  of the 
requirements of TFC (potentially up to 50% of sulphur, but a much 
sm aller percen tage of the hydrogen  w hich goes in to  the 
m anufacture of ammonia). It is in fact accepted that the local 
production of sulphur and ammonia would be uneconomic unless 
it was part of a netw ork  of chemical industries in which 
petrochemicals (as distinct from basic refinery) played a central role 
(Jones, 1981: 82-104). The importance of chemical industries to most
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other industries, and to pharmaceutical preparations, is well 
known. Clearly in the 1961-69 period Tanzania did not consider the 
establishment of such a complex intermediate goods industry a 
necessity, the object at that time being merely to substitute some 
important imports by local production, rather than to create a well- 
integrated industrial structure.
While the value of trying to obtain sulphur and ammonia locally 
was not clear in the 1961-69 period, the local availability of the most 
basic input into the factory, rock phosphate, was well known. The 
largest and most productive of three phosphate deposits in 
Tanzania is at Minjingu, 500 kilometres north-west of Tanga. 
Tanzania's State Mining Corporation was to claim in a later period 
that it could supply TFC with Minjingu phosphate at less than half 
the world price (Jones, 1981: 92). But only when the foreign 
exchange crisis of the late seventies and early eighties became 
severe did the TFC factory utilize the phosphate from Minjingu, at 
an annual saving of sh. 40,000,000 in foreign currency, according to 
the estimates of the Ministry of Industries in 1983. It was later to be 
acknowledged by both government officials and TFC's management 
that Minjingu should have been the source of the factory's 
phosphate requirements from the start.
Other prominent examples include the textile and soap 
industries, both of which depend on massive imports of caustic 
soda - a basic chemical with many other industrial uses which could 
have been manufactured in Tanzania as part of the already 
mentioned network of chemical industries. Jones (1981: 214) notes 
that the use of caustic soda in the soap industry could be avoided by 
introducing a process of soap-making that utilizes the cheaper
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sodium carbonate, a basic mineral abundant in Tanzania (but not yet 
mined).
(d) The wrong location of some industrial plants
As indicated above, the fact that industry built in the 1961-69 
period was highly dependent on im ported inpu ts was one 
dem onstration of the lack of inter-industry linkages and forward 
planning. Another dem onstration of this was in the location of 
some of the im portant plants. Thus the TFC factory should have 
been built in Dar-es-Salaam, where the harbour facilities for its 
bulky im ports already existed, and where the production of 
am m onia and su lphur or sulphuric acid in the fu ture was a 
possibility. Or it should have been located at Arusha, only 80 
kilometres from the Minjingu phosphate deposits. Similarly the 
steel rolling mill should have been somewhere in the Southern 
Highlands, where both the iron ore and coal would be mined in the 
future. The two industries were apparently located in Tanga as 
alternative sources of employment to the depressed sisal industry 
in the surrounding region - an im portant consideration which, 
nevertheless, should not have been overriding.
6.4 Industry in the 1969-81 period
Serious thinking on a programme for industry emerged during 
the formulation of the Second Five Year Development Plan, which 
was designed to cover the period 1969-74. The Second Plan was the 
first of three phases of industry policy. In this plan a commitment 
was m ade to reform import-substituting industrialization (ISI) so as 
to take account of the basic consum er needs of the general 
population. This was the beginning of what can be loosely referred 
to as an emphasis on inward-looking aspects of industry. The
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second phase of industry policy began with the formulation of the 
Long Term Industrial Strategy in the mid-1970s and coincided with 
the Third Five Year Development Plan. In this phase there was a far 
greater commitment to industrialization whose highlights were a 
recognition of the centrality of what has come to be known as 'basic 
industries', and of the primacy of capital goods in them. The third 
phase derived from a strategy which places priority on balance of 
payments considerations and a greater pursuit of the principle of 
comparative advantage in carrying out production and exchange. 
The industrial ramifications of this strategy, which started in 1981 
with the publication of the first of the National Economic Survival 
Programmes (NESP) and was strengthened by the adoption of the 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1982, included an 
emphasis on export industrial production, a curtailment of 
industrial expansion and the raising of efficiency levels in existing 
plants.
6.4.1 The Second Five Year Plan and the promise to reform the ISI 
At a general level the Second Plan (1969-1974) reiterated the two 
major goals of the Arusha Declaration - Socialism and Self-Reliance. 
More emphasis however was laid on self-reliance, which appeared 
to be the overriding spirit of the plan. The stated aim of the plan 
was the creation of a relatively self-sustaining, high investment and 
high growth economy. It was expected that this would be achieved 
in two ways. First, the government would promote agricultural 
expansion. Secondly, institutions for the promotion and support of 
industrial growth would be created. Here the government 
envisaged an expansion of the parastatal sector. This made the 
government's position on the ownership of industry quite clear.
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Ownership was seen as one of the most important elements in an 
industry policy. In the specific industry section of the plan, the 
private sector was still being encouraged. But as in the general aims 
of the plan, the expansion of the public sector was reiterated. This 
time a more detailed justification for this was given. First, there 
was a perception that only parastatals could provide local large-scale 
investment as a desired alternative to the previous reliance on 
foreign investment. Secondly, the government believed that it 
would be possible to create a genuine Tanzanian industrial know­
how faster than under conditions of unrestricted private 
investment. Thirdly, there was a conviction that it would be 
possible to pursue a more effective industrial strategy in this way 
than under private industry. Fourthly, the government believed 
that under public ownership more of the profits made in industry 
would be re-invested in Tanzania.
The need for structural change in industry was mentioned in the 
second plan; it was stated that in the long term economic 
development required the creation of an industrial base, and that 
this in turn entailed fundamental changes in the existing structure 
of industry (Tanzania Govt., 1969a : 59). However, the nature of the 
structural change in industry was not identified, and the plan left 
the impression that the question of structural change would be 
considered seriously only in the future.
This inability to spell out the nature of the required structural 
change in industry reflected at that time the tussle between those 
who were keen to assign the leading role in development to 
agriculture, composed mainly of the authors of the Arusha 
Declaration, and those who understood industry to be the leading 
sector in development, mainly economists (to whom the
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preparation of the plan was logically entrusted). The latter 
managed to write in the primacy of an industrial base in the pursuit 
of development. But nothing else in the plan indicated a 
commitment to this, and the meaning of structural change 
necessary for the creation of that base was not clearly spelt out. It 
was an indication of the strength of those not inclined to think of 
industry as crucial to Tanzanian development in the circumstances 
of the time. This of course was facilitated by the dominance of ISI 
thinking among those supporting the primacy of industry, such 
that industrial growth especially in terms of its addition to GDP was 
still the overall consideration, and not structural change.
If the concept of an industrial base was alluded to rather than 
adopted in the Second Plan, and structural change remained a 
promise for the future, at least there was an outline of the elements 
of a Long-Term Industrial Strategy. Although such a strategy was 
not expected to start before the commencement of the Third Five- 
Year Development Plan, it was implied that its outline would, 
thenceforward, provide guidance in the establishment, expansion 
and management of industry. The elements of the Long Term Plan 
included (i) the expansion of the range of manufactured goods, (ii) 
the lessening of the dependence on external sources of supply of 
inputs, (iii) an increase in the manufactured component of exports, 
(iv) the development of (local) managerial and technical expertise in 
the operation of industry, (v) emphasis on basic intermediate and 
capital goods industries, and (vi) the targeting of industrial growth 
towards the stimulation of internal exchange and specialization. 
Out of these, the change envisaged in elements (i) and (iv) can be 
seen as incremental while (ii), (iii) and (vi) clearly sought to reform
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ISI. Element (v) can easily be seen to be related to structural change. 
There was no special ranking assigned to any of the elements.
There was another guideline for industry in the long term that 
was difficult to classify in terms of ISI, structural change, or whether 
it simply sought to make additions to the contribution of industry. 
But it certainly signalled a change in the existing pattern of 
industry. The guideline stressed that it was important to establish 
small-scale industries wherever possible, and it gave a hint of the 
reason why. Small-scale industries would offer technology 
commensurate to the level of productive forces in the economy, 
and were labour-intensive (a factor more conducive to employment 
creation in a 'labour-surplus' economy).
The Second Five Year Plan spelled out the actual industrial 
projects to be established in the five years 1969-1974. The projects 
were classified according to the International Standard Industrial 
classification (ISIC), and the aims to be achieved in each grouping of 
industrial projects differed according to the two-digit classification of 
this system as follows:
(a) The food, beverages and tobacco division. A quarter of the 
proposed 385 industrial projects were to be established in this 
division. The aims to be achieved here were clearly stated as being 
import substitution - an increase in the production of consumer 
goods already being locally manufactured, particularly in grain 
milling, sugar refining, oil milling, tobacco processing, brewing, and 
in bakeries.
(b) The textile, wearing apparel and leather division. Here is was felt 
that sufficient expansion had been achieved; the programme 
therefore sought to increase the degree of sophistication in
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production and the utilization of capacity. 51 projects were 
envisaged in this division, more than 1/8 of the total.
(c) The wood and wood products division. The aim here was to 
develop a large-scale production of fibreboard and plywood.
(d) The paper and paper products division. The aim in this division 
was the large-scale production of pulp and paper, but it is important 
to note that the Second Plan was only putting it on the agenda 
while making it clear that it did not expect implementation to take 
place until the Third Plan.
(e) The division of chemicals and chemical, petroleum, coal, rubber 
and plastic products. This is the division comprising the most 
important of intermediate goods. In the manufacture of chemicals, 
the government saw a possibility of a 'mushrooming' of chemical 
plants in the future, and therefore sought to forestall over-capacity 
by committing itself to the creation of a co-ordinating medium for 
chemical and allied industries. Significant projects in the division 
comprised the large scale fertilizer and tyre factories (whose initial 
planning preceded the Second Plan), and some medium-scale soap 
and detergent factories.
(f) The non-metallic mineral products division. The aim here was to 
expand the existing capacity of the cement industry.
(g) The basic metals division. The essence of basic industries, this 
division is made up of the production of iron and steel as well as 
non-ferrous metals. The Second Plan did not set out to establish any 
specific plant in this division in the five year duration. It 
committed itself merely to the investigation of the possibilities of 
producing iron ore, creating an iron and steel industry, and 
establishing the steel-rolling mill that we mentioned earlier.
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(h) The fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment 
division. Here the Second Plan aimed at end-of-line assembly, parts 
manufacture, and electrical appliances manufacture, but this was to 
be simple, small- scale and experimental. The aim, in the words of 
the plan, was limited to the creation of technical know-how for the 
future (Tanzania Govt., 1969a: 71-72).
Although the broad aims of the industry section of the Second 
Plan contained much that could have brought about a radical 
alteration of the pattern and structure of industry, it can be seen 
from the formulation of the actual industrial projects that the 
implementation of those aims was not a top priority and was 
unlikely to be strictly pursued. This is because the nature of the 
projects chosen reflected the dominance of the manufacture of 
consumer goods, and of import substitution, i.e. the continuation of 
the existing nature of industry. Table 3 gives an indication of this. 
For example, whereas the expectation of the plan was that metal 
products, machinery and equipment would constitute 20% of all 
industrial projects, only 8.2% of investment would be spent on 
these.
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Table 3: INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS IN THE SECOND PLAN 1969-74.
Industry No.of % Investment %
projects sh.'000,000
Food, beverages and tobacco
Textile, apparel and leather
Wood and wood products, incl. furniture
Paper and paper products
Chemicals, incl. coal, petrol and plastics
Non-metal mineral products products
Basic metals
Metal products, machinery & equip. 
Other manufacturing
97 25.2 436 22.5
51 13.2 274 14.2
67 17.4 147 7.6
12 3.1 355 18.4
48 12.5 349 18
18 4.7 112 5.8
3 0.8 92 4.8
77 20.0 159 8.2
12 3.1 10 0.5
Total 385 100.0 1934 100.0
SOURCE: Tanzania Govt. (1969: 64).
Another important factor to consider in order to determine the 
industry thrust of the Second Plan was the method for evaluating 
the usefulness of a project to an economy. The plan laid down the 
criteria as being (i) the net foreign exchange impact of the project, 
(ii) its real net contribution to GDP, (iii) its budgetary impact, for 
example whether the loss of import duty revenues resulting from 
the domestic manufacture of a previously imported product was 
adequately offset by internal duties on the product, and (iv) its social 
and long-term economic impact. No specific social and long-term 
goals were mentioned here except that of promoting regional 
balance (later to be modified into regional growth poles), but the 
assumption was that these had been made clear by the Arusha 
Declaration and subsequent documents immediately following it. It 
can therefore be said that it was the spirit of Arusha which made a
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mention of the social and long-term economic criterion possible, 
and that only the public investment and the local management of 
industry that the declaration brought about permitted this criterion 
to assume any importance at all.
However, there were factors that would work against the social 
and long-term economic criterion. First the wording in the plan 
plainly showed that implementation did not demand strict 
compliance with this criterion. Secondly, to the extent that the 
meaning of this criterion was not yet as straightforward as the three 
financial criteria, it was likely that it would be ignored if a project 
satisfied the requirements of the latter. Thirdly by their training 
and experience in approving projects with economic benefits that 
are immediately tangible, the dominant evaluating group - the 
economic technocrats - were likely to have a bias for the other three. 
This is also one of the reasons why import-substitution was likely 
to continue being the dominant form of industrialization in 
Tanzania, and why a heavy bias against metal-working and other 
capital goods industries was likely.
The evidence in the Second Plan did not exhibit any special bias 
against industry as a whole, as might have been expected after the 
skepticism of the Arusha Declaration over this sector. Still, it can be 
said that the only potential supporters of an anti-dependence re­
orientation in industry (that is, the authors of the Arusha 
Declaration) were disinterested enough to leave most of the 
thinking on the sector to conventional economists. The latter were 
clearly interested in an increase in the value of industrial 
production, but not quite in structural changes within it. In short, 
there was enough support for industry to continue unharmed by 
Arusha, and no real support for changes within it. Thus while
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incorporating useful discussions on the importance of structural 
change, the industry section of the Second Plan still left 
comprehensive strategic planning of industrialization to the future.
6.4.2 The characteristics of actual industrial expansion following the 
Second Five Year Plan
Although the Second Plan formally ended in 1974, the Third Five 
Year Plan did not start until 1976, and the industrial policy direction 
of the latter was not put into practice until 1978. This means that in 
general the philosophy of the Second Plan guided industrial 
expansion up to 1978.
Actual industrial expansion in the 1969-78 period was 
concentrated in ISIC divisions 31 (food, beverages and tobacco) and 
32 (textiles, apparel and leather). Efforts tended to concentrate on 
the expansion of capacity at existing plant sites rather than the 
creation of new industrial establishments, a notable exception being 
in the cashewnut industry. Significant additions included the 
expansion of Mwatex's capacity from 24,000,000 linear metres per 
annum to about 43,000,000, at a cost of approximately sh. 
314,000,000. Urafiki's capacity was expanded from 24,000,000 metres 
to 33,000,000. Notable new establishments included the 
construction of seven cashewnut factories, which raised the total 
capacity from the original 12,500 tons of raw nuts per year at 
TANITA 1 to 60,500 per annum.
Expansion in the metal-based industries, beginning in 1975, was 
significant enough to raise their share in both industrial 
employment and output, as Appendix 4 indicates. An important 
process that was added to these industries was billet casting (from 
locally-procured scrap iron) at Aluminium Africa Limited, which
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eased the dependence of the steel rolling mill on imports. The 
m anufacture of spare parts at M ang'ula and by the N ational 
Engineering Com pany in Dar-es-Salaam was also an im portant 
addition. The bulk of the expansion, however, was in motor repair 
and assembly.
Another feature of the capacity expansion in the period was the 
increase in the value-added processing of exports. This d id  not 
result in any significant boosting of the share of industrial exports 
in total exports - largely a function of output shortfalls in the entire 
sector which we shall consider later - except in 1974 w hen 
'processed m aterial' and petroleum  re-exports raised this share 
above 10% for the first time (Tanzania Govt., 1982e: 30; Bank of 
Tanzania, 1982: 52).
6.4.3. The long-term Basic Industry Strategy (BIS)
As promised, the drafting of the long-term industrial strategy was 
begun by experts at the M inistry of Development Planning and 
Economic affairs soon after the draw ing up of the Second Plan. 
Throughout the drafting stage, it was clear that the envisaged 
industrial base of the country would be built around the basic metal 
industries (especially iron and steel) and the m etal-w orking 
industries (i.e. ISIC division 38 comprising the m anufacture of 
fabricated m etal products, m achinery and equipm ent). These 
would be closely supported by other capital and intermediate goods 
industries (Tanzania Govt., 1975a: 2; 1977: 69). In this sense the 
stra tegy  was consistent w ith an outlook which stresses the 
im portance of industrialization in general, and the capital goods 
sector in particular (Dobb, 1963). However, the final version stated 
that whereas capital and interm ediate goods industries were the
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driving force in the intensification and structural reorientation of 
all industries, the production of basic consumer goods was equally 
important when overall development was considered. It was for 
this reason that the term 'Basic Industry Strategy (BIS)' was given to 
the long-term industrial strategy.
The numerous study papers and drafts at the Ministry of 
Planning and Economic Affairs indicate that some of the most 
important contributors to the actual programmes of the strategy 
included Roemer (1972; 1973; 1974), Tidrick (1973a; 1973b; 1973c), 
Williams (1973), and Ngumbullu (1973). These were among those 
assigned the responsibility of drawing up plans for each of the most 
important branches of industry. Thomas (1974) was an early 
inspiration to academics and planners in Tanzania in the quest for a 
restructuring of industry. This was due to his well argued and now 
familiar suggestion that independent industrialization was possible 
in 'small economies' provided a 'basic materials sector' was 
identified and established, and that early competitiveness and 
existing demand patterns were not always the most important 
criteria for successful industrialization. But the person who was 
most influential in the shaping of BIS as it is textually understood 
in Tanzania was Justinian Rweyemamu, a theorist of 
industrialization since the early 1970s (Rweyemamu, 1971, 1973).
Rweyemamu was part of a group of theorists of dependence and 
underdevelopment at the University of Dar-es-Salaam, where he 
was Professor of Economics in the early 1970s. He evolved his most 
definitive ideas on industrialization when the most influential of 
his debating colleagues had only a cursory concern for 
industrialization and growth, and when issues of class struggle, 
social equity and imperialism were paramount, as can be seen in
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the works of Shivji (1970), Rodney (1972) and Cliffe and Saul (1972; 
1973). Later, as Principal Secretary to the Ministry of Planning and 
Development Affairs, he was in charge of the formulation of the 
Third Five Year Plan and the Long-term Industrial Strategy (or the 
BIS) at a time when the authors of Arusha were sometimes posing 
agricultural development as if it was an alternative to 
industrialization, and when pro-industry experts were concerned 
merely with immediate and optimal returns in each industrial 
establishment.
Rweyemamu's ideas were not novel, but he was virtually alone 
in consistently arguing for industrialization and the centrality of 
capital goods in a restructured future Tanzanian industry 
(Rweyemamu, 1973: 73, 167; 1976: 5). Records at the ministry show 
clearly that on many occasions he launched desperate appeals to his 
peers in government and other political circles not to ignore his 
kind of thinking.
6.4.4 The contents of Tanzania's BIS
The BIS covers the twenty-year period 1975-1995. Its importance 
and the degree of commitment to it by the government in the years 
1975-81 were emphasized by its status as the source of the industry 
section of the Third Five Year Plan (1976-81), its incorporation into 
the Long-Term (Development) Perspective Plan (1981-2000), and the 
detailed references to it in other government statements on 
industry in the period (Msuya, 1978; Tanzania Govt., 1979b). Its 
broad goals are structural change and self reliance in both industry 
and, by extension, the economy at large (Tanzania Govt., 1975a: 1). 
Structural change was defined not merely in the familiar terms of 
an increase of the share of capital and intermediate goods in total 
manufacture, but also in terms of the development of Tanzanian
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resources to meet Tanzanian needs (Tanzania Govt., 1974b: 2; 1975a 
: 1). The latter aspect of the definition, which the authors of BIS 
intended to be the axiom of implementation, is an indicator of the 
input from Thomas (1974) who advocated the need for creating 'a 
convergence between domestic resource use and domestic demand', 
and 'between final demand and material needs'. Table 4 indicates 
the extent of structural changes that were expected to occur within 
industry in twenty years from the launching of the programme, and 
Table 5 shows some aspects of the expected home-market 
orientation of industrial production resulting from the BIS.
Table 4: FORECASTS OF STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN INDUSTRY 1975-95
Share (%) of Value Added by: 1970 1974 1980 1995
a) Food, beverages, tobacco 40.0 32.0 29.1 21.2
b) Textiles and leather 25.0 21.0 21.5 18.7
c) Wood and products 12.0 11.5 10.6 9.9
d) Chemicals 10.0 16.2 18.0 16.3
e) Non-metal minerals 3.0 4.0 6.0 3.6
f) Metals and products 10.0 15.3 14.8 30.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
SOURCE: Tanzania Govt. (1974b:5; 1976:44).
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Table 5: FORECASTSOF THE DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL ORIENTATION OF 
INDUSTRY:
Share (%) of Value Added by: 1970 1974 1980 1995
a) Manufactured exports 10.0 4.3 5.9 2.4
b) Domestic goods made largely
from imported inputs 45.0 48.5 45.8 14.8
c) Domestic goods made largely
from local inputs 45.0 47.2 48.3 82.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
SOURCE: Tanzania Govt. (1974b:5; 1976:44).
The strategy specifies the basic industries in the Tanzanian 
context as being the metal-working industries (perceived as the 
most important), iron and steel, cotton textiles, leather, chemical, 
food processing, beverages, paper, wood products, sisal and non- 
metal mineral industries, particularly cement and other 
construction materials (Tanzanian Govt., 1976: 44-45, 48). The
products of these industries are either used as inputs into the 
production of goods in other industries or are final items that are 
basic to consumers. What is particularly noteworthy in this list is 
the inclusion of sisal. Since it is not a basic industry as such, it 
qualified for inclusion in the twenty-year programme of 
industrialization on other grounds, as we shall soon see.
The programme of action of the BIS in the twenty-year period, 
adapted from several slightly varying versions (Tanzania Govt., 
1974b: 3; 1975a: 1; Msuya, 1978: 2; Tanzania Govt., 1979b: 3; Mramba, 
1982: 7), is:
(i)To expand and consolidate those industries which meet the basic 
needs of the people, namely food processing, textiles and footwear
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m anufacture, the m anufacture of final building items, and the 
m anufacture of inputs into the basic services of health, education 
and water supply.
(ii) To estab lish  m etal-w ork ing  in d u strie s  and engineering  
workshops for the m anufacture of machine parts/com ponents, 
spare parts and machine tools for the purpose of enhancing the 
country's technological capacity, expanding the internal market for 
steel products and creating a substantial forward linkage for a future 
iron and steel industry.
(iii) To establish basic metal industries, especially iron and steel, as 
well as an interm ediate goods branch of industry, particularly in 
chemicals and fabricated metal construction materials.
(iv) To expand and intensify agro-industries and other prim ary 
processing, mainly in order to earn a greater export income.
(v) To increase scientific, technical and technological knowledge 
through the expansion of industrial workers' training and the 
establishm ent of specialized centres of industrial services and 
technology.
(vi) To expand small-scale and establish medium-scale industries in 
rural areas with a view to locating a portion of the manufacture of 
basic consumer goods where most consumers reside, promoting a 
country-wide distribution of industries and income, and promoting 
appropriate technology.
(vii) To devote optim al efforts to using domestic resources as 
alternatives to imported inputs into manufacture.
(viii) To increase technical and industria l co-operation w ith 
neighbouring countries and in ternational institutions so as to 
enhance the development of an industrial economy.
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6.4.5 The rationale for the BIS
Let us look at the justification, and other background 
considerations, for the choice of this programme.
(a) The choice of industrial activity
The consumer goods industries that meet the basic needs and 
demands of the people were of course nearly an automatic choice, 
in a country which had professed people-oriented development for 
some time. But the choice also indicates that the government was 
not prepared for a 'wholesale' interference with current consumer 
preferences which the pursuit of a restructuring may sometimes 
imply (Tanzania Govt., 1974a). In addition this group of industries 
in general remained easier to establish and more profitable to run, 
due to the existence of an established market for its products and its 
relatively lighter investment. The requirement of maintaining a 
routine operation of industry and normalcy in the economy while a 
restructuring took place thus dictated that these industries be given 
an important place in the programme.
The basic metal and metal-working industries form the core of 
the 'basic materials' or 'basic industries' sector in any industrialized 
country (Dobb, 1963; Thomas, 1974; Rweyemamu, 1976; Luttrell, 
1982). In Tanzania, the choice of iron and steel as a basic industry 
was regarded as self-evident from the fact that its products are the 
most used in the physical structures, tools and equipment that 
support modern life. However, the metal-working industrial 
'sector' was considered to be the most important, and the reasons for 
this were listed as follows.
-It is the most basic industry of all because it provides capital goods, 
especially machinery, and many other goods used in all other
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industries. In addition it has a higher linkage effect than any other 
industry.
-It has one of the highest concentrations of technological know-how, 
and as such its development is crucial in breaking out of 
dependence on the technological front.
-Because it is the best 'laboratory' for technological innovation it is 
better suited to the adaptation of technology to concrete conditions. 
It makes more sense to talk of appropriate technology in Tanzania 
along with an extensive development of this sector.
-It is the greatest user of products of the iron and steel basic 
industry.
The picture of basic industries was completed by the addition of 
the chemical group of industries in the 'intermediate' sector, which 
as a rule has an extremely high linkage effect (Rweyemamu, 1976: 8).
We have already noted the inclusion of agricultural processing, 
represented by the processing of sisal exports. This activity does not 
qualify as a basic industry because its linkage effect is very small and 
it does not cater for the basic needs of consumers in Tanzania. But 
its inclusion in the programme is interesting because it represents 
simultaneously a genuine support for BIS and an opposition to it by 
differing opinion groups within the government. The export 
processing activity became a major issue in early 1974 when the 
committee charged with the preparation of the strategy was 
presented with what appeared to be a finalized industrial 
investment programme for the Third Five Year Plan (itself the first 
phase of the twenty-year strategy). The programme was notable for 
its heavy reliance on the processing of raw materials, especially for 
export. The economic committee of the cabinet had already 
approved the programme, although it had not yet allocated any
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funds to some of the projects. The main sponsors and supporters of 
the programme within the government were the officials of the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MinCom). This reflected their 
reluctance to abandon the previous industrial direction which they 
had overseen for many years and had become familiar with, as well 
as reflecting the 'trade-push' influence of the commerce division in 
the ministry. Those closely associated with the preparation of BIS, 
mostly from the Ministry of Development Planning and Economic 
Affairs (DevPlan), were opposed to the 'strategic concept underlying 
that particular programme'.
MinCom urged that the investment programme approved by the 
cabinet be adopted and accorded top priority, arguing that Tanzania 
should process as much of its own raw materials as possible. This, 
the argument went, should increase the value-added content of the 
materials, earn additional foreign exchange, increase employment, 
and change colonial patterns of trade in which Tanzania exported 
raw materials for processing elsewhere. The last-mentioned 
objective, implying the need to base industrialization on local 
resources, was acceptable to all. But those drafting the BIS appeared 
to doubt MinCom's long-term commitment to this, and therefore 
they responded as if MinCom’s real interest was the achievement of 
quick results and profitability. In this regard the supporters of the 
BIS demonstrated, first, through a cost-benefit analysis that 
Tanzania's comparative advantage in agricultural and other 
primary processing for export at that time was significant only in 
sisal and marginal in cotton. Then, arguing that restructuring and 
long-term considerations on industry were superior goals, they 
emphasized that the development of local resources (including 
processing) should be for the home market rather than for export,
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with the objective of reducing dependence not only on imported 
inputs but also on external markets.
In their zeal to combat export-led industrialization, supporters of 
the BIS may have appeared to lose sight of the tactical importance of 
the foreign exchange value of export-processing industries. Some, 
however, had been mindful of this, acknowledging it as an 
inevitable modification of BIS to be introduced into the programme 
(Rweyemamu, 1976).
The final version retained the possibility of an interpretation of 
BIS in which the processing of Tanzanian raw materials (including 
export-processing) was regarded as a constituent part of its 
definition. This could come about because the status of export­
processing in general remained unclear and therefore open to 
different interpretations, but also because one of the industries in 
this area - sisal processing - was designated a basic industry, thus 
offering a basis for regarding all export-processing in the same way 
by those with that inclination. In the subsequent publication of the 
programme, export-processing was on occasion presented as if it was 
a basic industrial activity that qualified for inclusion in the BIS 
independently (Msuya, 1978).
The general observation here is that the low-linkage, export- 
dominated sisal industry should not have been given the status of a 
basic industry, its significant role as a foreign exchange earner in the 
early years of BIS notwithstanding. The inclusion of activities of 
this nature in a programme of the BIS should have been clearly 
stated, that it was a necessary accommodation to existing economic 
realities - a tactical rather than strategic measure. In view of the 
potential of export-processing to 'eclipse' the real basic industries 
through its ability to produce immediate returns and to earn
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foreign exchange, this should have been stressed at every 
opportunity.
(b) The choice of technique and scale of production
Another subject which attracted conflicting opinions during the 
formulation of the BIS was the choice of technique and scale of 
production. There was a strong advocacy of labour-intensive and 
small-scale industries, reflecting to an extent the people-oriented 
philosophy and more specifically the influence of the 'appropriate 
technology' concept that had gained currency in Tanzania in the 
1970s. Again MinCom was the sponsor and supporter of a 
commitment to promote small-scale industries during the twenty- 
year programme, urging that special resources be set aside for them. 
The formulators of BIS argued that small-scale industries had 
disadvantages in comparison with large-scale industries when 
product-by-product analysis was made. Small-scale industries could 
produce goods of comparative quality, and at similar efficiency 
levels in certain areas (for example garments). But all small-scale 
production, it was argued, was difficult to organize, and thus 
industries of that scale, as a general rule, took longer to establish, 
leading to an unnecessary cost to the country. Mostly they were not 
cost-efficient and their products were below acceptable levels of 
quality (Tanzania Govt., 1974a: 4). Their most positive side was that 
they were easy to locate away from the established industrial centres 
and therefore better suited to achieving the goal of spreading 
industry to other areas. Because of these factors the formulators of 
the BIS preferred that production and marketing opportunities be 
reserved for small-scale manufacturing only in those areas of 
industry in which they could compete reasonably well with large- 
scale operations. But since knowledge of such areas required a
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period of experimentation and gestation, in the meantime large- 
scale production should proceed even in the reserved areas to avoid 
delays. Later official elaborations, however, tended to veer away 
from the rationales and course of action explained here, towards an 
advocacy of small-scale industrial production as a way of avoiding 
dependence on external finance and foreign-based technology 
(Msuya, 1978).
In practice, decisions on which scale of production to adopt were 
likely to rest on three major considerations - the preference of the 
major financiers, the characteristics of technology in each type of 
production, and the financial costs and benefits involved. Of these, 
the latter was likely to be the central debating point, since 
participants in the debate still accepted it to be the ultimate arbiter 
in cases where all other factors proved to be controversial. Since on 
this criterion the dominant perception seemed to be that small-scale 
production was less beneficial than large-scale production, the latter 
was likely to prevail in spite of the preference of many of the 
authors of the Arusha Declaration and MinCom civil servants.
(c) The high profile of technical rationale for aspects of BIS
In those initial stages therefore, BIS supporters won the debate at 
the theoretical level against building the programme on primary 
processing for export, and against according priority and special 
protection to small-scale production. We can see that part of the 
reason for the acceptance of the BIS proposals on these issues lay in 
the fact that not only could those who saw change as the overriding 
goal - the authors of Arusha - relate to it, but the more 
technocratically-oriented also could. The use of technical criteria to 
argue the BIS case could win over the traditionally technocratic 
supporters of the 'maximum growth' strategy, since it virtually
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eliminated possible skepticism over it as merely the politicians' 
normative invention. This, in fact, was the hallmark of the entire 
programme.
There were other areas of discussion in which the BIS line was 
accepted on the basis of its superior technical arguments. For 
example, the programme showed that it was still committed to 
what had become, since Arusha, the traditional welfare and equity 
principles, but the mode of discourse on these during the 
preparation of BIS and its subsequent popularization was technical 
rather than normative. Thus it expressed the need for a 
regional/provincial dispersal of industry, as the industry section of 
the Second Plan had done previously, but unlike its predecessor, it 
took full cognizance of the difficulties involved in pursuing this 
goal with limited capital and inadequate infrastructure. In this 
regard the BIS classified industry according to two tiers. The first tier 
was that of national industries, comprising all large-scale 
establishments as well as some medium ones. The policy made it 
clear that these could not be expected to be established in every 
region, and therefore spreading them around the country would be 
limited to what were termed industrial growth zones, each 
comprised of several regions. The twenty Mainland regions were 
for this purpose divided into only six zones. The second tier of 
industries comprised medium and small establishments producing 
basic consumer goods for domestic consumption. The distribution 
of these among districts and even villages was possible due to their 
smaller capital outlays and easier adaptation to lower 
infrastructural levels. The rationale for the dispersal of industry 
that was stressed was that goods should be produced not too far 
from where they are consumed (Msuya, 1978: 4-5). This tended to
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highlight efficiency considerations (i.e. reduced transport costs) 
rather than purist concerns for welfare and equity.
The argument in support of BIS in regard to the issue of 
employment effect was accepted on the basis of a cost-benefit 
analysis, thus continuing the tendency to defend the programme on 
technical rather than political grounds. The fact that BIS was built 
around the production of machines, machine tools, machine parts, 
other engineering products, other equipment, chemicals, as well as 
iron and steel, all of which have a generally high capital-labour 
ratio, meant that the programme would create less employment 
than any of the more likely alternatives which excluded or 
minimized these activities, such as the production of basic 
consumer goods or the processing of exports. But studies in the 
preparatory stages of BIS indicated that the potential spin-off of its 
industrial activities was high, and that in the long term it would 
create more employment than the alternatives were capable of.
There was in the BIS a degree of sensitivity to consumer 
preferences that, to an extent, placated potential opposition from 
especially those who were averse to interference with accepted 
demand, which the restructuring of industrial production implied. 
This can be seen in what amounted to concessions by BIS 
supporters in the discussion on import levels of some basic goods. 
The programme allowed for levels of importation arising not from 
shortfalls in domestic production but from a desire to meet some of 
the consumers' current expectations. For example, although the 
demand for roofing materials could be fully met by local 
production, chiefly of clay tiles, which would be consistent with the 
goal of using locally-based inputs, a specified quota of the materials 
would be imported due to a general preference by consumers for
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(externally made) galvanized iron sheets. Also, nearly all shoes 
could be made locally, mainly due to the abundance of leather. But 
the leather industry in Tanzania was already small-scale in nature, 
and policy intentions were that it should stay that way. In addition, 
leather is by itself expensive. Both these factors make leather shoes 
dear. Thus, it would defeat the consumers' expectation to obtain 
cheap shoes if all demand was met by local production. Non­
leather shoes produced on a large scale elsewhere met the 
requirement of low cost and good quality, and therefore a portion of 
the market would be served by these. Similar allowances were 
made for imported synthetic fabrics into a market that could be fully 
catered for by textiles made from local cotton (Tanzania Govt., 
1974a: 7).5
The programme also committed itself to the completion of 
ongoing projects, mainly in order to guard against too much 
disruption of the economy when in fact some of it could be 
avoided. This showed a degree of flexibility and 'responsibility' to 
which those attached to the old structure of industry could relate.
Above all, the entire programme seemed to be quite viable on the 
'drawing board', as indeed were the newest and most expensive 
individual programmes of metal-working industries and iron and 
steel (Williams, 1973; Luttrell, 1980; TISCO, 1982a; TISCO, 1982b). 
6.4.6 The probable strength and weakness of the BIS in terms of its 
sustenance as a national programme
The above discussion has already pointed out the strength of the 
BIS. In summary this strength lies in the fact that this is the 
programme that more closely expresses a commitment to non­
dependent development while at the same time demonstrating, at 
least in the planning phase, that it is economically viable.
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How ever, there are two factors which are likely to throw  the 
program m e into  national d isfavour. The first is that the 
program m e's results and successes are pinned on the long term. In 
tim es of econom ic crises,w hen liqu id ity  and short term  
considerations tend to dom inate developm ent thinking, the 
wisdom of sustaining the commitment to such a programme could 
continually be questioned. The second, which is related to the first, 
is that some of the individual sections that constitute the new 
innovation and are considered to be the more im portant are quite 
expensive to fund. Even if the economy did not experience serious 
unforeseen economic difficulties and immediate financial benefits 
did not become a pervasive demand on industry, the funding of 
these areas would put so much strain on the funding levels of other 
areas that increasing opposition to it w ould be predictable as 
implementation advanced. Table 6 shows the cost estimates of the 
individual sections of the programme at the time of its preparation. 
Whereas it indicates, on the one hand, the commitment to the core 
aspects of the BIS by the allocation of large proportions of funding 
to iron and steel (23.1% of the total), and to the metal-working 
industries (16.7%), it at the same time indicates the heavy financial 
burden  the BIS could be, especially if unforeseen economic 
difficulties p reven ted  the core elem ents from generating the 
expected new industrial activity.
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Table 6: PROJECTED INVESTMENT ALLOCATIONS IN THE BIS 1975-1995 (Sh. 
’000,000)
Industrial Investment in Five-Year Periods Ending in:
1980 1985 1990 1995 '75-'95 %
Food, beverages
and tobacco... 410 180 702 914 2206 16.4
Textiles and Apparel
(home production)... 266 331 362 423 1382 10.3
Textiles (exports)... 150 - 50 - 200 1.5
Leather and
Leather footwear... 59 40 30 63 192 1.4
Wood and paper
products; printing... 176 568 292 628 1664 12.4
Chemicals and
their products... 144 45 258 1186 1633 12.2
Glass and Cement... 153 141 260 252 806 6.0
Metal working... 269 400 603 970 2242 16.7
Iron and Steel... 265 900 964 964 3093 23.1
Total 1892 2605 3521 5400 13418 100.0
SOURCE: Tanzania Govt. (1974b: 4).
6.4.7 Comparison in funding between the BIS and the ’maximum 
growth’ strategy
It is useful to look at the contrast between the BIS and what could 
have been the alternative long-term  program m e of 
industrialization in Tanzania - what has come to be known, in the 
literature on the Tanzania economy, as the 'maximum growth' 
strategy (Tanzania Govt., 1974a; 1974b; 1975a). The funding 
allocations of the latter to the various divisions of industrial 
activity were at face value somewhat similar to those of the BIS. 
The allocations would in fact have been the same in both strategies
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except in food, beverages and tobacco; textiles, apparel and leather; 
and iron and steel. Although the 'maximum growth' strategy 
would have reduced the allocation to food, beverages and tobacco by 
a small amount (about 0.4% of the total), it would have allocated an 
additional amount (equal to 4.8% of the total) to cashew nut 
processing - an export industry.6 In the textiles, apparel and leather 
division, the 'maximum growth' strategy would have allocated a 
large proportion specifically to export textiles - 18.8% of the total 
compared to 1.5% in the BIS. Also, in the same division, it would 
have allocated additional amounts equal to 2.6% of the total to sisal 
spinning, and 0.7% to leather tanning -both being export industries 
at that time. All together these additional allocations were roughly 
equal to the proportion allocated to Iron and Steel in the BIS, and it 
was this industry which the 'maximum growth' strategy left out of 
its programme.
It is interesting to note that the 'maximum growth’ strategy 
would have allocated the same proportion (16.7% of the total) to 
metal-working as the BIS did. Yet without the development of an 
iron and steel industry this sector would have had to depend on the 
importation of inputs throughout the twenty-year programme. 
Presumably this would have been partly sustained by the export 
revenues of the investment in textile and other value-added 
exports. The probable effect of this would have been to help deny 
an independent home-base for the metal-working industries, with 
ramifications on the entire industrial sector.7 What is clear is that
the 'maximum growth' alternative was less oriented towards home 
production, and it was not as committed to the creation of a capital 
goods branch of industry as the BIS was.8
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6.4.8 Project priorities and the funding of industrialization in the 
early phase of the BIS
The list of basic industries in the twenty-year programme did not 
by itself give adequate indication of the areas of investment on 
which the government would concentrate in the early phase. It was 
the industry section of the Third Plan - the first phase of BIS - that 
spelt out such priority. The basic industries to be established in that 
phase were metal- working, chemicals and paper and pulp.9 It was 
made clear that top priority went to the establishment of metal­
working industries (Tanzania Govt., 1976: 45, 48; Msuya, 1978), and 
the task was assigned to the most important and experienced 
industrial corporation in the country, the National Development 
Corporation (NDC).
As implied by the entire programme, the rationale for making 
the metal-working industries the priority in the first phase of the 
BIS included the need to construct a metal-utilizing infrastructure 
for a national iron and steel industry, and to create a technological 
pool for other industries (Msuya, 1978: 3). In relation to this, there 
were to be priorities within the metal-working division itself, with 
the Third Five Year Plan expected to concentrate on the 
manufacture of spare parts and the upgrading of existing 
engineering firms into industrial workshops (Msuya, 1978: 4). Other 
stages, in sequence, were to be the establishment of machine tool 
industries, the manufacture of simple machines or parts of complex 
machines, and, finally, the manufacture of machines. It was 
possible that some of these would be undertaken in the Third Five 
Year Plan, but they were expected to fall under subsequent plans. 
The markets that these metal-working industries were expected to 
serve were also ranked according to policy priorities, with the first
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phase of the BIS concentrating on agriculture and other rural 
aspects of development (Msuya, 1978: 4).
6.5 The nature of industrial expansion after the inauguration of the 
Basic Industry Strategy
one expects food processing and textile industries to continue 
dominating available industrial capacity for some time, despite the 
gain by other divisions. As these industries provide the basic 
necessities of life, their expansion tends to correspond to the rate of 
population growth (which in Tanzania has averaged 2.7% 
annually). Even when a drastic re-orientation of industry is 
undertaken, say with a heavy bias towards metals, metal-working 
and chemical industries, it may still be necessary to expand capacity 
in the food and textile industries, as the BIS itself stipulates. This is 
in fact what happened after the launching of the BIS; investment in 
food processing and textiles continued to be high This is indicated 
by Appendix 3, which shows the amount of investment and the 
number of projects licensed in the 1976-82 period for each industrial 
division. The largest share of investment (26.88%) wTas taken by 
textiles. The bulk of that investment in textiles was in the large- 
scale integrated Musoma Textiles Limited (Mutex).
The share of textiles indicated here was commensurate with its 
planned share in the long-term industrial strategy, but appears 
excessive in terms of the priorities of the industry section of the 
Third Five Year Plan. However, this did not disadvantage the 
metal-working, chemical and paper and pulp industries, which 
were the special focus of the plan. Of these three, the policy for the 
establishment of metal-working industries was the most closely 
adhered to. Appendix 3 further indicates that a high level of
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investment (19.12% of the total) was maintained in these industries 
in 1976-82. As indicated by Appendix 4, levels of employment in 
the combined metals and metal-working industries had a rising 
share of total employment in the period. Even output levels 
indicate the increasing significance of such industries, but the 
employment factor is a better supplement to the investment 
criterion in determining the extent of capacity expansion, since it 
remained unaffected even by severe economic downturns. This is 
because up to the early 1980s labour laws in Tanzania were such 
that it was next to impossible to lay off workers.
Notable metal-working enterprises that were newly-established 
included various foundries; several manufacturers of electrical 
goods and accessories, the most important of which (TANELEC) is 
in Arusha; the production of machine tools such as lathes, grinding 
machines and wood working machines in Moshi; and the 
manufacture of farm implements in Mbeya and Mwanza. In the 
1978-83 period, the NDC initiated twenty metal-working projects, 
with costs of individual projects ranging from sh. 33,000,000 to 
370,000,000 and totalling sh. 2,553,000,000 altogether.
In the chemical industries the projects under implementation in 
the period included a factory for the liquefaction of a naturally- 
occurring carbon dioxide at Kyejo-Tukuyu (important to the 
production of beverages and the preservation of processed food). 
The largest project in the division, however, was the attempt to 
produce ammonia and urea from natural gas reserves at Songo 
Songo, to be used in the manufacture of fertilizers.
An extremely large and expensive paper and pulp plant was being 
constructed at Mufindi in the Southern Highlands. It had a capacity 
to produce 60,000 tons of paper annually (which matched projected
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total dom estic demand to 1985), and was built at a cost of sh. 
3,000,000,000.
It is clear then, that in terms of the creation of capacity, the 
priorities and sequencing of industrialization as laid down by the 
industry section of the Third Five Year Plan, the first phase of the 
BIS, w ere being im plem ented as planned. In general the 
investment in the capital goods branch of industry, the mainstay of 
which are metals and the bulk of the metal-working industries, was 
rising. Regarding the iron and steel industry in particular, a 
decision had already been made to exploit the iron ore at Liganga in 
the Southern Highlands. However, more feasibility studies were 
still being conducted, and there seemed to be problems in getting 
funds (expected to come mainly from external sources) for this 
particular industry. Meanwhile substantial expansion was being 
undertaken  in the traditional metal industries, especially at 
Alum inium  Africa and the steel rolling mill (where a billet casting 
project to provide the mill with a backward linkage in the same 
premises was underway). The dominance of metal-based imports 
from 1978, shown especially by columns 2-5 in Appendix 5, is to an 
extent a reflection of the rising share of metal-based industries in 
in d u stria l capacity expansion in the period follow ing the 
inauguration of the BIS.
Regarding the propensity of industrial production to move 
tow ards a predom inance of processing for export, it seems that 
efforts in the period generally kept in line with the BIS guidelines, 
nam ely to guard against a proliferation of investm ent in such 
activities (though it seems that another reason for the lack of 
growth in export processing was the depressed markets for both 
cashew kernels and sisal products in the period). Similarly, it
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appears that the share of industrial exports in the total would have 
more or less stabilized at existing levels, indicating a desire to serve 
the home market first, except that in 1979 and 1980 that share rose 
dramatically (from 8.5% previously to over 18%). Appendix 6 
shows this. The explanation for it is that following the war with 
Amin's Uganda (which had depleted the foreign reserves) a 
temporary policy of 'everything for export' was put into effect, both 
in order to earn foreign currency and to help rehabilitate the 
Ugandan economy.
Finally, regarding the import-dependence of industries in terms 
of inputs, searches for ways of minimizing imported inputs and the 
utilization of local raw materials now became widespread. We 
have already mentioned the switch by TFC from imported 
phosphates to Minjingu phosphates. The steel rolling mill was 
already utilizing billets cast from scrap iron by Aluminium Africa. 
The General Tyre plant in Arusha had started its own rubber 
plantation. The major textile mills, Urafiki and Mwatex, had 
created foundries in order to manufacture their own light spare 
parts; Mwatex's expansion after 1975 was expressly labour-intensive 
with the view to reducing import-dependence. At the gigantic 
Southern Paper Mills (SPM) a pine forest to provide raw materials 
had been prepared for many years, and it is also worth noting that 
the production of some of its chemical inputs - caustic soda and 
chlorine - on site was envisaged in the plan. The future production 
of surphuric acid on a large scale in Tanzania, for use by SPM, TFC 
and others, was then being considered seriously in planning 
circles.io
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6.6 The performance of industry in the 1965-81 period 
6.6.1 Characteristics of output
In the independence era, industrial output experienced its 
greatest growth in 1966, when the annual rate was 15%. This 
matched the exceptional growth of industrial capacity that was 
clustered around 1965-66. Between 1965 and 1973 industrial output 
grew steadily, averaging a rate of 8.9% annually in real terms. In 
comparison, the growth rates of the total GDP and of agriculture 
were, respectively, 5.4% and 3.9% in the same period. This enabled 
industry to raise its share in the total GDP from 7.7% to around 
10%, as Appendix 8 indicates.
The growth in output was sluggish in 1974 and 1975, causing the 
annual growth rate in real terms to drop to 1.3% and 0.3% 
respectively. The share of industrial production in the total also 
dropped to around 9%. Industrial performance picked up again in 
1976 and 1977, with the growth rate averaging 11.4% and the share 
of industry in the total reaching 10.4%. The rate of growth in 
industrial output declined dramatically from 1978 onwards, until it 
reached -39.4% in real terms in 1981. In that year the contribution 
of industry to total GDP was only 5.8% at 1966 prices. The average 
annual rate of growth of industrial production in the 1974-81 period 
was -5.2%. In comparison, that of total GDP was 3.1%, and of 
agriculture 2.1% (Tanzania Govt., 1975b: 6-9; 1982a: 8-11).
6.6.2. Explanations of decline
The major explanation for the decline in industrial output 
around 1974-75 and then between 1978 and 1981 was the increasing 
unavailability of inputs resulting from a severe shortage of foreign 
exchange. This shortage was in turn related to the performance of
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the agricultural sector, which is the source of the bulk of foreign 
exchange.
(a) The 1974-75 decline
Due to drought in 1974, agricultural output declined. This 
lowered both the procured and export volume of most export crops 
in the 1974-75 season, and, except for coffee, in the 1975-76 seasons, 
as Appendices 9-13 indicate. This was translated into a decline in 
total export earnings in 1975 (shown by the second column of 
Appendix 6). It also resulted in a shortage of food, thus 
necessitating massive food imports, as the food import bill for the 
years 1974 and 1975 in Appendix 5 indicates. At the same time the 
oil crisis had started, with the fuel bill increasing more quickly since 
1974. This is also indicated by Appendix 5. These factors in 
combination greatly reduced the foreign reserves, necessitating a cut 
in imports that extended beyond 'luxuries' such as cars, to items 
that are necessary for a reasonable performance of the economy. It 
goes without saying that such import restriction affected industry 
more than any other sector, since it is the most import-dependent. 
This is what caused the lowered output. It is worth noting here that 
a prolonged import restriction of industrial inputs, leading to a 
semi-permanent under-utilization of capacity ultimately affects the 
entire economy by reducing its services to the productive and 
infrastructural sectors. A shortage of agricultural bags at a critical 
time of the season can lead to massive crop losses. Shortfalls in the 
industrial production of tyres and refined petroleum products can 
cripple the agricultural and transport sectors in a very short time. 
Each of the important sectors can then become both the cause and 
the victim of the other's declining performance in a cyclic fashion.
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However, certain factors soon reduced the gravity of the crisis 
induced by the 1974-75 agricultural decline. First, foreign aid was 
stepped up (as indicated by the total aid inflow for 1975 in Appendix 
21 A). Secondly, the drought subsided. Thirdly, as soon as the 
decline was recognized, government applied persistent pressure on 
peasant farmers to expand acreage generally and to increase the 
output of drought-resistant food crops, and on wage earners to 
spend their spare time cultivating.il The result was an increase in 
export crops and food production. Appendices 9,10,12, and 13 give 
some indication of the increase in relation to export crops. The 
food procurement statistics of the National Milling Corporation 
(NMC) - a proxy for food production levels - also indicate this 
increase in the 1976/77 and 1977/78 seasons (Tanzania Govt., 1982a: 
75). In addition, in 1976 and 1977 each of the major export crops 
except sisal (i.e. coffee, cotton, cashewnuts, tobacco and tea) 
experienced a favourable shift in its world market price. This is 
indicated by the trends in world price or the selling price of the 
relevant crop authorities in Appendices 9-13, and the improvement 
in the terms of trade which had been declining since 1967. This 
improvement in the terms of trade is partly the reason for the 1976- 
77 increase in the value of coffee, cotton, tobacco and tea (Tanzania 
Govt., 1982a: 21, 25) as well as the increase in the overall value of 
exports for that period, indicated by Appendix 6. Among the export 
crops whose world price rose, only cashewnuts did not register a 
higher export value in the period, the reason being that both its 
procurement and export levels continued to decline.
The increase in aid and the improvement in agricultural export 
production and trade solved the liquidity problem for Tanzania so 
well that it found itself with what was thought by the government
268
and some international economic experts to be an 'excessive' 
amount of foreign reserves (Payer, 1982: 9). The amount certainly 
registered the highest half-yearly rate of growth (75%) and reached 
an all time high in June, 1977 (Bank of Tanzania, 1981: 39). The 
greater availability of foreign exchange was the major factor directly 
associated with industry's recovery in 1976 and 1977.
At the end of 1977 import liberalization was allowed by the 
government, on the advice of the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) - both of which contributed a substantial 
share of aid in the period. The liberalization took the form of 
issuing open licences to importers (including private traders). In 
this way it dismantled the existing 'confinee' system in which only 
about six parastatal corporations had decided on and prepared lists 
of imports needed by the economy (Payer, 1982: 9-ll).i2
The intention of the liberalization was to facilitate the 
importation of industrial inputs. In theory the facility for an easier 
importation of these and other essential items could have been 
created merely by identifying them and confining the 
'liberalization' to these. The significance of this can be seen in the 
fact that by making the liberalization general, a lot of unproductive 
and inessential imports - for example expensive wines and 
silverware - were also brought in, with serious foreign exchange 
consequences in the subsequent period.
(b) The 1978-81 decline
Tanzania's terms of trade resumed the downward trend in 1978 
and continued that way for the rest of the period covered here. The 
trend was punctuated by a particularly steep drop in the price of 
coffee, Tanzania's leading foreign exchange earner since 1975. This
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was accompanied by other factors that were negative to the 
economy in 1978 and 1979.
1978 and 1979 were the years in which the Uganda War was 
conducted. It was reported by Keesing's Contemporary Archives in 
September, 1979 to have cost Tanzania more than sh. 2,065,000,000. 
Meanwhile, the East African Community had just broken up, 
leaving the government of partner states, including Tanzania, with 
the liabilities of the former East African corporations at a critical 
time.
As the world economic situation deteriorated at the end of the 
period, interest rates on foreign debts rose, but this was somewhat 
modified by the conversion of some Tanzanian debts into grants, 
especially by the Scandinavian countries.
The period also experienced the second round of the rise in oil 
prices. Petroleum imports had already become extremely 
burdensome. For example, in 1973 the 810,970 tons of crude oil that 
were imported cost sh. 133,600,000, but in 1977 the reduced volume 
of 670,398 tons cost sh. 552,200,000 (Green, et al, 1980: Table All). In 
the 1978-81 period the oil crisis became even worse. It can be 
recalled that 1979 was the year in which the Organization for 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) raised the price of oil from 
US$ 13 to 30. The greater increase in the fuel bill in 1979 and 1980 
shown by Appendix 5 is a reflection of that price rise. The rise is 
also reflected in the figures presented in Appendix 7, which show 
the fuel item making up 22.87% of the import bill and equalling 
56.57% of the export receipts in 1980.
The combination of all the factors mentioned above, including 
the generalization of import liberalization, once again resulted in 
the depletion of foreign reserves, which plummeted from sh.
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2,390,200,000 at the end of 1977 to sh. 224,300,000 at the end of 1978, 
recovering later in the period to be sh. 853,800,000 at the end of 1981 
(Bank of Tanzania, 1981: 39). Industry was once again starved of 
essential inputs, and this continued through to 1983. It is indicated 
by the dismal amount of foreign exchange allocated to industries, in 
relation to their requests, as highlighted by Table 7.
Table 7: FOREIGN EXCHANGE ALLOCATION TO MANUFACTURING 
(Sh ’000,000)
Industr. Raw Material Machinery and spares
Year Request Actual % Request Actual %
1977 2649.6 1574.5 59 362.1 106.2 29
1978 4158.1 2138.1 51 532.8 154.8 36
1979 6092.0 1339.3 22 481.4 55.7 12
1980 7855.0 1960.0 25 690.0 55.0 8
1981 10000.0 600.0 6 900.0 45.0 5
SOURCE: TISCO (1980:13)
The lack of essential inputs was also represented in the under­
utilization of industrial capacity, which is indicated by Table 8 for 
selected industries in 1979 and 1980.
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Table 8: CAPACITY UTILISATION IN TANZANIA'S INDUSTRIES
Product 1979 1980
Fertilizers 37.4 61.3
Petrol 62.5 75.4
Soap 81.1 -
Paints 78.3 42.9
Tyres and tubes 63.3 80.3
Sugar 64.9 68.6
Cigarettes 92.6 28.6
Glassware 76.7 -
Cement 53.3 51.0
Textiles 64.6 61.6
Leather 52.8 41.2
Shoes 77.8 50.2
Beer 98.5 75.0
Bicycles 15.0 16.9
SOURCE: Tanzania Govt. (1982b: 62)
Additional representation of the fact that the decline in industrial 
output was mainly related to the foreign exchange crises of 1974-75 
and 1978-81 can be found in Appendix 16, which shows the index of 
production levels for some industries, with 1970 taken as the 
statistical base year.
Other factors in the decline of industrial output have been 
mentioned by other writers. They include lengthy durations of 
project implementation and the under-utilization that is not 
related to the lack of imported inputs but to infrastructural 
problems such as power or water supply interruptions 
(Tidrick/World Bank, 1977). These had only a minor impact, since 
the range of industries that they affected was much more limited. 
Moreover, for them to have been major causes, it has to be assumed
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that the decline was persistent, and that it occurred outside periods 
of foreign exchange crises. This was not the case.
(c) Special productivity problems of Tanzanian industry
One of the arguments that attracted considerable attention in the 
country in the late 70s was that labour in Tanzanian industry was 
not productive. The argument did not suggest that the inefficiency 
of labour was the cause of the 1974-75 and 1978-81 declines. It 
simply proposed that if labour was more productive it would help 
industry withstand some of the 'externally-induced shocks', 
especially in contributing to the competitiveness of industrial goods 
in external markets when the foreign exchange crisis made an 
increase in industrial exports a necessity. The argument differed 
from the popular journalistic image of African wage earners and 
managers as being inherently inefficient. It also differed from the 
assumption that the industry was over-manned, a result of 
employment policies, since this referred only to under-employment 
without being relevant to levels of output. The assumed over­
manning of industry did not necessarily affect profitability, since 
declining real wage rates over the years (indicated by the last 
column of Appendix 18) cancelled its impact. What seemed to be 
relevant to the argument was therefore the absence of incentives.
The argument was that due to labour laws, which made it 
extremely difficult to dismiss non-performing workers 
(Tidrick/W orld Bank, 1977; Jackson, 1979), and because 
remuneration was based on time spent at work rather than on 
results, there was no incentive for employees to work harder 
(Tidrick/World Bank, 1977). Some group bonuses were in certain 
instances paid to units or companies that exceeded targets, 
although there were many difficulties in determining realistic
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targets as well as the differing non-worker productivity factors of 
various industries.
There is no doubt that the labour laws and regulations (such as 
those related to workers' participation in decision-making) 
safeguarded the employment and integrity of workers.13 They 
were a positive step forward to the extent that they replaced a 
'commandist' approach to labour relations and the uncertainty of 
conditions of employment, both of which were a legacy of 
colonialism. However, it is also w idely believed that the 
introduction of the famous paragraph 15 of the Party Guidelines 
(Mwongozo) in 1971, which strove to create equality between the 
leaders and those that they led, resulted in a neglect of responsibility 
and the lack of accountability. This was what some referred to as 
'the release of production relations before their time', and was a 
function of the increasing dominance of the socialistic aspect of the 
development strategy. It strengthened the situation of ’neither 
sanction for non-performance nor incentives for working harder’.
The fact that in 1981 the parliament passed an act - The Incomes, 
Prices and Productivity Policy - which emphasized the importance 
of payment by results as well as bonuses, and created a body to 
oversee its implementation, demonstrates that the lack of 
incentives was at last being acknowledged as a significant problem 
by critical organs of the state.
(d) The managerial question
There are two opposing views on the management question and 
how it affects the performance of industry. On the one hand there 
are those who have argued that the foreign management agencies 
which have administered most of the important large-scale 
enterprises are new conduits for the transfer of funds from
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Tanzania to their home countries without much interest in the 
efficient performance of Tanzanian industry (Shivji, 1976; Coulson, 
1977a). It is argued that this is due largely to their guaranteed 
annual fees, their control over machinery, spare parts and inputs 
for which their home-companies or associates are usually the 
supplier, and their control of overseas sales for which their home- 
companies may be agents. The last two factors, it is argued, makes it 
possible for such managing agencies and their home companies to 
participate in the over-invoicing of imports and the under­
invoicing of exports. The foreign management of the Tanzania 
Fertilizer Company (Kloeckner), the Tanzania Instant Coffee 
(Nestles) and the Tanzania Publishing House (Macmillan) are 
believed to have been among those which collected large sums in 
fees and yet were themselves the cause of the poor performance of 
those companies. Case studies done on these appear to support the 
contention (Coulson, 1977b; Hutchinson, 1977; Jones, 1981: 177-179). 
Brooke Bond Liebig, the former joint owners and managing agents 
of the Tanzania Packers Limited with a dominant position in world 
meat markets, are believed to have under-invoiced TPL's products 
for many consecutive years - one of the reasons the government 
took full control of the industry in 1974 (Jones, 1981: 152). It is of 
course difficult to calculate the cost of such malpractices, and 
therefore this debate is never really resolved.
It is clear that the basic fee paid to foreign management agencies 
was a fixed amount. Information from most agreements shows that 
the standard fixed rate in the late 1970s and the early 1980s was 
about US$300,000 per annum.14 Depending on the extent of the
services, the foreign management agency could demand an 
additional 1% of sales and 4-6% of profits. If there were no
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m alpractices of the above-mentioned nature, these fees do not 
appear to have been excessively burdensome.
Attitudes within the government and the holding parastatals 
tow ards foreign m anagem ent tended to differ. Among the 
parastatals, the NDC generally tended to favour m anagem ent 
agreem ents while TEXICO (textiles) usually saw their importance 
chiefly as necessary links in the creation of a rapport with external 
donors and equity partners. Some governm ent ministries were 
sufficiently concerned with the doubts being raised about foreign 
m anagem ent agreements to keep the debate alive throughout the 
1970s. DevPlan was particularly concerned w ith the lack of 
in fo rm atio n  and co-operation  from  NDC in scru tin iz ing  
m anagem ent agreem ents w ith foreign com panies, w hile the 
Ministry of M anpower Development lamented the fact that little 
effort had been made by foreign management agencies in preparing 
T anzanians to take over, as stipu la ted  by the agreem ents 
(Manpower, 1976: 25).
On the other hand there was the argument that in the foreseeable 
future, Tanzanian industry could only be run efficiently by foreign 
m anagers because they had the expertise and experience which 
lacked in Tanzania (World Bank, 1975). This in fact was only partly 
true; it applied to specific areas of management. Often it was 
assum ed that there  w ere still no Tanzanians w ith  form al 
m anagerial qualifications. The assumption was based on readily 
dem onstrable statistical evidence of the num ber of qualified 
m anagers on the country's m anpow er list. The num ber was 
certainly quite sm all, but so were the num ber of industrial 
establishments, or indeed the volume of manufacturing business, 
undoubtedly the num ber was not enough for the existing plants,
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but, especially in general management, the shortfall was not large 
either - a function of a consistent training policy for manpower self- 
sufficiency which came into existence in the early sixties. In general 
there was a reasonable growth of local general managerial expertise; 
it did not lag behind existing rates of capacity expansion.
It should be borne in mind that many of the Tanzanian staff had 
worked with their enterprises for a long time, some since the 
beginning. At Mwatex, middle level Tanzanian managers were 
emphatic that they knew more about running a textile corporation 
than the (foreign) top management that had been brought in by 
TEXICO, consequent to the expansion and aid agreement with the 
World Bank, and that they were formally more qualified than some 
of the latter. They clearly resented their 'denigration' by TEXICO, 
and were keen to point out that Mwatex's output was consistently 
lower after the expansion, when their say in the running of the 
affairs of the corporation was lessened. In reality the persistently 
poor performance of Mwatex after the expansion was a combination 
of the 'go- slow' attitudes of the resentful, experienced employees, 
the worsening of the water and power supply problems and, above 
all, the increasing unavailability of foreign exchange for spare parts. 
There was at least one lesson though, that in conditions of foreign 
exchange scarcity for inputs, foreign management could also be as 
helpless as a local management team. Mwatex's middle level 
management may have exaggerated their importance, but in many 
plants Tanzanian managers believed that it was not possible for 
foreign managers to run Tanzanian companies better, given the 
same resources. This is because many of the Tanzanian had more 
than ten years of experience in running the plants in that particular 
environment. It was useful, however, they generally argued, to
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maintain a few foreign consultants or co-managers for two reasons. 
Firstly, although individual foreign managers were themselves not 
necessarily experienced, their parent companies usually were. 
Secondly, the parent companies were usually  im portant (and 
sometimes critical) equity partners, creditors, or overseas marketing 
monopolies whose goodwill and m anagerial co-operation could 
mean the survival of a Tanzanian industry.
The major issue raised here by these conflicting views is that an 
optim al m anagem ent arrangem ent could help  an em battled  
industry handle the problems better; it is not suggested that the 
decline in industry that we have discussed was caused by the lack of 
appropriate management.
The aspect of management that lagged behind was the technical 
one (involving production managers and engineers) which often 
m ust be handled by specialists in the relevant production processes. 
This was consistent w ith the country 's level of scientific and 
technological developm ent, and was partly  a result of having 
concentrated early efforts on producing social scientists from the 
high level educational institutions in the country and abroad. This 
bias was perhaps justified in the early days when national control 
and  a d m in is tra tio n  by local peop le  w ere the im p o rtan t 
considerations. But in the 80s the governm ent appeared to be 
m oving aw ay from  this bias; it reg istered  its in ten tion  to 
concentrate on developing a scientific and technological manpower 
capacity (Tanzania Govt., 1982b: 181).
6.7 Concluding observations on industry
We have emphasized that the 1961-69 period was characterized by 
a surge in industrial activities, especially around 1965-66, and
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dominated by large-scale plants. We have stressed that the growth 
in industrial activities was accompanied by shortcomings, which 
included unsuitable machinery, poor planning for location, 
markets, inputs and inter-industry linkages, as well as a 
preoccupation with demand-led industrialization which did not 
question the structure of industry. But as we conclude we should 
note that mistakes pertaining to the establishm ent and 
characteristics of particular plants can be made in any economy, and 
that the lack of attention to structure plagues many Third World 
industrializers. The specific thing to note in relation to Tanzania is 
that at that time there was a greater likelihood that these 
shortcomings would emerge, owing to the limited number of 
people with high-level technical knowledge, the lack of industrial 
experience and the fact that it was a period of rapid changes not 
conducive to thorough and lengthy appraisals.
More importantly, from the point of view of those making 
particular investment decisions, the ultimate goal was that the 
level of industrial production be stepped up; and for those making 
the more general decisions (especially soon after Arusha, when the 
major shareholders in all important industries became Tanzanian 
organizations) that a significant level of national control of industry 
be established. When these considerations are given weight, and in 
comparing it with the previous era, the 1961-69 industrial 
expansion was a positive effort towards the creation of a process of 
non-dependent development. As we noted in Chapter Three, the 
increase in industrial activity and national control of the economy 
are important first steps towards that process.
The beginning of the 1969-81 period was also the time when the 
egalitarian and welfarist principles of the Arusha Declaration were
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taking root. The policy on industry in 1969-74 to an extent reflected 
the growing influence of the nationalist authors of the declaration 
in development planning, hitherto a preserve of conventional 
growth economists, even though the nationalists regarded industry 
with suspicion because of its greater disposition to being foreign- 
dominated. In the broad aims of the policy, there was a recognition 
of the need for a restructuring of industry generally, the importance 
of a capital goods sector of industry, the necessity to develop local 
managerial and technical expertise for the running of industry, and 
the value of going beyond the profitability criteria for establishing 
industry, to include social and long-term goals. Although the goal of 
attaining local manpower self-sufficiency in general management 
appears to have been pursued more vigorously, no special ranking 
or priority was assigned to these aspects. Thus, during 
implementation it was the usual preference for Import Substituting 
Industrialization and profitability criteria that were overriding.
In the 1976-81 phase the formulation of an industry policy 
committed to a restructuring of industry, and, through it, the 
economy, took place in the form of the Basic Industry Strategy (BIS). 
This policy recognized the centrality of the capital goods sector in a 
programme of industrialization, stressing in particular the need to 
develop the iron and steel as well as the metal-working industries. 
There was a special Tanzanian emphasis on the need to marry the 
capital goods sector with the basic needs of the people, thus avoiding 
attempts at constructing an unfriendly and detached 'heavy 
industry'. The BIS was only launched in 1978, so that, until then, 
implementation in the industrial sector was still largely guided by 
the 'half-hearted' commitment to restructuring characteristic of the 
Second Five Year Plan. In addition, the BIS began to operate at a
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time of great economic difficulties, when industrial performance 
throughout the country was poor. Yet, in the expansion of industrial 
capacity that continued to take place, the prominent activities were 
the establishment of metal-working industries and the promotion 
of inter-industry linkages (mostly in the provision of inputs). Both 
were clearly BIS goals, thus demonstrating consistence and 
commitment in this respect.
After these efforts at industrialization, Tanzania's industry was 
still small, even compared to neighbouring Kenya, where the 
growth of manufacturing in the 1970-82 period was 9%, as against 
Tanzania's 0.5% (World Development Report, 1984). But the 
expansion was quite consistent, and the diversification significant, 
throughout the 1961-81 period. In its BIS phase, industrialization 
still enjoyed support and consistence, since implementation of its 
programme was still going on despite general economic adversity, 
its higher costs and its lower 'immediate returns'.
Footnotes to Chapter Six:
1 The number of 'industrial' establishments actually quoted by the
industrial census of 1965 was 569. Among these there were 110 
sisal 'processing' and 30 cotton ginning establishments 
(Tanzania Govt., 1968: 60; Rweyemamu, 1973: 112). It is the 
exclusion of these that brings the total down to 429.
2 Generally the post-colonial records have followed these criteria.
3 Rweyemamu (1973) classifies the meat-canning activity of
Tanganyika Packers as 'export-propelled' industrialization (to 
use his term). Having been established jointly by the colonial
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administration in Tanganyika and the British Liebig company 
(later Brooke Bond-Liebig) to supply meat as well as earn dollars 
for Britain, the plant exported virtually all of its output. The 
subsidiary of the Metal Box Company was established in 
Tanganyika to meet the packing requirements of Tanganyika 
Packers and other meat extract companies overseas, and as such 
was itself fully geared towards export. Rweyemamu classifies as 
luxury those industries turning out products that are consumed 
mostly by 'high-income' people. He specifies beverages as some 
of the 'luxury' products around the time of independence. This 
of course includes the Coca Cola drinks. In his definition, grain 
milling was the only significant industry that was both non 
luxury and internally orientated.
4 Most of this and the subsequent information in this subsection has
been compiled from files in the Ministry of Industries, the 
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (especially for the 
1965-66 period), selected NDC annual reports in the period 1971- 
80, Jones (1981) and TISCO (1981).
5 That the importation of certain consumer goods which could all be
produced domestically was allowed to continue may at first 
appear insignificant, since external trade is necessary. But this 
must be seen in the context of one of the principles of the BIS, 
which was to meet domestic production through the 
development and use of local materials as far as possible. Thus 
self-sufficiency in some lines of manufactured consumer goods, 
as well as the lowering of expectations (including consumption
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Standards) would be understandable. More importantly, it 
should also be seen that even though no one had at any time 
envisaged a plan for self-sufficiency in manufactured consumer 
goods, both the BIS authors and the supporters of the traditional 
ISI had a strongly-held philosophical viewpoint that home 
production must initially be the goal of industrialization, with 
increased levels of exports and imports arising (in a later 
period) from such home production. It is for this reason that 
the sensitivity to consumer expectations in the BIS can be seen 
to have been significant.
6 Details of this information are available at the Ministry of
Planning and Economic Affairs.
7 Significantly so since the 'maximum growth' strategy would have
allocated less than the BIS in the area of intermediate inputs, 
notably chemicals.
8 Even where there are similarities, differences of funding would
emerge if the long twenty-year duration was broken into 
phases, indicating priorities of investment in each division - 
w hat development planners in Tanzania have called 
sequencing.
9 The inclusion of the paper and pulp industry in the Third Five
Year Development Plan was indicative of a strong fast-growing 
market for paper products; paper usage increases dramatically 
with industrial expansion and other advances in the economy.
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It was also an indication of the high linkage effects of paper (its 
main raw material, timber, is abundant in Tanzania while its 
products are crucial to the print industry). The paper and pulp 
project was seen as having the potential for cutting imports (at 
the beginning of the Third Plan Tanzania imported all its paper 
requirements), and the potential for earning foreign exchange 
through sales to neighbouring countries (the capacity of the 
planned project, 60,000 tons of paper per annum, was well above 
the 1980 domestic demand of 44,870 tons).
10 A couple of feasibility studies on the production of surphuric 
acid, written by DevPlan staff, testify to this.
11 This is what was known as the 'do or die' national survival 
campaign (’kilimo cha kufa na kupona’ in kiswahili).
12 Both the World Bank and the IMF had wanted a more general 
policy of economic liberalization, for which the IMF in 
particular has received legendary Third World condemnation.
13 Mapolu (1979) has argued a view contrary to this, that there was
no real participation of workers in practice.
14 This information was obtained from a variety of documents at
the National Development Corporation (NDC) and the 
National Textile Corporation (TEXICO). Most of the following 
discussion is based on those documents, some files of the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning
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(DevPlan), and personal interviews conducted at Mwanza 
Textile Limited (Mwatex) and the Steel Rolling Mill in Tanga.
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CHAPTER SEVEN : SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Most of the opposition to an anti-dependence strategy of 
development revolves around the questions whether it is necessary, 
and if so, whether it is possible. The latter question has two aspects. 
The first of those aspects is a questioning of the possibility of an 
"economically small" country to pursue such a policy consistently, 
and whether it can yield benefits especially of an economic kind.
By looking at the literature in Chapter One and Two, We think 
we established at the theoretical level that for most of the Third 
World countries it is necessary to have an anti-dependence strategy 
in order to facilitate further development, although such a strategy 
must take cognizance of concrete conditions in each country. We 
also saw in those chapters that a fundamental factor in a successful 
pursuit of an anti-dependence strategy of development is 
industrialization, and that in particular the production of what are 
generally referred to as capital goods must form a significant part of 
that industrialization. While still at the theoretical level, in Chapter 
Three we think we established that it is possible for many Third 
World countries to pursue the strategy consistently and have success 
in the economic field. We did that by looking at a few examples 
around the world which existing empirical literature has brought to 
light. The examples emphasized the fact that the strategy can vary 
greatly in form and degree, these differences being due to the 
peculiarity of political and economic factors of each country at the 
particular time of the strategy. More importantly the examples 
emphasized that industrialization must be the fundamental aspect 
of the strategy.
In view of the central role of industrialization in development 
and in the elimination fo dependence, it was taken to be the leading 
criterion for evaluating the significance of a strategy of an anti­
dependence strategy of development in Tanzania. Accordingly the 
discussion of the nature of industrialization best suited to bring this 
about was extended in chapter Three, highlighting in particular the 
shortcoming of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) and the 
importance of basic industries. In other words, what Chapter Three 
did, in addition to discussing the examples of other countries and 
their lessons, was to work out the standards that would be used to 
judge whether the Tanzanian strategy would be capable of effecting 
an anti-dependence process of development.
In Chapter Four we showed through a review of the history of 
the country that no conditions of significance for modern or further 
development had been created at the time of independence; that in 
addition, control of and influence over economic processes by 
externally-based forces had been created at the time of colonialism, 
that channels likely to reproduce such control in the future already 
existed; and that such control was in some cases likely to prove 
detrimental to further development, as it had sometimes done in 
the past.
In Chapter Five we pointed out the immediate circumstances 
that, when combined with the history of low development and lack 
of national control over the economy, led almost inevitably to a 
decision by the leadership to embark on an anti-dependence strategy. 
We also examined the initial formulation of that strategy of 
development, noted in particular its nationalistic thrust contrasted 
with its socialistic aspect which others have usually highlighted in 
the past, and attempted to judge the degree of commitment to the
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strategy in the formulation itself, keeping in mind the guidance of 
the standards we set out in Chapter Three. The more direct 
assessment of an anti-dependence strategy of development began in 
this chapter. We found that especially with the nationalizations, the 
policy was directed at reducing the level of external control. But we 
also argued that initially the policies that formed the strategy 
suffered from a degree of 'reactive' response and were ambiguous in 
some areas. We noted the efforts to emphasize the socialistic aspects 
of the strategy, important in other respects of course but also 
containing the danger of upstaging the anti-dependence aspect and 
thus causing a delay in strengthening it. We noted in particular the 
failure initially to construct an industrial programme, let alone 
emphasize its centrality in the strategy.
In Chapter Six, while still keeping in mind the guidance of the 
standards of judgment we spelt out in Chapter Three, we examined 
the process of implementation of the anti-dependence strategy of 
development by looking at efforts at creating an industrial base, 
production levels and, above all, the consistency in the 
commitment to the strategy in its subsequent elaborations and in 
other policies complementing it.
Notable in the chapter was the continuing delay in the 
formulation of an industrial programme devoted to changing the 
structure of industry as well influencing the structure of the 
economy as whole, despite a mention of it in the Second Five Year 
Plan. A promise to formulate such a programme was made, but we 
noted that the actual industrial projects as well as other aspects of 
the industry section of the Plan were likely to reinforce the previous 
pattern of industrial development, with import substitution still 
dominant. Significant growth of industry which had been ushered
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in w ith the coming of independence, and had accelerated from 
about 1965/1966, continued. If desired industry was not yet on the 
agenda, at least some consistent efforts at industrialization were 
being m ade, and this was not negative to an anti-dependence 
strategy of development; it could have been worse - a total devotion 
to agriculture and the complete neglect of industry as some aspects 
of the Arusha Declaration had suggested could have occurred.
A rem edy to the hesitation in form ulating an industria l 
programme for structural change and for creating an industrial base 
in the country finally came with the launching of the Basic Industry 
Strategy (BIS) in 1976, and much of the remainder of the material in 
chapter six was about this programme. In it we found that the BIS 
demonstrated a deeper commitment to an anti-dependence strategy 
by its stated goals, and by the level of implementation considering 
the constraints on it.
In general therefore, there was a significant adherence to stated 
policy. Some aspects of stated policy were not adhered to due to 
practical "interventions" of an economic nature, and some of these 
constraints were predictable from the point of view of theory.
In terms of the overall impact of the Tanzania anti-dependence 
strategy, and of its accompanying industrialization policy, several 
things can be noted. Tanzania was still a small economy in 1981, 
with a very small industrial base, low levels of education, and, of 
course, a very poor populace, despite genuine people-oriented 
policies. It w as, to use the dependence phrase, still quite 
underdeveloped. Its reliance on aid for sustenance, or even 
survival, was increasing, even though not d isproportionately  
com pared  w ith  sim ilar countries, such as Kenya (W orld 
Development Report, 1984). In addition Tanzania was still suffering
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from a trade-based vulnerability, though it had shifted this a bit 
from being dominated by the United Kingdom to being dominated 
by the European Economic Community (EEC), partly as a result of 
the community's export stabilization scheme (STABEX) involving 
Afro-Caribbean and pacific nations under the LOME 1 agreement 
(Asante, 1981).1
Despite a small increase in manufactured exports in later years of 
the period studied, the role of the unprocessed agricultural products 
in earning foreign exchange remained unaltered. The country 
remained as vulnerable to the fluctuations of terms of trade as ever, 
on account of this dominance of the economy by the export of 
primary products.
Industry itself, especially the basic industry thrust, remained 
quite vulnerable. As seen earlier, the BIS is not fully supported by 
the growth economists, who still dominate economic decision­
making, because of its high costs. When this is combined with the 
increasing donor pressure, led by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank, for balanced budgets, free markets and 
the removal of protectionism, the entire industry may die out even 
before it begins to have a truly beneficial socio-economic impact. A 
stronger nationalist group may resist all these internal and external 
pressures to salvage the programme of industrialization, but then it 
would need to raise funds to keep it afloat. It would entail, among 
other things, an overburdening taxation (or curtailment of 
consumption) and control, which is what the group that authored 
the Arusha Declaration tried to do, with the consequence of losing 
political favour.
By the low standard of industrialization in the region, 
Tanzania's experience in industry may have been quite useful. The
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fact that in the attempts at collective self-reliance (Amin, 1977b), 
represented by the Southern African Development Co-ordinating 
Committee (SADCC), Tanzania was assigned the role of co­
ordinating industry may have been a recognition of its relative 
advance in this field.
Thus the greatest benefit of questioning dependence to Tanzania 
may have been the experience gained, and the raising of the level of 
awareness of the mechanism of dependence, apart from putting the 
process of anti-dependence itself into train. The anti-dependence 
process may not survive at the economic level; the experience and 
awareness is likely to.
This is not the place to start a new debate, but it does not appear 
that Tanzania fared much worse in overall economic performance 
in the duration covered by the anti-dependence strategy, as 
Appendix 22 may indicate. Moreover, as chapter five and six 
showed, Tanzania's movement towards anti-dependence was 
almost inevitable, considering the long duration of economic 
'neglect' and dependence, especially in comparison with the closest 
neighbour and competitor, Kenya.
The theoretical part of an anti-dependence strategy shows that 
it is the only way to start moving forward faster for some of the 
countries that are late starters in industrialization and have 'small 
economies' at the beginning. The Tanzanian case does not 
contradict this, and it demonstrates that the deficiencies that exist in 
the process of carrying out that strategy are due mainly to lost 
opportunities resulting from lesser implementation capabilities and, 
to a lesser extent, from policy omissions that left out important anti­
dependence requirements.
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1. STABEX encouraged a diversion of trade towards the EEC where an 
ACP country had an export crop that was included in the scheme. The 
scheme compensated producers for loss of revenue due to a decline 
in terms of trade for the designated crop (usually a valuable raw 
material not produced in the EEC). ACP recipients were encouraged 
to increase trade with the EEC in this scheme because a condition of 
eligibility for the insurance was that the EEC would not be 
discriminated against. LOME 1 was formally launched in 1975. 
Tanzanian's top three export crops were included in this scheme in 
the duration of its operation.
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